CVE-2026-115578 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-129 vulnerability in github.com/phires/go-guerrilla. A fix is available for github.com/phires/go-guerrilla — see the affected versions and patch details below.
go-guerrilla crashes on a bare XCLIENT command (7-byte slice off-by-one panic)
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
github.com/phires/go-guerrilla🐹github.com/phires/go-guerrillaReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
The defect
Confirmed at HEAD. server.go: cmdXCLIENT = []byte("XCLIENT") is 7 bytes (line 78), so the dispatch match cmdXCLIENT.match(cmd) only guarantees len(input) >= 7. The handler then slices input[8:] (line 586):
case sc.XClientOn && cmdXCLIENT.match(cmd):
if toks := bytes.Split(input[8:], []byte{' '}); len(toks) > 0 { // line 586
A client sending the bare command XCLIENT (exactly 7 bytes) hits input[8:7] and panics runtime error: slice bounds out of range [8:7]. handleClient runs in the per-connection goroutine (server.go:391) which has no recover(); the only recover() calls are in the backend mail-processing workers (a different goroutine never reached during command parsing), so the unrecovered panic crashes the whole SMTP daemon.
Input and attacker
Connect to the SMTP port, then send XCLIENT\r\n (a bare LF also works; no HELO needed). Precondition: xclient_on: true (off by default, but a documented nginx-fronted deployment; go-guerrilla does not restrict who may send XCLIENT). Attacker model: any unauthenticated client on the SMTP port.
Verification level
EXECUTED with a negative control (agent-run, driving the real server.handleClient with XClientOn=true over the suite's mock net.Conn). The bare XCLIENT panics with the exact OOB; the negative control XCLIENT with a trailing space (8 bytes) does not panic and returns 250. The upstream TestXClient tests XCLIENT ADDR=... and XCLIENT c but never the bare 7-byte form (the missing regression case). I independently re-confirmed at HEAD that cmdXCLIENT is 7 bytes (server.go:78), that the handler slices input[8:] (server.go:586), and that handleClient (server.go:391) has no recover. NOT verified: did not stand up a standalone daemon on a real socket to observe OS-level process exit (used the mock net.Conn plus the traced absence of recover; crash-to-exit is standard Go runtime behavior).
Suggested fix
Guard the slice against the exact-verb-length case: require len(input) > len(cmdXCLIENT)+1 (or slice at the verb length and trim) before input[8:]. A recover in the per-connection handleClient loop would also contain any residual command-parse panic to the single connection.
Also checked and SOUND
The rfc5321 recursive-descent parser (MAIL/RCPT/HELO/EHLO/address) is bounds-safe (next()/peek() return 0 at EOF), and the line/size/recipient caps are enforced. XCLIENT is the only off-by-one; every other command arm slices exactly at its verb length.
Advisory-source note
Five-source enumeration (repo advisories, OSV, NVD, the global GitHub DB, no vendor CNA) shows the PROXY-header IP-spoof bug (CVE-2025-31135, fixed v1.6.7) is the only published advisory; this XCLIENT panic is undisclosed and not contested.
Dedup
Dedup gate clean: no phires/go-guerrilla blocking verdict in COVERED-INDEX, DISCLOSURE-INDEX or SCOUT-EXCLUDE.
Tooling
AI assistance was used while investigating. The panic is executed-verified with a negative control (a bare XCLIENT crashes the real handleClient while XCLIENT with a trailing space returns 250), and the reporter confirmed at HEAD that cmdXCLIENT is 7 bytes while the handler slices input[8:] on a per-connection goroutine with no recover.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/phires/go-guerrilla | all versions | No fix |
| 🐹Go | github.com/phires/go-guerrilla | all versions | 1.6.7-1go get github.com/phires/go-guerrilla@v1.6.7-1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/phires/go-guerrilla, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
A fix is available for CVE-2026-115578; check the affected-versions list above or the advisory for the patched release of github.com/phires/go-guerrilla, then make sure no transitive dependency still pins the vulnerable range.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-115578 in your dependencies?
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