GHSA-224p-v68g-5g8f
MEDIUMGraphQL Armor Max-Depth Plugin Bypass via fragment caching
Blast Radius
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Description
Summary
A query depth restriction using the max-depth can be bypassed if ignoreIntrospection is enabled (which is the default configuration) by naming your query/fragment __schema.
Details
In the countDepth function, we have the following code that calculates the depth of a used fragment:
} else if (node.kind == Kind.FRAGMENT_SPREAD) {
if (this.visitedFragments.has(node.name.value)) {
return this.visitedFragments.get(node.name.value) ?? 0;
} else {
this.visitedFragments.set(node.name.value, -1);
}
const fragment = this.context.getFragment(node.name.value);
if (fragment) {
let fragmentDepth;
if (this.config.flattenFragments) {
fragmentDepth = this.countDepth(fragment, parentDepth);
} else {
fragmentDepth = this.countDepth(fragment, parentDepth + 1);
}
depth = Math.max(depth, fragmentDepth);
if (this.visitedFragments.get(node.name.value) === -1) {
this.visitedFragments.set(node.name.value, fragmentDepth);
}
}
}
which will calculate the depth of the fragment used in the current node, store the value in this.visitedFragments and re-use it in the future to avoid re-calculating the depth for the same fragment.
The issue arises when the same fragment is used multiple times, at different depths. The current caching takes into account the depth of the first occurrence, which means if the fragment is re-used later in a higher depth, this cached value is not updated.
So, for example, sending the following query with a max depth of 6:
query {
books {
author {
...Test
}
}
books {
author {
books {
author {
...Test
}
}
}
}
}
fragment Test on Author {
books {
title
}
}
The first use of Test fragment does not exceed the defined limit, and this depth will be cached.
In the second use, the fragment is reused in a greater depth, but the countDepth function will still use the depth cached, without accounting for the increased depth.
PoC
Max depth: 6
query {
books {
author {
...Test
}
}
books {
author {
books {
author {
...Test
}
}
}
}
}
fragment Test on Author {
books {
title
}
}
Impact
This issue affects applications using the GraphQL Armor Depth Limit plugin.
Fix
This is fixed in PR#824. We now store only the additional depth contributed by the fragment and add it to the parent depth where the fragment is used (parentDepth).
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @escape.tech/graphql-armor-max-depth | all versions | 2.4.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @escape.tech/graphql-armor-max-depth. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update @escape.tech/graphql-armor-max-depth to 2.4.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-224p-v68g-5g8f is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-224p-v68g-5g8f is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-224p-v68g-5g8f. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-224p-v68g-5g8f in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-224p-v68g-5g8f across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.