CVE-2026-48487 — zeroconf
Fix: python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf@5444495CVE-2026-48487 is a CWE-130 vulnerability in zeroconf. A fix is available for zeroconf — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Zeroconf: Unvalidated rdlength in record payload readers allows LAN-local cache corruption via crafted mDNS packet
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-48487.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
zeroconfReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
_read_character_string and _read_string in src/zeroconf/_protocol/incoming.py sliced self.data[self.offset : self.offset + length] and advanced self.offset by the declared length without checking it against self._data_len. Python's slice silently returns fewer bytes when the end index runs past the buffer, so a record whose 16-bit RDLENGTH (RFC 1035 §3.2.1) over-advertised by tens of kilobytes was constructed from a truncated payload, appended to DNSIncoming._answers, and committed to the cache before any later parse failure surfaced. The follow-up _read_name for the next record then failed, but the corrupt record had already entered the answer list and propagated to DNSCache and ServiceInfo.
Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, 224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb) can multicast a single mDNS response carrying a TXT, HINFO, or A/AAAA record that advertises rdlength=65535 and only a handful of real payload bytes; consumers calling ServiceInfo.properties then parse the truncated bytes as if they matched the wire, and downstream integrations (Home Assistant and other zeroconf-driven discovery) trust the decoded record. The bug is parser-state desync rather than RCE, but it seeds the cache with attacker-shaped key/value and address records for a TTL window and is a building block for higher-impact chains.
The impact is likely lower than the other recently released advisories as there is no additional risk of OOM so the severity was manually set to low to override the score CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N (6.5, Medium) since that doesn't fully consider the mDNS threat model.
Patches
Fixed in zeroconf 0.149.16 (PR #1756). Note that this change originally intended to ship in 0.149.13 but we ran out of space on PyPI: see https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/issues/1769
Upgrade to >= 0.149.16.
Workarounds
There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP client isolation, guest-network separation, or host firewall rules.
Resources
- PR #1756, fix
- Issue #1752, public tracking issue
- RFC 1035 §3.2.1, RFC 1035 §3.3, CWE-130
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | zeroconf | all versions | 0.149.16pip install --upgrade 'zeroconf==0.149.16' |
Affected Products
zeroconfpaulsmDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for zeroconf, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update zeroconf to 0.149.16 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-48487 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
Zeroconf is a pure Python implementation of multicast DNS (mDNS) service discovery. Prior to 0.149.16, the record string/character-string readers advance the parser offset using an attacker-declared RDLENGTH without checking it against the actual buffer length, allowing a malformed TXT, HINFO, or A/AAAA record to…
Upgrade to zeroconf 0.149.16 or later once packaged in the affected Red Hat product. Where upgrading isn't immediately possible, restricting the affected host's exposure to the local network segment (network segmentation or firewalling multicast DNS traffic on UDP/5353) reduces the practical attack surface, since exploitation requires local-link access.Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-48487 (CC BY 4.0)
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-48487 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.