CVE-2026-46612 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) Missing Authentication vulnerability in github.com/fission/fission. A fix is available for github.com/fission/fission — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Fission StorageSvc /v1/archive endpoint exposes unauthenticated CRUD over all function archives
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-46612.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-46612 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 379,145 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/fission/fissionReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The Fission storagesvc component registers archive CRUD handlers (/v1/archive GET / POST / DELETE and /v1/archives list) directly on its HTTP router without performing any authentication or authorization. Any caller able to reach the storagesvc ClusterIP — including any other workload in the same Kubernetes cluster — could enumerate archive IDs, download archives belonging to other tenants, upload arbitrary archive content, and delete archives.
Affected component
pkg/storagesvc/storagesvc.go— handler registration and per-route handler logic at lines 72-95 (list), 167-199 (download/delete), and 263-270 (route wiring).
Impact
A workload elsewhere in the cluster (e.g. a compromised function pod, a noisy-neighbour tenant in a multi-tenant deployment, or any pod whose egress is not constrained by NetworkPolicy) could:
- Enumerate every function deployment archive in the cluster.
- Download the deployment archive of any function in any namespace, exposing the function's source code and any embedded secrets.
- Delete archives, causing the next function specialization or rebuild to fail.
- Upload arbitrary archives that subsequent function specializations would fetch and execute.
In multi-tenant Fission deployments this completely breaks the tenant boundary for function code.
Root cause
pkg/storagesvc/storagesvc.go mounts the handlers without an authentication middleware. Network-layer controls (NetworkPolicy) were the only line of defence before this fix, and the chart shipped no NetworkPolicy for storagesvc by default, so reachability was open.
Fix
Released in v1.23.0:
- PR #3368 (commit
2455fc0c) wraps thestoragesvcarchive routes with the application-layer HMAC verifier frompkg/auth/hmacusing theServiceStoragesvcderived key. Callers (executor, fetcher, builder, CLI) sign their requests using a shared cluster master secret derived per-service via HKDF. Mismatched signatures are rejected with401. - Defence in depth: PR #3365 added a
NetworkPolicyforstoragesvcso only the executor/fetcher/builder pods can reach it network-layer (independent of authentication).
Mitigation (until upgrade)
- Enable the Helm chart's per-service NetworkPolicy (set
networkPolicy.enabled=true). - Restrict
storagesvcegress/ingress to the executor, builder, and fetcher pods only. - Avoid running untrusted workloads in the cluster that hosts Fission.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/fission/fission | all versions | 1.23.0go get github.com/fission/fission@v1.23.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/fission/fission, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/fission/fission to 1.23.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-46612 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-46612 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-46612. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-46612 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-46612 across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.