CVE-2026-55887 — mcp-gateway
Fix: docker/mcp-gateway@306d2d9CVE-2026-55887 is a CWE-88 vulnerability in github.com/docker/mcp-gateway. A fix is available for github.com/docker/mcp-gateway — see the affected versions and patch details below.
MCP Gateway: Argument injection via OCI image label YAML in Docker MCP Gateway
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-55887.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/docker/mcp-gatewayReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A maliciously crafted OCI image label can inject arbitrary arguments into the docker run command line constructed by the MCP Gateway. An attacker who controls an image that the victim references via docker://, or that the victim's catalog pulls a snapshot from, can mount the host filesystem, run as UID 0, and execute arbitrary code on the host.
Details
The io.docker.server.metadata OCI image label is YAML-unmarshalled directly into the wide catalog.Server struct, which carries runtime-shaping fields (Volumes, User, Command, ExtraHosts, AllowHosts, DisableNetwork, Env, Remote, SSEEndpoint, OAuth,Secrets, LongLived, Policy) alongside descriptive fields. Every runtime field carries a YAML tag, so the unmarshal mass-assigns from the attacker-controlled label content; only Image is overwritten afterwards. The gateway's container-launch code then appends those fields verbatim as docker run flags (-v, -u, --add-host) with no allowlist or origin check, and execs docker with the resulting argv.
Impact
A malicious image author can achieve arbitrary code execution as UID 0 on the host of a victim running an affected version of MCP Gateway. Attacker-injected -v /:/host, -u root, and -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock arguments reach the docker run invocation that launches the MCP server container, giving the attacker full host filesystem access and root execution. The container/host trust boundary is bypassed at container-creation time, so the --security-opt no-new-privileges flag the gateway applies provides no protection: no in-container privilege escalation is needed.
Patches
The OCI image-label parser now only populates descriptive fields from the image label, which excludes fields that control the container runtime.
Credit
This issue was reported by Jabr Al-Otaibi @ DarkCov working with TrendAI Zero Day Initiative
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/docker/mcp-gateway | ≥ 0.21.0&&< 0.42.2 | 0.42.2go get github.com/docker/mcp-gateway@v0.42.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/docker/mcp-gateway, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/docker/mcp-gateway to 0.42.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-55887 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Close the privilege gap rather than the entry point: audit which accounts, roles and service identities can reach the affected operation, drop the component to the least privilege it actually needs, and review file and directory permissions created by earlier installs — a default left in place is what makes this reachable.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-55887 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.