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MEDIUM severity

GHSA-224p-v68g-5g8f graphql-armor-max-depth

MEDIUMFix: Escape-Technologies/graphql-armor#824

GHSA-224p-v68g-5g8f is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) vulnerability in @escape.tech/graphql-armor-max-depth. A fix is available for @escape.tech/graphql-armor-max-depth — see the affected versions and patch details below.

GraphQL Armor Max-Depth Plugin Bypass via fragment caching

Published
Aug 26, 2025
Updated
Aug 26, 2025
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 26, 2025 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

25other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@escape.tech/graphql-armor-max-depthnpm
262Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

A query depth restriction using the max-depth can be bypassed if ignoreIntrospection is enabled (which is the default configuration) by naming your query/fragment __schema.

Details

In the countDepth function, we have the following code that calculates the depth of a used fragment:

    } else if (node.kind == Kind.FRAGMENT_SPREAD) {
      if (this.visitedFragments.has(node.name.value)) {
        return this.visitedFragments.get(node.name.value) ?? 0;
      } else {
        this.visitedFragments.set(node.name.value, -1);
      }
      const fragment = this.context.getFragment(node.name.value);
      if (fragment) {
        let fragmentDepth;
        if (this.config.flattenFragments) {
          fragmentDepth = this.countDepth(fragment, parentDepth);
        } else {
          fragmentDepth = this.countDepth(fragment, parentDepth + 1);
        }
        depth = Math.max(depth, fragmentDepth);
        if (this.visitedFragments.get(node.name.value) === -1) {
          this.visitedFragments.set(node.name.value, fragmentDepth);
        }
      }
    }

which will calculate the depth of the fragment used in the current node, store the value in this.visitedFragments and re-use it in the future to avoid re-calculating the depth for the same fragment.

The issue arises when the same fragment is used multiple times, at different depths. The current caching takes into account the depth of the first occurrence, which means if the fragment is re-used later in a higher depth, this cached value is not updated.

So, for example, sending the following query with a max depth of 6:

query {
  books {
    author {
      ...Test
    }
  }
  books {
    author {
      books {
        author {
          ...Test
        }
      }
    }
  }
}
fragment Test on Author {
  books {
    title
  }
}

The first use of Test fragment does not exceed the defined limit, and this depth will be cached.

In the second use, the fragment is reused in a greater depth, but the countDepth function will still use the depth cached, without accounting for the increased depth.

PoC

Max depth: 6

query {
  books {
    author {
      ...Test
    }
  }
  books {
    author {
      books {
        author {
          ...Test
        }
      }
    }
  }
}
fragment Test on Author {
  books {
    title
  }
}

Impact

This issue affects applications using the GraphQL Armor Depth Limit plugin.

Fix

This is fixed in PR#824. We now store only the additional depth contributed by the fragment and add it to the parent depth where the fragment is used (parentDepth).

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@escape.tech/graphql-armor-max-depthall versions2.4.2npm install @escape.tech/graphql-armor-max-depth@2.4.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @escape.tech/graphql-armor-max-depth, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update @escape.tech/graphql-armor-max-depth to 2.4.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-224p-v68g-5g8f is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-224p-v68g-5g8f can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-224p-v68g-5g8f. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A query depth restriction using the max-depth can be bypassed if `ignoreIntrospection` is enabled (which is the default configuration) by naming your query/fragment `__schema`. ### Details In the `countDepth` function, we have the following code that calculates the depth of a used fragment: ```typescript } else if (node.kind == Kind.FRAGMENT_SPREAD) { if (this.visitedFragments.has(node.name.value)) { return this.visitedFragments.get(node.name.value) ?? 0; } else { this.visitedFragments.set(node.name.value, -1); } const fragment = this.c
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-224p-v68g-5g8f in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-224p-v68g-5g8f across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-224p-v68g-5g8f: Medium 5.3 severity | O3 Security