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CVE-2026-63337 — amqp-client

Fix: rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client@0032f75

CVE-2026-63337 is a CWE-470 vulnerability in com.rabbitmq:amqp-client. A fix is available for com.rabbitmq:amqp-client — see the affected versions and patch details below.

RabbitMQ Java client: Unvalidated Class.forName in JSON-RPC ProcedureDescription enables arbitrary class loading

Also known asGHSA-6g32-pxv4-2wfj
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 3, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-63337.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs44th percentile — riskier than 44% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.35%0.70%1.06%0.3%0.6%0.6%Sep 26Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
☕com.rabbitmq:amqp-client

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

The JSON-RPC tools in com.rabbitmq.tools.jsonrpc perform Class.forName(javaReturnType) with initialize=true on class names received from untrusted AMQP messages, without any validation or allowlist.

Vulnerable code (ProcedureDescription.java:101-127): When a JsonRpcClient connects, it calls system.describe and receives a service description from the AMQP queue. The response JSON includes javaReturnType fields that are reflectively set via JSONUtil.tryFill(), triggering setJavaReturnType() → computeReturnTypeAsJavaClass() → Class.forName(javaReturnType).

Attack scenario:

  1. Victim uses JsonRpcClient to connect to a JSON-RPC service via RabbitMQ
  2. Attacker (co-tenant on shared broker, or MITM) intercepts the system.describe request
  3. Attacker responds with crafted javaReturnType values
  4. Victim's client calls Class.forName(attackerInput) with default initialize=true
  5. Static initializers of attacker-specified classes execute in victim's JVM

Additionally, the loaded class from getReturnType() is passed to mapper.parse(replyStr, expectedType) at JsonRpcClient.java:168, potentially enabling type-confusion.

Recommended fix: Use Class.forName(javaReturnType, false, classLoader) to prevent static initializer execution, or add an allowlist of permitted return types.

CWE: CWE-470


Reply from reporter (2026-06-29): Thanks for the quick turnaround. Fix looks good. Looking forward to the CVE assignment.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
☕Mavencom.rabbitmq:amqp-clientall versions5.33.0com.rabbitmq:amqp-client:5.33.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for com.rabbitmq:amqp-client, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update com.rabbitmq:amqp-client to 5.33.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-63337 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatImportant

Red Hat has evaluated this vulnerability as Important because an attacker with access to the messaging transport can trigger arbitrary class initialization and execution in the host JVM without requiring privileged access. The risk is elevated in multi-tenant message broker environments where untrusted actors can…

Workaround published by Red Hat
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-63337 (CC BY 4.0)

Frequently Asked Questions

The JSON-RPC tools in `com.rabbitmq.tools.jsonrpc` perform `Class.forName(javaReturnType)` with `initialize=true` on class names received from untrusted AMQP messages, without any validation or allowlist. **Vulnerable code** (`ProcedureDescription.java:101-127`): When a `JsonRpcClient` connects, it calls `system.describe` and receives a service description from the AMQP queue. The response JSON includes `javaReturnType` fields that are reflectively set via `JSONUtil.tryFill()`, triggering `setJavaReturnType()` → `computeReturnTypeAsJavaClass()` → `Class.forName(javaReturnType)`. **Attack sce
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-63337: Fixed in 5.33.0 | O3 Security