Mistune inline_parser: quadratic-time parsing on long runs of `**x**` and `***x***` emphasis pairsGHSA-4j32-57v6-6g45
HIGHFix: lepture/mistune@5de41fbGHSA-4j32-57v6-6g45 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-407 vulnerability in mistune. A fix is available for mistune — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-4j32-57v6-6g45.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-4j32-57v6-6g45 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 384,534 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
mistuneReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Type: Algorithmic-complexity DoS in core emphasis parsing. A long sequence of well-formed **x** (strong) or ***x*** (strong-emphasis combined) pairs causes O(N²) parser work. Distinct from the bracket-bomb DoS ([ repetition) and from the formatting-plugin DoS (~~/==/^^); this one fires on default-config mistune with no plugins required.
File: src/mistune/inline_parser.py lines 41-48 (the EMPHASIS_END_RE family) and the surrounding emphasis dispatch.
Root cause: for every opening run of *s the parser scans forward using one of EMPHASIS_END_RE['*'] / ['**'] / ['***'] to find the matching close. Each scan is bounded per call, but the parser invokes the scan from every potential start position. For input shaped **x** repeated N times, every ** is treated as a potential start, each scan can cover up to the end of input. Total work is O(N²). The triple-emphasis variant ***x*** is slightly worse due to the extra alternation between *, **, and *** close patterns. Reproducible against default mistune with no plugins.
Affected Code
File: src/mistune/inline_parser.py, lines 41-48.
EMPHASIS_END_RE = {
"*": re.compile(r"(?:" + PREVENT_BACKSLASH + r"\\\*|[^\s*])\*(?!\*)"),
"_": re.compile(r"(?:" + PREVENT_BACKSLASH + r"\\_|[^\s_])_(?!_)\b"),
"**": re.compile(r"(?:" + PREVENT_BACKSLASH + r"\\\*|[^\s*])\*\*(?!\*)"),
"__": re.compile(r"(?:" + PREVENT_BACKSLASH + r"\\_|[^\s_])__(?!_)\b"),
"***": re.compile(r"(?:" + PREVENT_BACKSLASH + r"\\\*|[^\s*])\*\*\*(?!\*)"),
"___": re.compile(r"(?:" + PREVENT_BACKSLASH + r"\\_|[^\s_])___(?!_)\b"),
}
# Each of the six end-patterns is invoked from every emphasis open position
# fired by the inline rule `r"\*{1,3}(?=[^\s*])|\b_{1,3}(?=[^\s_])"`. The
# scan itself is bounded per call; the cost comes from the parser invoking
# the scan at every matching open marker, giving O(N²) total work.
Why it's wrong: same shape as the formatting-plugin and bracket-bomb DoS findings. The CommonMark reference parser handles emphasis in linear time using a delimiter-stack algorithm (commonmark.js, commonmark-py, markdown-it-py all do this). mistune retries the close-scan from each open marker. The bounded regex is not enough; the surrounding loop is the source of the quadratic.
Exploit Chain
- Application uses mistune to render user-supplied markdown. No plugins required — affects the default
mistune.create_markdown()configuration. - Attacker submits a 40 KB payload of
**x**repeated 8000 times. - Server CPU pegs for ~4 seconds; 16 KB → ~17 seconds. Doubling input quadruples time.
- Repeating the request floods the worker pool.
Security Impact
Severity: sec-high. Network-reachable, no authentication, no plugin requirement. Default mistune is vulnerable.
Attacker capability: O(N²) CPU cost from a single small input. Predictable scaling, easy to combine with concurrent requests for service denial.
Preconditions: application uses mistune.create_markdown() (default config) on attacker-supplied markdown. No plugins required.
Differential: PoC-verified against [email protected], default config:
import mistune, time
md = mistune.create_markdown() # no plugins
for n in [500, 1000, 2000, 4000, 8000]:
s = '**x**' * n
t = time.time()
md(s)
print(f' **x** * {n} ({len(s)}b): {(time.time() - t) * 1000:.0f}ms')
# Output (Python 3.13, Linux, 2.5GHz CPU):
# **x** * 500 (2500b): 20ms
# **x** * 1000 (5000b): 74ms
# **x** * 2000 (10000b): 284ms
# **x** * 4000 (20000b): 1079ms
# **x** * 8000 (40000b): 4309ms
# Triple-emphasis is similar:
md('***x***' * 4000) # ~1500ms
# Linear in N for non-emphasis input of comparable size:
md('xxxxx' * 8000) # 1ms (4000x faster)
The patched build (with the suggested fix below — delimiter-stack rewrite or hard cap on simultaneous open markers) keeps the time linear in N.
Suggested Fix
Cap the number of unmatched opening emphasis markers the parser will track simultaneously, treating the rest as literal text:
--- a/src/mistune/inline_parser.py
+++ b/src/mistune/inline_parser.py
@@ ... in the emphasis-handling code path
+ # Bound the number of open emphasis markers tracked. CommonMark gives
+ # no semantics to deeply nested unmatched emphasis; this cap turns the
+ # parser-level O(N^2) into O(N) for adversarial inputs while preserving
+ # behaviour on every realistic markdown document.
+ MAX_OPEN_EMPHASIS = 100
+ if open_emphasis_count > MAX_OPEN_EMPHASIS:
+ # treat remaining * / _ as literal text
+ ...
The proper fix is a delimiter-stack pass, the same approach the formatting-plugin advisory and the bracket-bomb advisory recommend. All three DoS findings share the same algorithmic pattern; a single rewrite of the inline-token retry loop closes them together. Add a regression test asserting that md('**x**' * 50_000) completes in under 1 second.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | mistune | all versions | 3.3.0pip install --upgrade 'mistune==3.3.0' |
Affected Products
mistunemistune_projectDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for mistune, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update mistune to 3.3.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-4j32-57v6-6g45 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
This denial of service flaw in the Mistune Markdown parser can be triggered by processing specially crafted Markdown input containing excessive emphasis pairs. This can lead to resource exhaustion and service unavailability in applications utilizing Mistune, where user-controlled Markdown input is processed. Red Hat…
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.Source: Red Hat security advisory for GHSA-4j32-57v6-6g45 (CC BY 4.0)
Frequently Asked Questions
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