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🐍 PyPI

GHSA-49gj-c84q-6qm9

Picklescan is missing detection when calling built-in python cProfile.run

Published
Aug 26, 2025
Updated
Aug 26, 2025
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍picklescan

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Using cProfile.run function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file.

Details

The attack payload executes in the following steps:

First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to cProfile.run function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.

PoC

import cProfile

class EvilCProfileRun:
    def __reduce__(self):
        # cProfile.run(statement) -> Profile().run(statement) -> exec(statement)
        return cProfile.run, ("__import__('os').system('whoami')",)

Impact

Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.

Corresponding

https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIpicklescanall versions0.0.30

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for picklescan. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update picklescan to 0.0.30 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-49gj-c84q-6qm9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-49gj-c84q-6qm9 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-49gj-c84q-6qm9. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Using cProfile.run function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. ### Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to cProfile.run function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. ### PoC ``` import cProfile class EvilCProfileRun: def __reduce__(self):
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-49gj-c84q-6qm9 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-49gj-c84q-6qm9 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.