GHSA-wg23-69c2-gjc8
GHSA-wg23-69c2-gjc8 is a remote code execution vulnerability in craftcms/cms. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-wg23-69c2-gjc8 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Craft CMS: Passkey login accepts replayed WebAuthn assertions
Blast Radius
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Description
Craft CMS passkey login accepts WebAuthn requestOptions from the unauthenticated login request body and does not persist the updated credential counter returned by the WebAuthn assertion validator. A captured passkey login request body can therefore be replayed because the old challenge is accepted again, and the stored credential counter remains stale.
Craft CMS 5.10.3 and current 5.x HEAD accept PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions from the unauthenticated users/login-with-passkey request body and do not persist the updated PublicKeyCredentialSource returned/mutated by web-auth/webauthn-lib after assertion validation.
As a result, a captured passkey login request body is not one-time-use. Reposting the same requestOptions and response can result in validation against the same stale credential counter and create another Craft session for that user. This weakens passkeys from a fresh, server-challenged authentication ceremony into a replayable bearer artifact if one successful assertion body is exposed.
Attack Scenario
- A victim successfully logs in with a passkey.
- The
POST /actions/users/login-with-passkeybody containingrequestOptionsandresponseis captured from an application/request log, debugging proxy, browser extension, compromised analytics layer, or another request-body disclosure point. - The attacker reposts the same body to
users/login-with-passkey. - Craft deserializes the attacker-supplied
requestOptions, so the old challenge remains accepted for validation. - The WebAuthn validator compares the assertion's
signCountagainst the stale stored credential counter. - Because Craft did not persist the updated credential source on the original login, the same stale stored counter is used again.
- The same captured assertion validates and Craft creates another authenticated session for the victim account.
This is exactly what WebAuthn's challenge and signature-counter lifecycle is meant to prevent: a successful assertion should be bound to a server-issued challenge and should update server-side credential state so it cannot be used again.
Impact
An attacker who obtains one successful passkey login request body can replay it to create additional authenticated Craft sessions for that user. This defeats WebAuthn’s intended one-time challenge and signature-counter replay protection, reducing a passkey assertion to a reusable bearer artifact if exposed through request logging, a debugging proxy, a compromised same-origin script layer, or another request-body disclosure path.
The impact is an account/session takeover of the affected passkey account after a single assertion body is captured. The issue is in Craft’s native passkey login flow and affects fresh Craft installations with passkeys enabled.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | craftcms/cms | ≥ 5.0.0-RC1&&< 5.10.5 | 5.10.5 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for craftcms/cms. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update craftcms/cms to 5.10.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wg23-69c2-gjc8 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-wg23-69c2-gjc8 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-wg23-69c2-gjc8. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-wg23-69c2-gjc8 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-wg23-69c2-gjc8 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.