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CVE-2026-49754 — mint

Fix: elixir-mint/mint@b662d12

CVE-2026-49754 is a CWE-770 vulnerability in mint. A fix is available for mint — see the affected versions and patch details below.

HTTP/2 CONTINUATION flood in Mint client via unbounded header-block accumulation

Also known asEEF-CVE-2026-49754GHSA-2p26-p43x-fhp8
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 5, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-49754.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs42th percentile — riskier than 42% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.34%0.68%1.02%0.4%0.4%0.5%0.5%Aug 26Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
💧mint

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Hex packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Mint's HTTP/2 client accumulates CONTINUATION header-block fragments into a per-connection buffer with no cap on size or frame count. A malicious or compromised HTTP/2 server can drive the client's memory to arbitrary size by streaming an endless chain of CONTINUATION frames after a HEADERS frame that omits END_HEADERS, causing memory exhaustion and BEAM process death. A single connection to an attacker-controlled HTTP/2 endpoint is sufficient.

Details

When Mint's HTTP/2 receive path observes a HEADERS frame without the END_HEADERS flag, 'Elixir.Mint.HTTP2':handle_headers/3 parks the unparsed header-block fragment in conn.headers_being_processed. Every subsequent CONTINUATION frame on that stream is then appended to the accumulator by 'Elixir.Mint.HTTP2':handle_continuation/3.

Nothing in the receive path bounds this accumulator: there is no per-stream size cap, no CONTINUATION frame-count cap, and max_header_list_size is only enforced on outgoing requests (its default is :infinity, and the only enforcement helper inspects server_settings for request encoding, never inbound header blocks). Each CONTINUATION payload can be up to the peer-advertised SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE, so the attacker can grow headers_being_processed to arbitrary size at line rate.

PoC

  1. Stand up a raw TCP server that speaks the HTTP/2 handshake.
  2. After the client's request HEADERS arrives, respond with a HEADERS frame on stream 1 with flags = 0 (no END_HEADERS, no END_STREAM) and an empty header-block fragment.
  3. Stream CONTINUATION frames on stream 1, each with flags = 0 and a payload up to SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE. Never set END_HEADERS.
  4. The client's process memory grows linearly with the flood and the BEAM process eventually crashes with OOM.

Impact

Remote, unauthenticated denial-of-service against any process using Mint as an HTTP/2 client against an untrusted or attacker-influenced server. A single connection is sufficient to drive memory to arbitrary size and crash the BEAM process. The default Mint configuration is vulnerable; no client-side opt-in is required. Scored CVSS v4.0 8.2 (HIGH).

Workarounds

Restrict Mint to HTTP/1 on connections to untrusted servers by passing protocols: [:http1] to 'Elixir.Mint.HTTP':connect/4. This avoids the vulnerable HTTP/2 receive path entirely, at the cost of losing HTTP/2 for those connections.

Resources

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
💧Hexmintall versions1.9.0mix deps.update mint

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for mint, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update mint to 1.9.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-49754 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Mint's HTTP/2 client accumulates `CONTINUATION` header-block fragments into a per-connection buffer with no cap on size or frame count. A malicious or compromised HTTP/2 server can drive the client's memory to arbitrary size by streaming an endless chain of `CONTINUATION` frames after a `HEADERS` frame that omits `END_HEADERS`, causing memory exhaustion and BEAM process death. A single connection to an attacker-controlled HTTP/2 endpoint is sufficient. ### Details When Mint's HTTP/2 receive path observes a `HEADERS` frame without the `END_HEADERS` flag, `'Elixir.Mint.HTTP2':hand
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-49754: mint — Fixed in 1.9.0 | O3 Security