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CVE-2026-44498 — zebrad

CVE-2026-44498 is a CWE-682 vulnerability in zebrad. A fix is available for zebrad — see the affected versions and patch details below.

ZEBRA: Block Validator Undercounts Coinbase and P2SH Sigops

Also known asGHSA-jv4h-j224-23cc
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-44498.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs21th percentile — riskier than 21% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.29%0.59%0.88%0.0%0.3%Jun 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🦀zebrad

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Zebra's block validator undercounts transparent signature operations against the 20000-sigop block limit (MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS), allowing it to accept blocks that zcashd rejects with bad-blk-sigops. A miner who produces such a block can split the network: Zebra nodes follow the offending chain while zcashd nodes do not.

Two distinct undercounts:

A: Coinbase Hidden Legacy Sigops

zcashd's GetLegacySigOpCount() includes the coinbase input's scriptSig. Zebra's Sigops impl skipped the coinbase input entirely, so up to ~98 sigops (the 100-byte coinbase script length cap, less the height prefix) could be hidden inside the coinbase scriptSig without being charged against the block limit.

B: Aggregate P2SH Sigops.

zcashd's GetP2SHSigOpCount() parses each P2SH input's redeem script with accurate=true and sums those sigops into the block-wide total via ConnectBlock. The check is per-block, not per-transaction, and the limit applies regardless of who mines the offending block — a miner just needs to include enough P2SH-spending transactions whose redeem scripts together exceed 20000 sigops. Zebra computed P2SH sigops only on the mempool-acceptance path (used for ZIP-317 weighting) and never accumulated them during block validation. A block whose aggregate redeem-script sigops exceed 20000 (e.g. 1334 P2SH spends × 15 sigops = 20010) would be accepted by Zebra and rejected by zcashd.

Patches

Fixed in this release: https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/releases/tag/v4.4.0.

Workarounds

None. Operators relying on Zebra for consensus should upgrade.

Resources

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iozebradall versions4.4.0cargo update -p zebrad --precise 4.4.0

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
zebradzfnd
< 4.4.0
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for zebrad, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update zebrad to 4.4.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-44498 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

Zebra's block validator undercounts transparent signature operations against the 20000-sigop block limit (`MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS`), allowing it to accept blocks that `zcashd` rejects with `bad-blk-sigops`. A miner who produces such a block can split the network: Zebra nodes follow the offending chain while `zcashd` nodes do not. Two distinct undercounts: #### A: Coinbase Hidden Legacy Sigops `zcashd`'s `GetLegacySigOpCount()` includes the coinbase input's `scriptSig`. Zebra's `Sigops` impl skipped the coinbase input entirely, so up to ~98 sigops (the 100-byte coinbase script length cap, less the
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-44498: zebrad — Fixed in 4.4.0