GHSA-2g5w-29q9-w6hx
HIGHmindsdb arbitrary file write when extracting a remotely retrieved Tarball
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
mindsdbReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
An unsafe extraction is being performed using tarfile.extractall() from a remotely retrieved tarball. Which may lead to the writing of the extracted files to an unintended location. Sometimes, the vulnerability is called a TarSlip or a ZipSlip variant.
Details
I commented the following snippet of code as a vulnerability details. The code is from file.py#L26..L134
@ns_conf.route('/<name>')
@ns_conf.param('name', "MindsDB's name for file")
class File(Resource):
@ns_conf.doc('put_file')
def put(self, name: str):
''' add new file
params in FormData:
- file
- original_file_name [optional]
'''
data = {}
... omitted for brevity
url = data['source']
data['file'] = data['name']
... omitted for brevity
with requests.get(url, stream=True) as r: # Source: retrieve the URL which point to a remotely located tarball
if r.status_code != 200:
return http_error(
400,
"Error getting file",
f"Got status code: {r.status_code}"
)
file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, data['file'])
with open(file_path, 'wb') as f:
for chunk in r.iter_content(chunk_size=8192): # write with chunks the remote retrieved file into file_path location
f.write(chunk)
original_file_name = data.get('original_file_name')
file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, data['file'])
lp = file_path.lower()
if lp.endswith(('.zip', '.tar.gz')):
if lp.endswith('.zip'):
with zipfile.ZipFile(file_path) as f:
f.extractall(temp_dir_path)
elif lp.endswith('.tar.gz'):
with tarfile.open(file_path) as f: # Just after
f.extractall(temp_dir_path) # Sink: the tarball located by file_path is supposed to be extracted to temp_dir_path.
So, a remotely available tarball is being retrieved and written to the server filesystem in chunks, and then, if the extension ends with .tar.gz of a compressed tarball, the mindsdb app applies tarfile.extractall() directly with no checks for the destination.
However, according to the following warning from the official documentation;
Warning: Never extract archives from untrusted sources without prior inspection. It is possible that files are created outside of path, e.g. members that have absolute filenames starting with "/" or filenames with two dots "..".
PoC
The following PoC is provided for illustration purposes only. It showcases the risk of extracting a non-harmless text file sim4n6.txt to one of the parent locations rather than the intended current folder.
> tar --list -v -f archive.tar.gz
tar: Removing leading "../../../" from member names
../../../sim4n6.txt
> python3
Python 3.10.6 (main, Nov 2 2022, 18:53:38) [GCC 11.3.0] on linux
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>> import tarfile
>>> with tarfile.open("archive.tar.gz") as tf:
>>> tf.extractall()
>>> exit()
> test -f ../../../sim4n6.txt && echo "sim4n6.txt exists"
sim4n6.txt exists
Attack Scenario
An attacker could craft a malicious tarball with a filename path, such as ../../../../../../../../etc/passwd, and then serve the archive remotely, proceed to the PUT request of the tarball through mindsdb and overwrite the system files of the hosting server for instance.
Mitigation
Potential mitigation could be to:
- Use a safer module, like
zipfile. - Use an alternative of
tarfile, such astarsafe. - Validate the location or the absolute path of the extracted files and discard those with malicious paths such as relative path
../../..or absolute path such as/etc/password. A simple wrapper could be written to raise an exception when a path traversal may be identified.
This is similar to the other report GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | mindsdb | all versions | 23.2.1.0 |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for mindsdb. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update mindsdb to 23.2.1.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-2g5w-29q9-w6hx is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-2g5w-29q9-w6hx is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-2g5w-29q9-w6hx. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-2g5w-29q9-w6hx in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-2g5w-29q9-w6hx across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.