CVE-2026-61798
HIGHCVE-2026-61798 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.1) vulnerability in io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-61798 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: BoringSSL HPKE private key bytes exposed through toString() and exception messages
Real-World Exposure
io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringsslReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl exposes raw HPKE private key bytes in string representations and error messages. BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.toString() includes the private-key parameter object, and BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.toString() renders the full byte array with Arrays.toString(bytes). Separately, failed native key initialization includes Arrays.toString(privateKeyBytes) in the thrown IllegalArgumentException message. Applications that log key-pair objects or exceptions can persist private key material in logs.
Details
codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.java renders private key material through toString():
BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.toString()at lines 72-78 concatenates"privateKey=" + privateKey.privateKeyis aBoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParametercreated withisPrivate=trueat lines 26-36.
codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.java then renders all bytes:
BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.toString()at lines 70-76 returns"bytes=" + Arrays.toString(bytes)regardless of whetherisPrivateis true.
A separate error path in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSL.java also exposes caller-provided private key bytes:
EVP_HPKE_KEY_init_or_throw(...)at lines 228-232 throwsIllegalArgumentException("privateKeyBytes does not contain a valid private key: " + Arrays.toString(privateKeyBytes))when BoringSSL rejects the key.
Because Java logging frameworks commonly call toString() for structured objects and commonly persist exception messages, these paths can place complete HPKE private key material in logs or telemetry.
Proof of concept
Safe local verification was performed without native BoringSSL by compiling the relevant Java classes and a no-op native stub for the unused finalizer reference. The observed output includes the full private key byte array:
BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair{privateKey=BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter{bytes=[1, 2, 3, 4], isPrivate=true}, publicKey=BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter{bytes=[5, 6, 7, 8], isPrivate=false}}
Minimal reproducer concept in the same package:
package io.netty.incubator.codec.hpke.boringssl;
public final class VerifyPrivateKeyToString {
public static void main(String[] args) {
byte[] privateKey = new byte[] {1, 2, 3, 4};
byte[] publicKey = new byte[] {5, 6, 7, 8};
BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair pair = new BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair(privateKey, publicKey);
System.out.println(pair.toString());
}
}
The code path is deterministic: the production toString() methods concatenate the raw private-key byte array.
Impact
If an affected key pair or initialization exception is logged, application logs contain complete HPKE private key material. Anyone with access to those logs can recover the key. Depending on key reuse and log retention, this can compromise:
- confidentiality of OHTTP messages encrypted to the exposed key;
- integrity/authenticity expectations for future messages if the key remains active;
- incident response and key rotation assumptions, because logs may retain key material long after the in-memory key is rotated.
Suggested remediation
- Redact private key material in
BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.toString()whenisPrivateis true, for examplebytes=<redacted>or only key type/length. - Redact
privateKeyinBoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.toString(). - Remove
Arrays.toString(privateKeyBytes)fromBoringSSL.EVP_HPKE_KEY_init_or_throw(...); report only length and KEM metadata. - Add regression tests asserting that
toString()and exception messages do not contain private key byte values. - Consider making key pair classes avoid implementing detailed
toString()for sensitive material entirely.
References
codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.java:72-78codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.java:70-76codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSL.java:228-232
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl | all versions | 0.0.23.Final |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl to 0.0.23.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-61798 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-61798 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to CVE-2026-61798. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-61798 in your dependencies?
O3 detects CVE-2026-61798 across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.