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CVE-2026-50168 — @angular/platform-server

Fix: angular/angular#68928

CVE-2026-50168 is a CWE-346 vulnerability in @angular/platform-server. A fix is available for @angular/platform-server — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Angular: URL Parser Differential in @angular/platform-server leading to SSRF Allowlist Bypass

Also known asGHSA-xrxm-cp7j-8xf6
Published
Jun 22, 2026
Updated
Aug 12, 2026
Affected
5 pkgs
Patched
4 / 5
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 26, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-50168.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs13th percentile — riskier than 13% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

5 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

1Kother npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@angular/platform-servernpm
914Kdownloads / week

Description

An issue in the @angular/platform-server package allows remote attackers to bypass host allowlist constraints and direct server-side outgoing requests to arbitrary external endpoints. This occurs due to a parser differential between the strict WHATWG URL parser used for allowlist validation and the lenient Domino URL parser used to initialize the server emulated DOM.

When a server-side request contains a malformed URL with a double port structure (e.g., http://evil.com:80:80/path), Node's strict URL.canParse(url) logic returns false and skips host check validation entirely. However, the same malformed URL is later accepted and parsed leniently by Domino's internal parser, which resolves the origin to http://evil.com:80. The Angular SSR HTTP request interceptor (relativeUrlsTransformerInterceptorFn) then resolves all relative backend HTTP requests against this adopted origin, executing the SSRF attack.

Impact

Any Angular application utilizing server-side rendering (@angular/platform-server) that configures host routing allowlists (allowedHosts) is vulnerable to this allowlist bypass.

By sending an HTTP request with a malformed Host header (e.g. Host: evil.com:80:80) or an absolute-form request URI, an attacker can bypass the allowlist logic completely (even when configured with a strict default deny setup). The SSR application will then route all relative HttpClient outgoing API queries—which commonly carry sensitive credentials, session cookies, and internal authorization tokens—to the attacker-controlled server instead of the intended backend services. Additionally, the attacker can supply custom payloads back to the emulated DOM, leading to response injection and content poisoning within the rendered HTML served to users.

Attack Preconditions

To successfully exploit this vulnerability, the following environment parameters and application states must all concurrently exist:

  1. Active Server-Side Rendering (SSR): The application must be configured to run with Angular Server-Side Rendering (@angular/platform-server).
  2. Host Header/URI Propagation: The SSR handler must reconstruct the request URL using raw client inputs (such as request Host headers or absolute-form URIs) and pass it as config.url to the rendering API (renderApplication or renderModule).
  3. Outbound Relative HTTP Requests: The server application must perform outbound backend API requests using relative paths (e.g., this.http.get('/api/data')) that undergo base-URL interceptor rewriting.
  4. Enabled Allowed Hosts Check: The server must use the framework-provided allowedHosts options to limit valid server locations.

Patches

  • 22.0.0-rc.2
  • 21.2.15
  • 20.3.22
  • 19.2.23

Affected Packages

5 total 4 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@angular/platform-server≥ 22.0.0-next.0&&< 22.0.0-rc.222.0.0-rc.2npm install @angular/platform-server@22.0.0-rc.2
📦npm@angular/platform-server≥ 20.0.0-next.0&&< 20.3.2220.3.22npm install @angular/platform-server@20.3.22
📦npm@angular/platform-server≥ 19.0.0-next.0&&< 19.2.2319.2.23npm install @angular/platform-server@19.2.23
📦npm@angular/platform-serverall versionsNo fix
📦npm@angular/platform-server≥ 21.0.0-next.0&&< 21.2.1521.2.15npm install @angular/platform-server@21.2.15

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @angular/platform-server, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update @angular/platform-server to 22.0.0-rc.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-50168 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-50168 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to CVE-2026-50168. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatImportant

Important: A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) flaw exists in Angular's `@angular/platform-server` package, allowing remote attackers to bypass host allowlist restrictions. This vulnerability, present in applications utilizing server-side rendering with host routing allowlists, enables the redirection of internal API…

Workaround published by Red Hat
If updating is not immediately possible, restrict the outbound network connectivity of the server-side rendering application to only trusted backend services using network egress filtering or firewall rules to prevent connections to arbitrary external endpoints. Additionally, validate and normalize incoming request URLs and `Host` headers before they are passed to `@angular/platform-server`, rejecting malformed values that could bypass host allowlist validation. Where possible, avoid constructing the SSR request URL directly from untrusted client-supplied `Host` headers or absolute-form request URIs.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-50168 (CC BY 4.0)

Frequently Asked Questions

An issue in the `@angular/platform-server` package allows remote attackers to bypass host allowlist constraints and direct server-side outgoing requests to arbitrary external endpoints. This occurs due to a parser differential between the strict WHATWG URL parser used for allowlist validation and the lenient Domino URL parser used to initialize the server emulated DOM. When a server-side request contains a malformed URL with a double port structure (e.g., `http://evil.com:80:80/path`), Node's strict `URL.canParse(url)` logic returns `false` and skips host check validation entirely. However, t
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-50168 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds CVE-2026-50168 across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

CVE-2026-50168: @angular/platform SSRF | O3 Security