CVE-2026-44884 — portainer

Summary

A missing authorization vulnerability in the Custom Template file endpoint (GET /api/custom_templates/{id}/file) allows any authenticated user to read the file content of any custom template by enumerating sequential integer IDs, bypassing Resource Control access restrictions. Template files may contain environment-specific values such as connection strings, API tokens, or registry credentials that administrators would not expect standard users to read.

Severity

Medium

CWE-862 — Missing Authorization

Exploitation requires an authenticated user account and at least one custom template to exist. Template files are returned verbatim and may contain embedded credentials.

Affected Versions

The vulnerability exists in every Portainer release since custom templates were introduced — the customTemplateFile handler has never performed an authorization check.

Fixes are included in the following releases:

Portainer 2.40.0 and later are not affected — the fix was already on develop when the 2.40.x STS line branched. Portainer LTS branches receive fixes for 6 months plus a 3-month overlap after the next LTS ships. All releases prior to 2.33.0 are end-of-life and will not receive a fix; users on EOL versions should upgrade to a supported release.

Workarounds

There is no runtime configuration that blocks the vulnerable endpoint directly. Administrators who cannot immediately upgrade can reduce exposure by:

• Avoiding storing secrets in custom templates until the patched release is deployed. Move sensitive configuration values to Portainer environment variables or an external secret store.
• Reviewing existing custom templates for embedded secrets. Assume any secret previously stored in a custom template on an unpatched instance has been exposed to every authenticated user and rotate accordingly.

Neither replaces the fix.

Affected Code

The customTemplateFile handler in api/http/handler/customtemplates/customtemplate_file.go (lines 30-53) retrieves a custom template by its numeric ID and returns the file content without performing any authorization check.

All other custom template endpoints properly verify access:

Vulnerable code (customtemplate_file.go:30-53):

func (handler *Handler) customTemplateFile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) *httperror.HandlerError {
    customTemplateID, _ := request.RetrieveNumericRouteVariableValue(r, "id")
    customTemplate, _ := handler.DataStore.CustomTemplate().Read(portainer.CustomTemplateID(customTemplateID))
    // NO AUTHORIZATION CHECK
    fileContent, _ := handler.FileService.GetFileContent(customTemplate.ProjectPath, entryPath)
    return response.JSON(w, &fileResponse{FileContent: string(fileContent)})
}

Secure reference (customtemplate_inspect.go:50-75):

canEdit := userCanEditTemplate(customTemplate, securityContext)
hasAccess := authorization.UserCanAccessResource(securityContext.UserID, teamIDs, resourceControl)
if !canEdit && !hasAccess {
    return httperror.Forbidden("Access denied to resource", httperrors.ErrResourceAccessDenied)
}

Impact

Any authenticated user (including the lowest-privilege standard user) can read the file content of every custom template in the instance. Custom templates commonly contain Docker Compose configuration, which may include environment-specific secrets such as database connection strings, API tokens, or registry credentials.

Timeline

• 2026-02-11: Reported via GitHub Security Advisory by duddnr0615k.
• 2026-03-04: Fix merged to develop and cherry-picked to release/2.39.
• 2026-03-19: 2.39.1 released with fix.
• 2026-03-25: 2.40.0 released with fix already present from branch cut.
• 2026-05-07: 2.33.8 released.

Credit

• duddnr0615k — identified and reported the missing authorization check on the custom template file endpoint.