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CVE-2026-61599

CVE-2026-61599 is a CWE-470 vulnerability in djust. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-61599 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

djust has an unauthenticated arbitrary module import via the WebSocket/SSE view-mount path

Published
Sep 16, 2026
Updated
Sep 16, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 16, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍djust

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

The djust live transport resolves the LiveView to mount from a client-supplied dotted path by calling __import__(module_path, ...). The module is imported — running its top-level code (import side effects) — before the framework checks that the resolved object is a LiveView subclass and before any per-view authentication. The LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES allowlist that should contain this is fail-open (if allowed_modules: — skipped when the setting is unset, the framework default) and uses loose startswith matching.

An unauthenticated WebSocket client (the WS handshake does not require auth; per-view auth runs only after import + instantiate) can therefore send a mount / live_redirect_mount / url_change frame (or an SSE mount) with view = "<any.importable.module>.AnyName" and cause the server to import — and execute the top-level code of — any importable Python module by name.

Consequences: server-side execution of arbitrary importable modules' import-time side effects by an unauthenticated client (effectively RCE-by-proxy on any host that has a side-effectful importable module), denial of service (import bombs / expensive dependency trees), and a module/class enumeration oracle via distinct error strings.

Reproduced end-to-end: an unauthenticated WebsocketCommunicator mount frame with the allowlist unset imported and executed a sentinel non-LiveView module before the "not a LiveView subclass" rejection.

Affected code

  • python/djust/websocket.py handle_mount (__import__ of the client view)
  • python/djust/runtime.py ViewRuntime.dispatch_mount / _instantiate_view (SSE + url_change path)
  • python/djust/sse.py SSE mount

Threat-model entry T4 (docs/audits/websocket-auth-2026-06.md) previously noted the default-open allowlist but understated the impact as mere LiveView-class probing; the real primitive is arbitrary-module import + top-level code execution, independent of whether the target is a LiveView.

Patches

Fixed by a fail-closed resolution gate (djust._view_resolution.is_view_import_allowed): a client view path resolves only if (a) its module is already loaded (sys.modules — so resolving runs no new code; URL-routed views loaded by URLconf at startup keep working with zero config) or (b) it matches LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES on a module-segment boundary (explicit opt-in for lazily-imported views). The gate runs before __import__ at all three sinks (+ defense-in-depth inside _instantiate_view).

Workarounds

Set LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES to the narrow list of modules that contain your mountable LiveView classes. (Note: pre-patch the allowlist is startswith-matched and the import still precedes the subclass check, so this is mitigation, not a complete fix.)

References

Reproducer + finding writeup retained privately by the maintainer.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIdjustall versions1.0.7

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for djust. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update djust to 1.0.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-61599 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-61599 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to CVE-2026-61599. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact The djust live transport resolves the LiveView to mount from a **client-supplied dotted path** by calling `__import__(module_path, ...)`. The module is imported — running its **top-level code (import side effects)** — *before* the framework checks that the resolved object is a `LiveView` subclass and *before* any per-view authentication. The `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` allowlist that should contain this is **fail-open** (`if allowed_modules:` — skipped when the setting is unset, the framework default) and uses loose `startswith` matching. An **unauthenticated** WebSocket client (the
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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