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HIGH severity

ArcadeDB: Privilege escalation via reader role in /api/v1/command JS scripting language — arbitrary host file readGHSA-48qw-824m-86pr

HIGH

GHSA-48qw-824m-86pr is a high-severity (CVSS 7.7) Improper Privilege Management vulnerability in com.arcadedb:arcadedb-server. A fix is available for com.arcadedb:arcadedb-server — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-65831
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 25, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-48qw-824m-86pr.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs48th percentile — riskier than 48% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.10%0.43%0.76%1.10%0.6%0.6%Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-48qw-824m-86pr by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 395,492 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
☕com.arcadedb:arcadedb-server

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

A user holding only reader (read-only) privileges on a single database could execute arbitrary JVM code by sending a "language": "js" command to the POST /api/v1/command/{database} HTTP endpoint, and use it to read arbitrary files on the host filesystem (e.g. /etc/passwd, configuration files), outside the scope of the database itself.

Two cooperating defects made this possible:

  1. Missing authorization on the scripting path (CWE-863 / CWE-269). Polyglot script execution (js and other GraalVM languages) never went through the database authorization checks applied to SQL/Cypher, so any authenticated principal - regardless of database role - could run scripts.
  2. Sandbox whitelist bypass. The GraalVM sandbox restricts direct class lookups to a configured allowedPackages list, but a script could reach arbitrary classes by reflecting off the bound database object: database.getClass().getClassLoader().loadClass("java.io.File").

Process creation was already blocked (allowCreateProcess(false)), so the confirmed impact is host file read, not OS command execution. Confidentiality: High. Integrity/Availability: None.

This is a distinct entry point and root cause from CVE-2026-44221, CVE-2026-54076 and CVE-2026-54077, and is reproducible on builds that already contain those fixes.

Patches

The fix is applied in the engine so it covers every entry point (HTTP command, HA-forwarded commands, MCP analyze), not only the HTTP handler:

  • Polyglot script execution now requires the updateSecurity database-administrator permission on command, analyze and registerFunctions. The check runs on the request thread that carries the authenticated user and is a no-op in embedded mode and internal/system contexts (schema load, HA replication apply).
  • The GraalVM host-access policy now denies access to java.lang.Class, java.lang.ClassLoader and java.lang.reflect members, closing the reflection escape that bypassed allowedPackages - even for authorized administrators - while leaving normal method calls on bound objects and explicit Java.type(...) lookups (governed by allowedPackages) working.

Workarounds

Until upgraded, do not grant command/query access on the HTTP API to untrusted users, and treat any account that can reach /api/v1/command as capable of code execution. Note that after the fix, non-administrator accounts can no longer run js/polyglot scripts over HTTP.

Credit

Reported by @kyojune76.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
☕Mavencom.arcadedb:arcadedb-serverall versions26.7.1com.arcadedb:arcadedb-server:26.7.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for com.arcadedb:arcadedb-server, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update com.arcadedb:arcadedb-server to 26.7.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-48qw-824m-86pr is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Close the privilege gap rather than the entry point: audit which accounts, roles and service identities can reach the affected operation, drop the component to the least privilege it actually needs, and review file and directory permissions created by earlier installs — a default left in place is what makes this reachable.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact A user holding only `reader` (read-only) privileges on a single database could execute arbitrary JVM code by sending a `"language": "js"` command to the `POST /api/v1/command/{database}` HTTP endpoint, and use it to read arbitrary files on the host filesystem (e.g. `/etc/passwd`, configuration files), outside the scope of the database itself. Two cooperating defects made this possible: 1. **Missing authorization on the scripting path (CWE-863 / CWE-269).** Polyglot script execution (`js` and other GraalVM languages) never went through the database authorization checks applied to
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