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CVE-2026-57209 — heimdall

CVE-2026-57209 is a Improper Input Validation vulnerability in github.com/dadrus/heimdall. A fix is available for github.com/dadrus/heimdall — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Heimdall: Forwarded Header Injection via Unsanitized Host Header in Proxy Mode

Also known asGHSA-4jgr-pg2m-m988GO-2026-5125
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 27, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs27th percentile — riskier than 27% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/dadrus/heimdall

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

When Heimdall operates in proxy mode, it constructs the Forwarded HTTP header after executing the matched rule pipeline by inserting the incoming request's Host header value directly into the header string without sanitizing commas or semicolons. This allows an attacker to inject additional parameters into the Forwarded header, potentially spoofing IP addresses for upstream services.

Vulnerable Code

File: proxy/request_context.go (line 201)

entry := "for=" + clientIP + ";host=" + in.Host + ";proto=" + proto

Go's net/http allows commas and semicolons in Host header values. No sanitization is applied before string concatenation.

PoC

# Inject a spoofed IP into the Forwarded header
curl -s -H "Host: evil.com,for=127.0.0.1" \
  "http://TARGET:PORT/protected-resource"

This produces the following Forwarded header sent to the upstream service:

Forwarded: for=1.2.3.4;host=evil.com, for=127.0.0.1;proto=http

Upstream services that parse the Forwarded header according to RFC 7239 will see two entries. If the service trusts the last or any for= value, the attacker successfully spoofs 127.0.0.1 as the client IP.

# More targeted attack: spoof to bypass IP allowlist
curl -s -H "Host: legit.com;for=10.0.0.1;proto=https,for=192.168.1.1" \
  "http://TARGET:PORT/admin-panel"

Impact

  • IP spoofing: Upstream services behind Heimdall may trust the injected for= value, believing the request originates from an internal/trusted IP
  • Access control bypass: Applications that restrict access based on IP address by themselves, without using the corresponding heimdall capabilities (e.g., admin panels, internal APIs), can be bypassed
  • Affects all proxy-mode deployments where upstream services parse the Forwarded header.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/dadrus/heimdallall versions0.17.17go get github.com/dadrus/heimdall@v0.17.17

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/dadrus/heimdall, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/dadrus/heimdall to 0.17.17 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-57209 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary When Heimdall operates in proxy mode, it constructs the `Forwarded` HTTP header after executing the matched rule pipeline by inserting the incoming request's `Host` header value directly into the header string without sanitizing commas or semicolons. This allows an attacker to inject additional parameters into the `Forwarded` header, potentially spoofing IP addresses for upstream services. ### Vulnerable Code **File: `proxy/request_context.go` (line 201)** ```go entry := "for=" + clientIP + ";host=" + in.Host + ";proto=" + proto ``` Go's `net/http` allows commas and semicolons
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-57209: heimdall — Fixed in 0.17.17