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GHSA-2pg6-44cx-c49v

Fix: elixir-mint/mint@fad0914

GHSA-2pg6-44cx-c49v is a CWE-93 vulnerability in mint. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-2pg6-44cx-c49v is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

mint has potential CRLF injection in its HTTP request line via unvalidated `method`/`target`

Also known asCVE-2026-48861EEF-CVE-2026-48861
Published
Jul 9, 2026
Updated
Jul 9, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 8, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-2pg6-44cx-c49v.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs6th percentile — riskier than 6% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.22%0.44%0.67%0.2%0.2%0.2%0.2%Jul 26Sep 26Sep 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
💧mint

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Hex packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Mint's HTTP/1 request encoder splices the caller-supplied method and target directly into the request line without character validation. An application that forwards attacker-controlled input as the HTTP method or the target to Mint.HTTP.request/5 is exposed to request-line CRLF injection, allowing the attacker to terminate the request line early, inject arbitrary headers, and pipeline a fully attacker-chosen second request onto the same TCP connection.

Details

encode_request_line/2 in lib/mint/http1/request.ex writes method and target to the wire verbatim. encode_headers/1 validates header names and values, but there is no equivalent validate_method!/1.

Mint 1.7.0 added validate_request_target/2, which rejects CRLF and other control characters in target by default and closes the path/query vector. The method field remains unvalidated, so a CRLF-bearing method such as "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nX-Smuggled: 1\r\nGET /admin" is accepted and written to the socket as-is. Bytes after the first \r\n are interpreted by the peer as an injected header, or, with a second \r\n, as an additional pipelined request.

PoC

  1. Stand up a Mint-using gateway/proxy that calls Mint.HTTP.request(conn, method, "/", [], nil) with method taken from caller input.
  2. Send a request whose forwarded method is "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nX-Smuggled-Header: pwned\r\nGET /admin/delete-everything".
  3. Observe the bytes received by the upstream server: the smuggled header line and the second request line appear verbatim in the outbound stream.

Impact

CRLF injection / HTTP request smuggling in the HTTP/1 client encoder, exploitable under default configuration whenever an application passes caller-influenced input as the HTTP method. An attacker who controls the method can inject arbitrary outbound headers (forged Host, Authorization, cache-poisoning headers) and smuggle additional, fully attacker-chosen requests to the upstream server over the same connection, potentially reaching endpoints the legitimate caller never intended to invoke.

Resources

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
💧Hexmintall versions1.9.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for mint. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update mint to 1.9.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-2pg6-44cx-c49v is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-2pg6-44cx-c49v is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-2pg6-44cx-c49v. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Mint's HTTP/1 request encoder splices the caller-supplied `method` and `target` directly into the request line without character validation. An application that forwards attacker-controlled input as the HTTP method or the target to `Mint.HTTP.request/5` is exposed to request-line CRLF injection, allowing the attacker to terminate the request line early, inject arbitrary headers, and pipeline a fully attacker-chosen second request onto the same TCP connection. ### Details `encode_request_line/2` in `lib/mint/http1/request.ex` writes `method` and `target` to the wire verbatim. `en
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-2pg6-44cx-c49v in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-2pg6-44cx-c49v across Hex dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-2pg6-44cx-c49v: mint | O3 Security