CVE-2026-41684 — incusd
MEDIUMCVE-2026-41684 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) NULL Pointer Dereference vulnerability in github.com/lxc/incus/v6/cmd/incusd. No vendor fix is recorded yet; mitigation options are listed below.
Incus: Nil Dereferences on Restore via Malformed YAML
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-41684.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-41684 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,156 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/lxc/incus/v6/cmd/incusdReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Details
It was found that backup.GetInfo() trusts the inline backup/index.yaml config when present and only falls back to parsing the legacy backup/container/backup.yaml file if result.Config == nil. As a result, an archive can carry a valid inline config that passes the initial import preflight while also carrying a malformed legacy backup/container/backup.yaml file that is reparsed later from the restored file system.
ParseConfigYamlFile() accepts YAML documents with no container section, and multiple downstream consumers then dereference .Container without checking for nil. Confirmed examples in the instance restore and import flow include backup.UpdateInstanceConfig() and internalImportFromBackup().
An authenticated user with permission to import instance backups may be able to crash the Incus daemon with a crafted backup archive whose inline backup/index.yaml is valid but whose extracted legacy backup.yaml omits container. The crash occurs in the restore path after archive extraction has begun.
The flow is as follows: A crafted backup archive contains a valid backup/index.yaml file together with a malformed backup/container/backup.yaml file that omits the container section. backup.GetInfo() parses backup/index.yaml successfully, so bInfo.Config is populated from the inline config. Because result.Config != nil, GetInfo() does not fall back to backup/container/backup.yaml. instances_post.go then builds the request from bInfo.Config.Container, which succeeds because the inline config is valid. Later, storage unpack extracts backup/container/backup.yaml into the instance volume as <mountPath>/backup.yaml. backend.go then calls backup.UpdateInstanceConfig(..., mountPath), which reparses <mountPath>/backup.yaml through ParseConfigYamlFile(). Because ParseConfigYamlFile() accepts YAML with no container section, backup.Container == nil, and later access to backup.Container.Devices or backup.Container.ExpandedDevices can trigger a nil-pointer dereference.
Affected Files:
- https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/internal/server/backup/backup_info.go#L87
- https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/internal/server/backup/backup_info.go#L115
- https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/internal/server/backup/backup_config_utils.go#L85
- https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/internal/server/backup/backup_config_utils.go#L159
- https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/internal/server/storage/backend.go#L809
- https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/cmd/incusd/api_internal.go#L749
The initial backup-metadata parser prefers inline backup/index.yaml content:
Affected Code:
if hdr.Name == backupIndexPath {
err = yaml.NewDecoder(tr).Decode(&result)
The legacy backup/container/backup.yaml file is only parsed if the inline config is absent:
Affected Code:
if result.Config == nil && hdr.Name == "backup/container/backup.yaml" {
err = yaml.NewDecoder(tr).Decode(&result.Config)
ParseConfigYamlFile() accepts an empty YAML document, or one with no container section, without validation:
Affected Code:
func ParseConfigYamlFile(path string) (*config.Config, error) {
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
...
backupConf := config.Config{}
err = yaml.Unmarshal(data, &backupConf)
UpdateInstanceConfig() conditionally uses backup.Container at first but later dereferences it unconditionally:
Affected Code:
if backup.Container != nil {
backup.Container.Name = b.Name
backup.Container.Project = b.Project
}
if updateRootDevicePool(backup.Container.Devices, pool.Name) {
rootDiskDeviceFound = true
}
if updateRootDevicePool(backup.Container.ExpandedDevices, pool.Name) {
rootDiskDeviceFound = true
}
Another confirmed sink is present in internalImportFromBackup():
Affected Code:
if allowNameOverride {
backupConf.Container.Name = instName
}
if instName != backupConf.Container.Name {
return fmt.Errorf("Instance name requested %q doesn't match instance name in backup config %q", instName, backupConf.Container.Name)
}
This was confirmed as follows:
Command:
go test ./test/fuzz -run='TestExtractedBackupYAMLMissingContainerNilDereference' -count=1 -v
Output:
=== RUN TestExtractedBackupYAMLMissingContainerNilDereference
=== RUN TestExtractedBackupYAMLMissingContainerNilDereference/legacy_backup_empty
extracted_backup_yaml_poc_test.go:70: UpdateInstanceConfig panicked on malformed extracted
backup.yaml (container is nil): runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer
dereference
=== RUN TestExtractedBackupYAMLMissingContainerNilDereference/legacy_backup_pool_only
extracted_backup_yaml_poc_test.go:70: UpdateInstanceConfig panicked on malformed extracted
backup.yaml (container is nil): runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer
dereference
=== RUN TestExtractedBackupYAMLMissingContainerNilDereference/legacy_backup_volume_only
extracted_backup_yaml_poc_test.go:70: UpdateInstanceConfig panicked on malformed extracted
backup.yaml (container is nil): runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer
dereference
--- FAIL: TestExtractedBackupYAMLMissingContainerNilDereference (0.21s)
FAIL
It is recommended to validate the parsed legacy backup.yaml structure before any dereference and to fail with a standard error if Container is missing:
Proposed Fix:
if backup.Container == nil {
return errors.New("No container struct in the backup file found")
}
That validation should be added at minimum in: backup.UpdateInstanceConfig() and internalImportFromBackup() before any backupConf.Container.* access
More broadly, it is recommended to centralize backup-config validation so that both inline backup/index.yaml and extracted legacy backup.yaml files are checked against the same structural requirements before any restore or import consumer uses them.
A patch is available at https://github.com/lxc/incus/releases/tag/v7.0.0.
Credit
This issue was discovered and reported by the team at 7asecurity (https://7asecurity.com/)
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/lxc/incus/v6/cmd/incusd | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/lxc/incus/v6/cmd/incusd, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
No patched version of github.com/lxc/incus/v6/cmd/incusd has shipped for CVE-2026-41684 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-41684 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-41684. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-41684 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-41684 across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.