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CVE-2026-75595 — netty-handler

Fix: netty/netty@1b5abc6

CVE-2026-75595 is a CWE-754 vulnerability in io.netty:netty-handler. A fix is available for io.netty:netty-handler — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Netty: SNI Routing Bypass via Fragmented TLS ClientHello Causing Fallback to Default SslContext

Also known asGHSA-c4c3-7fpv-j4q5
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 17, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-75595.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs25th percentile — riskier than 25% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.32%0.64%0.96%0.3%0.5%0.3%0.3%Sep 26Nov 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
☕io.netty:netty-handler☕io.netty:netty-handler

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A fragmented TLS ClientHello whose handshake header spans multiple records makes Netty silently fall back to the default SslContext; where per-SNI selection is the sole mTLS gate, an unauthenticated attacker can bypass the route's mTLS requirement.

Details

In io.netty.handler.ssl.SslClientHelloHandler#decode the guard that should wait for the 4-byte handshake header checks the wrong offset - it ignores the 5-byte record header that precedes it - and therefore never fires:

if (handshakeLength == -1) {
    if (readerIndex + 4 > endOffset) {
        // Need more data to read HandshakeType and handshakeLength (4 bytes)
        return;
    }

When the first record's payload is < 4 bytes, handshakeLength = in.getUnsignedMedium(readerIndex + SslUtils.SSL_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH + 1); leads to IndexOutOfBoundsException . That is caught by the generic catch (Exception) block, which calls select(ctx, null) - this is the default SslContext. Fallback to default on parse failure is a problem when per-SNI selection is the sole mTLS gate.

Impact

SNI routing bypass. Escalates to an unauthenticated mTLS bypass only when:

  • mTLS is enforced solely via per-SNI SslContext (clientAuth=REQUIRE)
  • the default/fallback SslContext is permissive (clientAuth=NONE/OPTIONAL)
  • no secondary peer-certificate verification exists at the application layer.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
☕Mavenio.netty:netty-handler≥ 4.2.0.Final&&< 4.2.17.Final4.2.17.Finalio.netty:netty-handler:4.2.17.Final
☕Mavenio.netty:netty-handlerall versions4.1.137.Finalio.netty:netty-handler:4.1.137.Final

Affected Products

1 product · 2 configurations
Application
nettynetty
≥ 4.2.0 && < 4.2.17
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty:netty-handler, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update io.netty:netty-handler to 4.2.17.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-75595 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatImportant

This is an Important flaw in Netty that allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass mutual TLS authentication. Applications that use Netty and rely solely on SNI-based clientAuth=REQUIRE for access control, without additional application-layer certificate verification, are vulnerable when an attacker exploits…

Workaround published by Red Hat
To mitigate this issue, ensure that application-layer certificate verification is implemented for services utilizing Netty with mutual TLS. This provides an additional layer of authentication beyond the TLS handshake, preventing unauthorized access even if the SNI routing is bypassed and a less restrictive default SslContext is used.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-75595 (CC BY 4.0)
ProductFixed inAdvisory
Red Hat build of Apache Camel 4.18.4 for Spring Boot 3.5.16netty-handlerRHSA-2026:71675
Red Hat Build of Debezium 3.6netty-handlerRHSA-2026:83612
Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.4rhbk/keycloak-operator-bundle:26.4.17-2RHSA-2026:95760
Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.4.17netty-handlerRHSA-2026:95759
Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.6rhbk/keycloak-operator-bundle:26.6.8-2RHSA-2026:95762
Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.6.8netty-handlerRHSA-2026:95761
Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 8.1netty-handlerRHSA-2026:95887

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A fragmented TLS ClientHello whose handshake header spans multiple records makes Netty silently fall back to the default SslContext; where per-SNI selection is the sole mTLS gate, an unauthenticated attacker can bypass the route's mTLS requirement. ### Details In `io.netty.handler.ssl.SslClientHelloHandler#decode` the guard that should wait for the 4-byte handshake header checks the wrong offset - it ignores the 5-byte record header that precedes it - and therefore never fires: ```java if (handshakeLength == -1) { if (readerIndex + 4 > endOffset) { // Need more data t
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-75595: netty-handler — Fixed in 4.2.17.Final