CVE-2026-55792 — cms
Fix: craftcms/cms#18559CVE-2026-55792 is a Information Exposure vulnerability in craftcms/cms. A fix is available for craftcms/cms — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Craft CMS: Sensitive File Disclosure / Server-Side File Read
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-55792.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
craftcms/cms🐘craftcms/cmsReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
The dataUrl() Twig function is included in Craft’s Twig sandbox allowlist, allowing any control panel user granted the utility:system-messages permission to embed a file-reading payload into system email templates. When those emails are sent, the server reads the target file and returns its contents as a base64-encoded data URL embedded in the email body. The .env file, which typically contains the database password, CRAFT_SECURITY_KEY, and third-party API keys, passes all of Craft’s existing dataUrl() protection checks and is fully exfiltrated. Obtaining CRAFT_SECURITY_KEY enables an attacker to forge session tokens and escalate to full admin account takeover.
Details
Affected versions: Craft CMS 4.x, 5.x (confirmed against 5.9.19)
The vulnerability arises from the combination of three code facts:
-
dataUrl is in the Twig sandbox allowlist src/config/twig-sandbox.php, line 115: php'allowedFunctions' => [ ... 'dataUrl', // ← allows file reading inside sandboxed templates ... ],
-
Html::dataUrl() does not block dotfiles src/helpers/Html.php, lines 1065–1090. The function applies four checks before reading a file:
Must be within the project root .env is at the root Must not be in a system directory (config/, vendor/, storage/, templates/) .env is not Must not be a .php file .env has no extension File must exist .env always exists in a Craft install
There is no check for dotfiles or specifically for .env. All four checks pass silently and file_get_contents() is called, with the result returned as data:text/plain;base64,....
- System message body is rendered via renderSandboxedString() src/mail/Mailer.php, lines 181–183: php$subject = $view->renderSandboxedString($systemMessage->subject, $variables); $textBody = $view->renderSandboxedString($systemMessage->body, $variables); $htmlBody = $view->renderSandboxedString($systemMessage->body, $variables, escapeHtml: true);
Any body content saved to a system message is executed inside the Twig sandbox when the email renders. Because dataUrl is in allowedFunctions, the sandbox policy permits its execution without restriction.
Access control: The utility:system-messages permission is a non-admin CP permission grantable to any user group via Settings > Users > Groups. It is not restricted to admins.
Impact
Vulnerability type: Sensitive File Disclosure / Server-Side File Read Who is impacted: Any Craft CMS 4.x or 5.x installation where at least one non-admin control panel user has been granted the utility:system-messages permission, and email sending is configured.
Resources:
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | craftcms/cms | ≥ 4.0.0-RC1&&< 4.18.0 | 4.18.0composer require craftcms/cms:^4.18.0 |
| 🐘Packagist | craftcms/cms | ≥ 5.0.0-RC1&&< 5.10.0 | 5.10.0composer require craftcms/cms:^5.10.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for craftcms/cms, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update craftcms/cms to 4.18.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-55792 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-55792 in your dependencies?
Find it across Packagist, including transitive dependencies.