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CVE-2026-44694 — n8n-mcp

Fix: czlonkowski/n8n-mcp@bcaba83

CVE-2026-44694 is a CWE-367 vulnerability in n8n-mcp. A fix is available for n8n-mcp — see the affected versions and patch details below.

n8n-MCP: Authenticated SSRF in n8n-mcp webhook and API client paths

Also known asGHSA-cmrh-wvq6-wm9r
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 7, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-44694.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs15th percentile — riskier than 15% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.27%0.54%0.81%0.0%0.2%Jun 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

0other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
n8n-mcpnpm
50Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

Authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery affecting the webhook trigger tools, the n8n API client (N8N_API_URL), and per-request URLs supplied via the x-n8n-url header in multi-tenant HTTP mode.

Impact

A caller with access to the MCP session can drive HTTP requests from the n8n-mcp host to internal services and cloud metadata endpoints that the SSRF gate is meant to block. The response body is returned to the caller, making internal-service enumeration and credential theft immediate without any out-of-band channel.

  • Multi-tenant HTTP deployments where tenants share an AUTH_TOKEN: any tenant with valid credentials can reach the operator's cloud metadata service and exfiltrate temporary IAM / GCP service account / Azure managed-identity credentials.
  • Single-tenant deployments: indirect prompt injection through tool arguments reaches the same surface; an attacker who can influence the LLM's tool calls can read internal services from the n8n-mcp host.
  • Stdio deployments are reachable via the same prompt-injection path.

Patched Versions

Fixed in [email protected].

Note for operators: The same SSRF gate that previously covered webhook URLs now also covers the n8n API client base URL. If N8N_API_URL points at http://localhost:5678 (n8n on the same host) or an RFC1918 address (n8n on the same private network), set WEBHOOK_SECURITY_MODE=moderate (allows localhost, still blocks RFC1918 and cloud metadata) or WEBHOOK_SECURITY_MODE=permissive (allows RFC1918 too — only safe on a trusted private network). Default strict is correct for deployments where n8n is reachable at a public hostname.

Workarounds

For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately:

  1. Restrict network egress from the n8n-mcp host with a firewall, reverse proxy, or cloud security group. Explicitly deny cloud metadata IPs (169.254.169.254, 169.254.170.2, 100.100.100.200, 192.0.0.192, and the GCP metadata.google.internal resolved IP) and any RFC1918 networks the server does not legitimately need to reach.
  2. Run in stdio mode instead of HTTP if the multi-tenant surface is not needed (no shared AUTH_TOKEN to compromise).
  3. Disable workflow management tools via DISABLED_TOOLS=n8n_trigger_webhook_workflow,n8n_create_workflow,n8n_test_workflow if the deployment does not need them.

Credit

Reported by @fg0x0.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmn8n-mcp≥ 2.18.7&&< 2.50.22.50.2npm install n8n-mcp@2.50.2

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
n8n-mcpn8n-mcp
≥ 2.18.7 && < 2.50.2
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for n8n-mcp, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update n8n-mcp to 2.50.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-44694 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery affecting the webhook trigger tools, the n8n API client (`N8N_API_URL`), and per-request URLs supplied via the `x-n8n-url` header in multi-tenant HTTP mode. ### Impact A caller with access to the MCP session can drive HTTP requests from the n8n-mcp host to internal services and cloud metadata endpoints that the SSRF gate is meant to block. The response body is returned to the caller, making internal-service enumeration and credential theft immediate without any out-of-band channel. - **Multi-tenant HTTP deployments** where tenants share
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-44694: n8n-mcp SSRF — Fixed in 2.50.2