CVE-2026-73421 — next-auth
Fix: nextauthjs/next-auth@d008b9bCVE-2026-73421 is a CWE-285 vulnerability in next-auth. A fix is available for next-auth — see the affected versions and patch details below.
NextAuth.js: Configuration errors can cause existence-based auth checks to fail open (auth object populated with an error)
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-73421.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
next-authnpmDescription
Impact
next-auth (Auth.js) v5 applications that gate access by checking only for the existence of the auth object — the pattern shown in the official session management / protecting resources guide — are affected.
When the Auth.js configuration produces a server-side error, the auth object exposed by the auth() wrapper (in middleware, Route Handlers, etc.) is populated with an error object instead of being null:
{ "message": "There was a problem with the server configuration. Check the server logs for more information." }
Because this object is truthy, any authorization check of the form !!auth (or if (req.auth)) evaluates to true for every request, including unauthenticated ones. The application fails open: instead of denying access when the auth layer is broken, it grants access to everyone.
// middleware.ts — affected pattern
export default auth((req) => {
const { nextUrl, auth } = req
const isLoggedIn = !!auth // <-- always true when the configuration is broken
// ...
})
A representative trigger is a provider that is missing required configuration. For example, a Keycloak provider with neither issuer nor authorization endpoint set logs:
[auth][error] InvalidEndpoints: Provider "keycloak" is missing both `issuer` and `authorization` endpoint config. At least one of them is required.
…and from that point on auth is the error object above, so !!auth is permanently true. The same fail-open behavior occurs for other server-configuration errors (for example, an unset AUTH_SECRET).
There is no impact while the configuration is valid. The risk materializes when a previously-working deployment becomes misconfigured — e.g. an environment variable is changed or removed during a deploy — at which point existence-based auth checks silently stop protecting routes and all visitors are treated as authenticated. Because the failure mode is silent and grants access to everyone, the consequences can be severe.
This is an instance of CWE-636 (Not Failing Securely / "Failing Open") leading to improper authorization (CWE-285).
Patches
The fix ensures that a server-configuration error no longer surfaces as a truthy auth object: existence checks fail closed rather than open. This is released in next-auth@<!-- TODO: set patched version on publish -->.
To upgrade:
npm i next-auth@beta
yarn add next-auth@beta
pnpm add next-auth@beta
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, check for a concrete user/session property rather than the bare object, so a configuration-error object is not treated as an authenticated session:
// middleware.ts
export default auth((req) => {
// `auth.user` is only present on a real session; resilient to config-error objects
const isLoggedIn = !!req.auth?.user
// ...
})
As defense in depth, make Auth.js configuration errors fail loudly in your deployment pipeline (for example, treat [auth][error] log lines as a failed health check) so a broken configuration cannot silently reach production. As always, an existing session indicates authentication only — for authorization, perform an explicit role/permission check rather than relying on session existence. See the role-based access control guide.
References
- Protecting resources / session management: https://authjs.dev/getting-started/session-management/protecting
- Role-based access control (RBAC): https://authjs.dev/guides/role-based-access-control
- Auth.js error reference: https://authjs.dev/reference/core/errors
For more information
If you have any concerns, Auth.js requests responsible disclosure, outlined here: https://authjs.dev/security
Credits
Reported by @marc-zollingkoffer-syzygy.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | next-auth | ≥ 5.0.0-beta.0&&< 5.0.0-beta.32 | 5.0.0-beta.32npm install next-auth@5.0.0-beta.32 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for next-auth, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update next-auth to 5.0.0-beta.32 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-73421 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-73421 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.