GHSA-wg23-69c2-gjc8 — craftcms/cms
Fix: craftcms/cms@d71a66dGHSA-wg23-69c2-gjc8 is a CWE-294 vulnerability in craftcms/cms. A fix is available for craftcms/cms — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Craft CMS: Passkey login accepts replayed WebAuthn assertions
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-wg23-69c2-gjc8.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
craftcms/cmsReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Craft CMS passkey login accepts WebAuthn requestOptions from the unauthenticated login request body and does not persist the updated credential counter returned by the WebAuthn assertion validator. A captured passkey login request body can therefore be replayed because the old challenge is accepted again, and the stored credential counter remains stale.
Craft CMS 5.10.3 and current 5.x HEAD accept PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions from the unauthenticated users/login-with-passkey request body and do not persist the updated PublicKeyCredentialSource returned/mutated by web-auth/webauthn-lib after assertion validation.
As a result, a captured passkey login request body is not one-time-use. Reposting the same requestOptions and response can result in validation against the same stale credential counter and create another Craft session for that user. This weakens passkeys from a fresh, server-challenged authentication ceremony into a replayable bearer artifact if one successful assertion body is exposed.
Attack Scenario
- A victim successfully logs in with a passkey.
- The
POST /actions/users/login-with-passkeybody containingrequestOptionsandresponseis captured from an application/request log, debugging proxy, browser extension, compromised analytics layer, or another request-body disclosure point. - The attacker reposts the same body to
users/login-with-passkey. - Craft deserializes the attacker-supplied
requestOptions, so the old challenge remains accepted for validation. - The WebAuthn validator compares the assertion's
signCountagainst the stale stored credential counter. - Because Craft did not persist the updated credential source on the original login, the same stale stored counter is used again.
- The same captured assertion validates and Craft creates another authenticated session for the victim account.
This is exactly what WebAuthn's challenge and signature-counter lifecycle is meant to prevent: a successful assertion should be bound to a server-issued challenge and should update server-side credential state so it cannot be used again.
Impact
An attacker who obtains one successful passkey login request body can replay it to create additional authenticated Craft sessions for that user. This defeats WebAuthn’s intended one-time challenge and signature-counter replay protection, reducing a passkey assertion to a reusable bearer artifact if exposed through request logging, a debugging proxy, a compromised same-origin script layer, or another request-body disclosure path.
The impact is an account/session takeover of the affected passkey account after a single assertion body is captured. The issue is in Craft’s native passkey login flow and affects fresh Craft installations with passkeys enabled.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | craftcms/cms | ≥ 5.0.0-RC1&&< 5.10.5 | 5.10.5composer require craftcms/cms:^5.10.5 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for craftcms/cms, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update craftcms/cms to 5.10.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wg23-69c2-gjc8 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-wg23-69c2-gjc8 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-wg23-69c2-gjc8. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-wg23-69c2-gjc8 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-wg23-69c2-gjc8 across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.