NIST deprecates RSA-2048 from 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐹
🐹 Go
Not in CISA KEV
MEDIUM severity

CVE-2026-63406 — anycable

MEDIUMFix: anycable/anycable@201c67e

CVE-2026-63406 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.9) CWE-312 vulnerability in github.com/anycable/anycable. A fix is available for github.com/anycable/anycable — see the affected versions and patch details below.

AnyCable: Telemetry Subsystem Contains Hardcoded Authentication Token and Transmits CLI Arguments Including Secrets

Also known asGHSA-w72w-9qmj-c9qmGO-2026-6529
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 1, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-63406.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs23th percentile — riskier than 23% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.27%0.53%0.80%0.3%0.3%Oct 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/anycable/anycable

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The telemetry subsystem embeds a hardcoded auth token ("secret") in the public source and transmits raw CLI arguments—including --secret, --jwt_secret, and --http_rpc_secret values—to a third-party telemetry endpoint.

Details

In telemetry/config.go line 12, var authToken = "secret" is committed in the public repository and used to authenticate to https://telemetry.anycable.io. In telemetry/telemetry.go, clusterFingerprint() (line 320) calls both anycableFileConfig(c.ConfigFilePath) (line 333), which reads the full TOML config file contents, and anycableCLIArgs() (line 402), which reads os.Args[1:] verbatim—including any --secret=..., --jwt_secret=..., --http_rpc_secret=... arguments. Both raw values are passed to generateDigest() (line 373), meaning the actual secret strings flow through the code path and are included in telemetry data sent to the third-party server. Since the hardcoded authToken = "secret" is public, any attacker who can perform DNS hijacking or is positioned on the network path can intercept and read the telemetry payload containing operator credentials.

PoC

  1. Read telemetry/config.go in the public repo to find authToken = "secret".
  2. Set up a DNS spoof for telemetry.anycable.io pointing to an attacker-controlled server.
  3. Start anycable-go with --secret=my-production-secret.
  4. The server sends a POST to the attacker's endpoint with the telemetry JSON payload. The clusterFingerprint field contains data derived from raw os.Args including --secret=my-production-secret.

Impact

In MITM/DNS-hijack scenarios, production secrets (JWT secrets, broadcast keys, RPC auth) are exposed to third parties. The hardcoded authToken = "secret" provides no protection since it is known to anyone reading the open-source code.

Fix

  1. Remove the hardcoded authToken from source; generate or require operator configuration at build time or deployment time. 2. Remove anycableCLIArgs() from the fingerprint computation, or sanitize it to exclude values of secret-bearing flags before hashing. 3. Add a documented opt-out mechanism for telemetry.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/anycable/anycableall versions1.6.15go get github.com/anycable/anycable@v1.6.15

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/anycable/anycable, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/anycable/anycable to 1.6.15 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-63406 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Escape or sanitise the affected output on the server side rather than relying on client-side filtering, and add a Content-Security-Policy that blocks inline script execution so injected markup cannot run even if it reaches the page.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The telemetry subsystem embeds a hardcoded auth token (`"secret"`) in the public source and transmits raw CLI arguments—including `--secret`, `--jwt_secret`, and `--http_rpc_secret` values—to a third-party telemetry endpoint. ### Details In `telemetry/config.go` line 12, `var authToken = "secret"` is committed in the public repository and used to authenticate to `https://telemetry.anycable.io`. In `telemetry/telemetry.go`, `clusterFingerprint()` (line 320) calls both `anycableFileConfig(c.ConfigFilePath)` (line 333), which reads the full TOML config file contents, and `anycableCLI
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-63406 in your dependencies?

Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-63406: anycable — Fixed in 1.6.15