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GHSA-2hm2-hc3v-44h9

MEDIUM

Mistune toc / TableOfContents directive: heading IDs use predictable `toc_N` numbering with no slugification, allowing collision with attacker-controlled `id="toc_N"` content

Also known asCVE-2026-59930PYSEC-2026-2218
Published
Jul 20, 2026
Updated
Jul 20, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍mistune

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Description

Summary

Type: Predictable identifier generation. The toc plugin and TableOfContents directive both default to generating heading IDs of the form toc_1, toc_2, toc_3, ... with no input-derived component. An attacker who can place a heading anywhere in the document can predict which toc_N ID it will receive, and can inject HTML elsewhere (in a non-heading context) that uses the same id="toc_N" to either (a) shadow the legitimate heading anchor, breaking same-page navigation, or (b) collide with CSS or JavaScript that targets #toc_N selectors, redirecting click handlers and styling to attacker-chosen content. File: src/mistune/toc.py line 36-37 (heading_id = lambda token, index: "toc_" + str(index + 1)); src/mistune/directives/toc.py line 33 (same default). Root cause: the default heading_id callback ignores the heading's text content and uses only the headings's order in the document. Two documents rendered together (or one document with attacker-influenced headings spliced into trusted content) produce overlapping toc_N IDs. Because id attribute uniqueness is required by HTML, browsers behaviour on duplicate IDs is undefined; document.getElementById('toc_1') returns the first match, getElementsByTagName + querySelector semantics differ across paths, and CSS rules targeting #toc_1 apply to whichever element matches first in tree order.

Affected Code

File: src/mistune/toc.py, lines 33-39.

def add_toc_hook(md, min_level=1, max_level=3, heading_id=None):
    if heading_id is None:
        def heading_id(token, index):
            return "toc_" + str(index + 1)               # <-- BUG: index-only ID, no slug derived from heading text

File: src/mistune/directives/toc.py, lines 32-33.

class TableOfContents(DirectivePlugin):
    def __init__(self, min_level=1, max_level=3):
        # ...

    def generate_heading_id(self, token, index):
        return "toc_" + str(index + 1)                   # <-- BUG: same predictable scheme

Why it's wrong: the standard markdown-engine convention (used by GitHub-flavoured Markdown, Sphinx, MkDocs, pandoc, every modern markdown renderer in production) is to slugify the heading TEXT for the ID — <h1 id="introduction">Introduction</h1> — with a numeric suffix appended only when slug collisions occur. mistune's default punts the slugification entirely and produces purely positional IDs that an attacker can predict in O(1).

The downstream impacts:

  • Same-page links with [click](#toc_1) go to whichever element with id="toc_1" appears first in tree order. If the attacker can land any HTML element with id="toc_1" before the real heading (via inline_html with escape=False, via the include-directive HTML branch, via attacker-supplied content earlier in the document), navigation is hijacked.
  • CSS rules targeting #toc_1 apply to the wrong element.
  • JavaScript bound to document.getElementById('toc_1') operates on the wrong element.
  • The TOC's own <a href="#toc_1"> link in the rendered TOC list points to whichever element wins the duplicate-ID race.

Exploit Chain

  1. Application uses mistune with add_toc_hook(md) or TableOfContents directive enabled (the documented setup for sites with TOC support).
  2. Application renders an attacker-supplied document, or splices attacker content into a trusted document. With escape=False (or via the include-directive .html branch covered by my prior advisory), the attacker can place <a id="toc_1">...</a> anywhere in the document.
  3. mistune assigns id="toc_1" to the first heading. Now there are two elements with id="toc_1" in the page.
  4. The rendered TOC contains <a href="#toc_1">First heading</a>. Clicking it navigates to whichever element with id="toc_1" appears first in tree order. If the attacker placed their <a id="toc_1"> BEFORE the heading, navigation is hijacked.
  5. Same-page CSS / JS / aria-described references to #toc_1 similarly redirect.

Security Impact

Severity: sec-low. Not a direct XSS or RCE; the issue is identifier confusion that enables UI-redirection / navigation-hijack attacks. The realistic attacker capability is "make an internal anchor link go to attacker content instead of the real heading", or "make a CSS selector apply to attacker content", or "break aria/screen-reader associations". Attacker capability: with the ability to plant any HTML element with id="toc_N" in the document, hijack <a href="#toc_N"> navigation and any CSS/JS targeting that ID. With escape=False, this is straightforward. With escape=True, the attacker needs another vector to land a raw id attribute (one of the include-directive branches, a sibling tooling pipeline that lets HTML through, etc.). Preconditions: application uses TOC + the default heading_id callback. If the application provides its own heading_id (e.g., one based on slugified heading text, with collision suffixes), this finding does not apply. Differential: PoC-verified against [email protected]:

import mistune
from mistune.directives import RSTDirective, TableOfContents
md = mistune.create_markdown(plugins=[RSTDirective([TableOfContents()])])

print(md('''
.. toc::

# Heading 1

# Heading 2
'''))

# Output (note: id="toc_1" / id="toc_2", purely positional):
# <details class="toc" open>
#   <summary>Table of Contents</summary>
#   <ul>
#     <li><a href="#toc_1">Heading 1</a></li>
#     <li><a href="#toc_2">Heading 2</a></li>
#   </ul>
# </details>
# <h1 id="toc_1">Heading 1</h1>
# <h1 id="toc_2">Heading 2</h1>

The patched build (with the suggested fix below) produces text-derived slugs like id="heading-1" and id="heading-2", which are tied to content rather than position.

Suggested Fix

Default to slugifying the heading text:

--- a/src/mistune/toc.py
+++ b/src/mistune/toc.py
@@ -33,9 +33,18 @@ def add_toc_hook(md, min_level=1, max_level=3, heading_id=None):
     if heading_id is None:
+        import re
+        _slug_re = re.compile(r"[^a-z0-9]+")
+        seen = {}
         def heading_id(token, index):
-            return "toc_" + str(index + 1)
+            text = striptags(md.renderer(md.inline(token["text"], {}), BlockState()))
+            slug = _slug_re.sub("-", text.lower()).strip("-") or "section"
+            n = seen.get(slug, 0)
+            seen[slug] = n + 1
+            return slug if n == 0 else f"{slug}-{n}"

Same change applies to src/mistune/directives/toc.py:33. Existing applications that have hardcoded #toc_N anchors will break; document the migration in the changelog and consider providing an opt-out flag for the legacy behaviour. Add a regression test that asserts heading IDs are slug-derived, not position-derived, and that collisions get a -N suffix.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPImistuneall versions3.3.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for mistune. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update mistune to 3.3.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-2hm2-hc3v-44h9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-2hm2-hc3v-44h9 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-2hm2-hc3v-44h9. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary **Type:** Predictable identifier generation. The `toc` plugin and `TableOfContents` directive both default to generating heading IDs of the form `toc_1`, `toc_2`, `toc_3`, ... with no input-derived component. An attacker who can place a heading anywhere in the document can predict which `toc_N` ID it will receive, and can inject HTML elsewhere (in a non-heading context) that uses the same `id="toc_N"` to either (a) shadow the legitimate heading anchor, breaking same-page navigation, or (b) collide with CSS or JavaScript that targets `#toc_N` selectors, redirecting click handlers an
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-2hm2-hc3v-44h9 in your dependencies?

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