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pypi-publish action revocation of CA in the chain that Sigstore uses in Trusted Publishing and Digital Attestations for PyPIGHSA-5xjx-3w67-w9x9

GHSA-5xjx-3w67-w9x9 is a security vulnerability in pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish. A fix is available for pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 30, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
📦pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects GitHub Actions packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The pypi-publish action versions before 1.14.2 used to bundle the emSign root CA trust store certificate through the certifi distribution. It has since been removed through the bundle and the new version no longer includes them.

Details

The certifi-provided TLS trust store is typically used by many projects in the Python ecosystem, including Sigstore that pypi-publish relies on for Trusted Publishing and Digital Attestations.

Related

The external compromise is being tracked at https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦GitHub Actionspypa/gh-action-pypi-publishall versions1.14.3

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish to 1.14.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5xjx-3w67-w9x9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The [pypi-publish action][pypi-publish] versions before 1.14.2 used to bundle the `emSign` root CA trust store certificate through the `certifi` distribution. It has since been removed through the bundle and the new version no longer includes them. [pypi-publish]: https://github.com/marketplace/actions/pypi-publish ### Details The `certifi`-provided TLS trust store is typically used by many projects in the Python ecosystem, including Sigstore that [pypi-publish] relies on for Trusted Publishing and Digital Attestations. ### Related The external compromise is being tracked at
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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pypi-publish action revocation of CA in the chain that…