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CVE-2026-62252 — homer-app

CRITICALFix: sipcapture/homer@b2e9420

CVE-2026-62252 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.8) Hard-coded Credentials vulnerability in github.com/sipcapture/homer-app. A fix is available for github.com/sipcapture/homer-app — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Homer: Hardcoded Default Admin Password 'sipcapture' With No Forced Change on First Login

Also known asGHSA-6xp5-7rcx-xfgxGO-2026-6671
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 22, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-62252.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.7%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs51th percentile — riskier than 51% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2026-62252 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 394,803 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/sipcapture/homer-app

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

On every fresh Homer deployment using internal authentication, the bootstrap process automatically creates an admin account with the password sipcapture (stored as a legacy SHA-256 hex hash). There is no first-login forced-change mechanism. Any attacker who reaches the login endpoint immediately gains full administrative access.

Details

config/config.go lines 858-861:

// DefaultInternalAuthPasswordHash is the SHA-256 hex digest of the default
// bootstrap password (cleartext: sipcapture).
const DefaultInternalAuthPasswordHash = "883ffc1f37fd0fe542b0fb9740035c4383e7d976c411161d24e62edace280f90"

coordinator/services/auth_bootstrap.go lines 20-71: EnsureBootstrapAdminUser() runs at startup. If no admin user exists, it inserts a row with username=admin, password_hash=DefaultInternalAuthPasswordHash. No force_change, no first_login flag, no expiry is set.

coordinator/services/auth_bootstrap_test.go line 114 confirms the plaintext:

u, err := svc.Authenticate(ctx, "admin", "sipcapture")

passwordhash/password.go lines 36-45: Legacy SHA-256 hex hashes are accepted via legacySHA256HexEqual, so the default credential is functional on any deployment.

PoC

# Authenticate with default credentials — works on any fresh Homer deployment
curl -s -X POST http://<homer-host>/api/v3/auth \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"admin","password":"sipcapture"}'
# Response: {"token":"<admin-jwt>","data":{"userGroup":"admin"}}

# Use the token to access all admin functionality
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <admin-jwt>" http://<homer-host>/api/v3/users

Impact

Use of Hard-coded Credentials (CWE-798). Any attacker who can reach a freshly deployed Homer instance gains immediate full administrative access using the publicly documented default password, with no lockout, rate limiting, or forced password change required.

Fix

Remove the hardcoded DefaultInternalAuthPasswordHash constant. Require operators to provide a hashed admin password in the configuration file. Alternatively, generate a random password on first startup, print it to stdout once, and immediately force a change on first login.

If possible, please apply for a CVE number when posting.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/sipcapture/homer-appall versions0.0.0-20260625091610-b2e942031ff8go get github.com/sipcapture/homer-app@v0.0.0-20260625091610-b2e942031ff8

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/sipcapture/homer-app, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/sipcapture/homer-app to 0.0.0-20260625091610-b2e942031ff8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-62252 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Escape or sanitise the affected output on the server side rather than relying on client-side filtering, and add a Content-Security-Policy that blocks inline script execution so injected markup cannot run even if it reaches the page.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary On every fresh Homer deployment using internal authentication, the bootstrap process automatically creates an `admin` account with the password `sipcapture` (stored as a legacy SHA-256 hex hash). There is no first-login forced-change mechanism. Any attacker who reaches the login endpoint immediately gains full administrative access. ### Details **`config/config.go` lines 858-861:** ```go // DefaultInternalAuthPasswordHash is the SHA-256 hex digest of the default // bootstrap password (cleartext: sipcapture). const DefaultInternalAuthPasswordHash = "883ffc1f37fd0fe542b0fb9740035c43
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-62252: homer-app — Fix Available