CVE-2026-82430
CVE-2026-82430 is a CWE-367 vulnerability. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-82430 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Description When launching a Docker or OCI worker, the setuid-root `worker-launcher` first changes ownership of the entire worker directory to the untrusted topology user, and only…
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-82430.
Description
Description
When launching a Docker or OCI worker, the setuid-root worker-launcher first changes ownership of the
entire worker directory to the untrusted topology user, and only afterwards reads and acts on the command
file that the supervisor wrote into that same directory. The file is opened without O_NOFOLLOW and without
re-verifying its owner, so between the ownership change and the read the tenant can replace its contents.
For the Docker path the parsed command is executed with real uid 0, and the command sanitiser is not a
privilege boundary: it admits -v with an arbitrary source, --device, --cap-add, --security-opt,
--user and --net, and copies positional arguments through verbatim. A rewritten file therefore yields an
attacker-authored, root-equivalent container invocation with the host filesystem available.
For the OCI path the same rewrite window applies, and mount validation is structural only, with no
source or destination allow-list, so arbitrary host paths can be bind-mounted read-write into the
container. The username field of the command file is likewise attacker-settable and is checked only
against non-root and minimum-uid rules, permitting execution as another tenant's uid.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the command file is validated before the ownership change and re-verified on open, and where mount sources and destinations are constrained by configuration.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should disable Docker and OCI worker isolation, or restrict topology submission on affected supervisors to trusted principals. Note that the launcher must be rebuilt and reinstalled after upgrading.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
Detection & mitigation playbook
VulnerabilityDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for the affected component. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of the affected component has shipped for CVE-2026-82430 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-82430 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to CVE-2026-82430. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-82430 in your dependencies?
O3 detects CVE-2026-82430 across dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.