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MEDIUM severity

CVE-2026-39844 — nicegui

MEDIUMFix: zauberzeug/nicegui@d38a702

CVE-2026-39844 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.9) Path Traversal vulnerability in nicegui. A fix is available for nicegui — see the affected versions and patch details below.

NiceGUI has a Path Traversal in NiceGUI Upload Filename on Windows via Backslash Bypass of PurePosixPath Sanitization

Also known asGHSA-w8wv-vfpc-hw2wPYSEC-2026-2234
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 4, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-39844.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs31th percentile — riskier than 31% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.33%0.66%0.99%0.1%0.4%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍nicegui

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The upload filename sanitization introduced in GHSA-9ffm-fxg3-xrhh uses PurePosixPath(filename).name to strip path components. Since PurePosixPath only recognizes forward slashes (/) as path separators, an attacker can bypass this sanitization on Windows by using backslashes (\) in the upload filename.

Applications that construct file paths using file.name (a pattern demonstrated in NiceGUI's bundled examples) are vulnerable to arbitrary file write on Windows.

Details

The sanitization in nicegui/elements/upload_files.py uses:

filename = PurePosixPath(upload.filename or '').name

PurePosixPath treats backslashes as literal characters, not path separators:

>>> PurePosixPath('..\\..\\secret\\evil.txt').name
'..\\..\\secret\\evil.txt'  # Not stripped!

When this filename is used in a path operation on Windows (e.g., Path('uploads') / file.name), Windows Path interprets backslashes as directory separators, resolving the path outside the intended directory.

Impact

On Windows deployments of NiceGUI applications that use file.name in path construction:

  • Arbitrary file write outside the intended upload directory
  • Potential remote code execution through overwriting application files or placing executables in known locations
  • Data integrity loss through overwriting existing files

Linux and macOS are not affected, as they treat backslashes as literal filename characters.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIniceguiall versions3.10.0pip install --upgrade 'nicegui==3.10.0'

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
niceguizauberzeug
< 3.10.0
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for nicegui, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update nicegui to 3.10.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-39844 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The upload filename sanitization introduced in GHSA-9ffm-fxg3-xrhh uses `PurePosixPath(filename).name` to strip path components. Since `PurePosixPath` only recognizes forward slashes (`/`) as path separators, an attacker can bypass this sanitization on Windows by using backslashes (`\`) in the upload filename. Applications that construct file paths using `file.name` (a pattern demonstrated in NiceGUI's bundled examples) are vulnerable to arbitrary file write on Windows. ### Details The sanitization in `nicegui/elements/upload_files.py` uses: ```python filename = PurePosixPath(
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-39844: nicegui RCE — Fixed in 3.10.0