CVE-2026-39859 — liquidjs
Fix: harttle/liquidjs#870CVE-2026-39859 is a Path Traversal vulnerability in liquidjs. A fix is available for liquidjs — see the affected versions and patch details below.
LiquidJS has a renderFile() / parseFile() bypass configured root and allow arbitrary file read
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-39859.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
liquidjsnpmDescription
liquidjs 10.25.0 documents root as constraining filenames passed to renderFile() and parseFile(), but top-level file loads do not enforce that boundary.
The published npm package [email protected] on Linux 6.17.0 with Node v22.22.1. A Liquid instance configured with an empty temporary directory as root still returned the contents of /etc/hosts when renderFile('/etc/hosts') was called. I have not exhaustively checked older releases yet; 10.25.0 is the latest tested version.
Root cause:
src/parser/parser.ts:83-85callsloader.lookup(file, LookupType.Root, ...)and then reads the returned file.src/fs/loader.ts:38passestype !== LookupType.Rootintocandidates().- For
LookupType.Root,enforceRootis false, sosrc/fs/loader.ts:47-66accepts resolved absolute paths and fallback results without anycontains()check.
This appears adjacent to the March 10, 2026 fix for CVE-2026-30952, which hardened include / render / layout but not the top-level file-loading APIs.
Proof of concept:
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const path = require('path');
const { Liquid } = require('liquidjs');
const safeRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'liquidjs-safe-root-'));
const engine = new Liquid({ root: [safeRoot], extname: '.liquid' });
engine.renderFile('/etc/hosts').then(console.log);
Expected result: a path outside root should be rejected.
Actual result: /etc/hosts is rendered successfully.
Impact: any application that treats root as a sandbox boundary and forwards attacker-controlled template names into renderFile() or parseFile() can disclose arbitrary local files readable by the server process.
Suggested fix: apply the same containment checks used for partial/layout lookups to LookupType.Root, and reject absolute or fallback paths unless they remain within an allowed root. A regression test should verify that renderFile('/etc/hosts') fails when root points to an unrelated directory.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | liquidjs | all versions | 10.25.5npm install liquidjs@10.25.5 |
Affected Products
liquidjsliquidjsDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for liquidjs, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update liquidjs to 10.25.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-39859 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-39859 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.