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CVE-2026-41205 — mako

Fix: sqlalchemy/mako@e05ac61

CVE-2026-41205 is a Path Traversal vulnerability in mako. A fix is available for mako — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Mako: Path traversal via double-slash URI prefix in TemplateLookup

Also known asGHSA-v92g-xgxw-vvmmPYSEC-2026-88
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 4, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-41205.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs30th percentile — riskier than 30% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.34%0.69%1.03%0.1%0.4%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍mako

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

TemplateLookup.get_template() is vulnerable to path traversal when a URI starts with // (e.g., //../../../secret.txt). The root cause is an inconsistency between two slash-stripping implementations:

  • Template.__init__ strips one leading / using if/slice
  • TemplateLookup.get_template() strips all leading / using re.sub(r"^\/+", "")

When a URI like //../../../../etc/passwd is passed:

  1. get_template() strips all / → ../../../../etc/passwd → file found via posixpath.join(dir_, u)
  2. Template.__init__ strips one / → /../../../../etc/passwd → normpath → /etc/passwd
  3. /etc/passwd.startswith(..) → False → check bypassed

Impact

Arbitrary file read: any file readable by the process can be returned as rendered template content when an application passes untrusted input directly to TemplateLookup.get_template().

Note: this is exploitable at the library API level. HTTP-based exploitation is mitigated by Python's BaseHTTPRequestHandler which normalizes double-slash prefixes since CPython gh-87389. Applications using other HTTP servers that do not normalize paths may be affected.

Fix

Changed Template.__init__ to use lstrip("/") instead of stripping only a single leading slash, so both code paths handle leading slashes consistently.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPImakoall versions1.3.11pip install --upgrade 'mako==1.3.11'

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
makosqlalchemy
< 1.3.11
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for mako, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update mako to 1.3.11 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-41205 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate
Workaround published by Red Hat
To mitigate this issue, applications utilizing the Mako template library must validate and sanitize all input before passing it to the `TemplateLookup.get_template()` function. Implementing robust input validation routines within applications will prevent specially crafted URIs from traversing outside intended directories and accessing sensitive files.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-41205 (CC BY 4.0)

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `TemplateLookup.get_template()` is vulnerable to path traversal when a URI starts with `//` (e.g., `//../../../secret.txt`). The root cause is an inconsistency between two slash-stripping implementations: - `Template.__init__` strips **one** leading `/` using `if`/slice - `TemplateLookup.get_template()` strips **all** leading `/` using `re.sub(r"^\/+", "")` When a URI like `//../../../../etc/passwd` is passed: 1. `get_template()` strips all `/` → `../../../../etc/passwd` → file found via `posixpath.join(dir_, u)` 2. `Template.__init__` strips one `/` → `/../../../../etc/passwd`
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-41205: mako Path Traversal — Fixed in 1.3.11