CVE-2026-81505 — convoy

Summary

frain-dev/convoy (all versions up to and including v26.6.2, no patch available) lets any authenticated caller who is authorized on at least one project read ANY OTHER project's "Source" record by ID via GET /api/v1/projects/{projectID}/sources/{sourceID} -- regardless of whether that Source actually belongs to the project named in the URL. The response includes the Source's full PubSub broker configuration in plaintext (AMQP/Kafka/SQS/Google credentials), with no redaction.

Details

Handler.GetSource (api/handlers/source.go) resolves the caller's authorization against the {projectID} in the URL via retrieveProject(), then calls sources.Service.FindSourceByID(ctx, project.UID, sourceID) (internal/sources/impl.go). That function accepts a projectID parameter but never uses it:

func (s *Service) FindSourceByID(ctx context.Context, projectID, id string) (*datastore.Source, error) {
    row, err := s.repo.FetchSourceByID(ctx, common.StringToPgText(id))
    ...
}

The underlying SQL query (internal/sources/repo/queries.sql, fetchSourceByID) has no project_id predicate at all:

SELECT ... FROM convoy.sources AS s
LEFT JOIN convoy.source_verifiers sv ON s.source_verifier_id = sv.id
WHERE s.id = $1 AND s.deleted_at IS NULL

So the {projectID} in the URL only gates "is the caller authorized to view a project" -- it never re-validates that the fetched Source actually belongs to that project. LoadSourcesPaged (the list endpoint) does correctly scope by project; only the single-item GetSource lookup is affected. SourceResponse{*datastore.Source} embeds the full database record with no redaction, so if the leaked Source is an AMQP/Kafka type, its pub_sub.*.auth.password field (a live, plaintext broker credential) is returned verbatim.

Proof of Concept

1. As a test account, create "Victim Project" and an AMQP Source in it with a known broker password (verified against a real RabbitMQ broker, not just stored -- Convoy performs a live connectivity check before persisting an AMQP source).
2. As the same or a different authenticated caller, create a completely separate "Attacker Project".
3. Call GET /api/v1/projects/{attacker_project_id}/sources/{victim_source_id} -- i.e. a request whose URL and authorization check only ever resolve the Attacker project.
4. Verified in a Docker lab (convoy v26.6.2): the request returns 200 with the Victim project's full Source object, including pub_sub.amqp.auth.password matching the secret set in step 1 exactly. The response's own project_id field is the Victim project's id, never the Attacker project id used in the URL/authorization check.
5. Negative control: an otherwise-identical request for a made-up source id under the same Attacker project returns 404, confirming this is a real, ID-specific hit and not a blanket-200 endpoint.

(Community Edition license-gates org_limit=1/user_limit=1, so this PoC used one account with two projects rather than two separate companies -- the vulnerable query performs no project-ownership check regardless of license tier, so a licensed multi-org deployment has the identical exposure between genuinely different tenants.)

Impact

Any authenticated user or project-scoped API key holder who has legitimate access to at least one project on a Convoy instance can read any other project's Source configuration by ID, including plaintext third-party message-broker credentials (AMQP/Kafka/SQS/Google PubSub). In a multi-tenant deployment this is a direct cross-customer credential leak.

Fix

Add a project_id predicate to the fetchSourceByID query (and audit other single-item repository lookups reachable via a {projectID} route for the same pattern), or re-check source.ProjectID == project.UID in the handler before returning the record.

Affected / Patched

Affected: <= v26.6.2 (latest release at time of report). No patched version available.