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HIGH severity

CVE-2026-54511

HIGHFix: dahlia/logtape@7a6e5b9

CVE-2026-54511 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.6) CWE-93 vulnerability in @logtape/syslog. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-54511 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

@logtape/syslog: syslog log injection via unescaped control characters and unvalidated SD-NAME keys

Published
Aug 26, 2026
Updated
Aug 26, 2026
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 26, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

3 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

0other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@logtape/syslognpm
1Kdownloads / week

Description

@logtape/syslog contains two related output-encoding bugs in the structured data formatting code. Both only affect deployments with includeStructuredData: true, which is non-default.

1. Unescaped C0 control characters in structured data values

escapeStructuredDataValue() in packages/syslog/src/syslog.ts escapes \, ", and ] per RFC 5424 but does not escape newline (\n), carriage return (\r), or any other C0 control characters (U+0000–U+001F):

function escapeStructuredDataValue(value: string): string {
  return value
    .replace(/\\/g, "\\\\")
    .replace(/"/g, '\\"')
    .replace(/]/g, "\\]");
  // \n, \r, and other C0 control characters are not escaped
}

TCP syslog commonly uses \n as a frame delimiter (RFC 6587, non-transparent framing). If an attacker-controlled value contains a literal newline, that newline terminates the current syslog frame. Bytes following the newline begin a new frame, and if they form a valid RFC 5424 header (<PRI>1 …), a downstream collector will accept them as a separate, authentic-looking syslog record.

2. Unvalidated SD-NAME keys

Structured data parameter keys are inserted into the message without validation or escaping:

elements.push(`${key}="${escapedValue}"`);

RFC 5424 defines SD-NAME as printable US-ASCII characters excluding =, ], ", and space, with a maximum length of 32. A key containing any of those characters, control characters, or exceeding the length limit will produce malformed structured data. If the key itself contains an embedded ], it can prematurely close the structured-data element.

In typical usage, property keys are developer-defined string literals and therefore safe. However, if an application forwards attacker-controlled keys as log properties—for example by spreading request headers or arbitrary metadata into a log record—this becomes a second injection path.

Proof of concept

The following Node.js snippet (no dependencies, no network required) demonstrates that the escaped value still contains a literal newline:

function escapeStructuredDataValue(value) {
  return value
    .replace(/\\/g, "\\\\")
    .replace(/"/g, '\\"')
    .replace(/]/g, "\\]");
}

const payload =
  'normal\n<134>1 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z forged evil - - - INJECTED';

const result = escapeStructuredDataValue(payload);
console.log("Newline present after escape:", result.includes("\n")); // true

Tested with Node.js 22.17.1.

Impact

An attacker who controls log property values can:

  • forge syslog records attributed to arbitrary hosts, applications, or process IDs;
  • insert records with arbitrary severity or facility levels;
  • obscure malicious activity by injecting misleading entries around legitimate ones;
  • break downstream log parsers or SIEM correlation rules that rely on log integrity.

Affected downstream collectors include rsyslog, syslog-ng, Splunk, Elastic Stack, and any other system using RFC 6587 non-transparent framing.

Suggested fix

Structured data values

Escape all C0 control characters (U+0000–U+001F) in addition to \, ", and ]. RFC 5424 does not define an escape sequence for control characters in PARAM-VALUE; the most interoperable approach is to strip or replace them:

function escapeStructuredDataValue(value: string): string {
  return value
    .replace(/\\/g, "\\\\")
    .replace(/"/g, '\\"')
    .replace(/]/g, "\\]")
    .replace(/[\x00-\x1f]/g, (c) =>
      `\\x${c.charCodeAt(0).toString(16).padStart(2, "0")}`
    );
}

Alternatively, strip them entirely: .replace(/[\x00-\x1f]/g, ""). The right choice depends on whether downstream consumers need some representation of the original value.

SD-NAME keys

Validate each key against the RFC 5424 SD-NAME grammar before including it. Keys that fail validation should be skipped or sanitized:

// SD-NAME: printable US-ASCII, excluding '=', ']', '"', SP; max 32 chars
const SD_NAME_RE = /^[!-<>-Z\\^-z|~]{1,32}$/;

for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(record.properties)) {
  if (!SD_NAME_RE.test(key)) continue;
  const escapedValue = escapeStructuredDataValue(String(value));
  elements.push(`${key}="${escapedValue}"`);
}

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@logtape/syslog2.1.0&&< 2.1.52.1.5
📦npm@logtape/syslog2.0.0&&< 2.0.142.0.14
📦npm@logtape/syslogall versions1.3.11

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @logtape/syslog. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update @logtape/syslog to 2.1.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-54511 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-54511 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to CVE-2026-54511. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

`@logtape/syslog` contains two related output-encoding bugs in the structured data formatting code. Both only affect deployments with `includeStructuredData: true`, which is non-default. ## 1. Unescaped C0 control characters in structured data values `escapeStructuredDataValue()` in `packages/syslog/src/syslog.ts` escapes `\`, `"`, and `]` per RFC 5424 but does not escape newline (`\n`), carriage return (`\r`), or any other C0 control characters (U+0000–U+001F): ```typescript function escapeStructuredDataValue(value: string): string { return value .replace(/\\/g, "\\\\") .replace(
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-54511 in your dependencies?

O3 detects CVE-2026-54511 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.