CVE-2026-42353 — i18next-http-middleware
HIGHCVE-2026-42353 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.2) Path Traversal vulnerability in i18next-http-middleware. A fix is available for i18next-http-middleware — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Path traversal / SSRF in i18next-http-middleware via user-controlled language and namespace parameters
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-42353.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
i18next-http-middlewarenpmDescription
Summary
Versions of i18next-http-middleware prior to 3.9.3 pass the user-controlled lng and ns values from getResourcesHandler directly into i18next.services.backendConnector.load(languages, namespaces, …) without any sanitisation. Depending on which backend is configured, the unvalidated path segments enable one of two attacks:
- Filesystem path traversal when the middleware is paired with
i18next-fs-backend(or any backend that interpolateslng/nsinto a filesystem path). - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) when the middleware is paired with
i18next-http-backend(or any backend that interpolates into an HTTP URL).
Example request:
GET /locales/resources.json?lng=../../etc/passwd&ns=root
with i18next-fs-backend reads the attacker-chosen file from disk; with i18next-http-backend reshapes the outgoing URL to target an internal service.
Impact
- Arbitrary file read via
fs-style backends — any file the Node process can read becomes reachable (source, configuration,.sshkeys,.env, Docker secrets, etc.). - SSRF via
http-style backends — requests to internal IPs / hostnames not normally reachable from the internet; combined with cloud metadata endpoints this can escalate to credential theft. - Unbounded growth of
i18next.options.ns— a now-incidental amplification: the pre-patchgetResourcesHandlerpushed every uniquensvalue into the sharedi18next.options.nssingleton array without validation or bounds, enabling memory exhaustion from repeated unique payloads.
The severity is bounded by the backend in place, but the middleware itself exposed the unsanitised path; this is the "weakest link" layer.
Affected versions
< 3.9.3.
Patch
Fixed in 3.9.3. The patch introduces utils.isSafeIdentifier and applies it in getResourcesHandler before lng and ns reach the backend connector:
languages = languages.filter(utils.isSafeIdentifier)
namespaces = namespaces.filter(utils.isSafeIdentifier)
isSafeIdentifier uses a denylist approach — it still accepts any legitimate i18next language-code shape (i18next FAQ) — rejecting:
..sequences (relative path traversal)- path separators (
/,\) - control characters (C0/C1)
- prototype keys (
__proto__/constructor/prototype) - empty strings and values longer than 128 characters
Unsafe values are dropped; only safe values reach the backend. The fix is a defence-in-depth layer on top of any sanitisation the backend itself may apply.
Workarounds
No workaround short of upgrading. Front-proxying the middleware with a WAF rule that rejects requests containing .., /, \, or URL-structure characters in lng / ns is a partial mitigation. Upgrading the configured backend (i18next-fs-backend ≥ 2.6.4, i18next-http-backend ≥ 3.0.5) also closes the same attack at the next layer.
Related advisories fixed in the same release
- GHSA-5fgg-jcpf-8jjw — prototype pollution via
setPathandmissingKeyHandler. Independently fixable, filed separately per CNA rules. - GHSA-c3h8-g69v-pjrg — HTTP response splitting + XSS-filter bypass (CVE-2026-41683).
Credits
Discovered via an internal security audit of the i18next ecosystem.
Resources
- CWE-22: Path Traversal
- CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) (specific sub-case when paired with an HTTP backend)
- i18next FAQ: language code formatting
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | i18next-http-middleware | all versions | 3.9.3npm install i18next-http-middleware@3.9.3 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for i18next-http-middleware, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update i18next-http-middleware to 3.9.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-42353 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Escape or sanitise the affected output on the server side rather than relying on client-side filtering, and add a Content-Security-Policy that blocks inline script execution so injected markup cannot run even if it reaches the page.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-42353 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.