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CVE-2026-31860 — unhead

Fix: unjs/unhead@9ecc4f9

CVE-2026-31860 is a Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in unhead. A fix is available for unhead — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Unhead has a XSS bypass in `useHeadSafe` via attribute name injection and case-sensitive protocol check

Also known asGHSA-g5xx-pwrp-g3fv
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 8, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-31860.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk+0.02%
Lower risk than most CVEs22th percentile — riskier than 22% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.26%0.53%0.79%0.0%0.3%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

96other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
unheadnpm
6.9Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

useHeadSafe() can be bypassed to inject arbitrary HTML attributes, including event handlers, into SSR-rendered <head> tags. This is the composable that Nuxt docs recommend for safely handling user-generated content.

Details

XSS via data-* attribute name injection

The acceptDataAttrs function (safe.ts, line 16-20) allows any property key starting with data- through to the final HTML. It only checks the prefix, not whether the key contains spaces or other characters that break HTML attribute parsing.

function acceptDataAttrs(value: Record<string, string>) {
  return Object.fromEntries(
    Object.entries(value || {}).filter(([key]) => key === 'id' || key.startsWith('data-')),
  )
}

This result gets merged into every tag's props at line 114:

tag.props = { ...acceptDataAttrs(prev), ...next }

Then propsToString (propsToString.ts, line 26) interpolates property keys directly into the HTML string with no sanitization:

attrs += value === true ? ` ${key}` : ` ${key}="${encodeAttribute(value)}"`

A space in the key breaks out of the attribute name. Everything after the space becomes separate HTML attributes.

PoC

The most practical vector uses a link tag. <link rel="stylesheet"> fires onload once the stylesheet loads, giving reliable script execution:

useHeadSafe({
  link: [{
    rel: 'stylesheet',
    href: '/valid-stylesheet.css',
    'data-x onload=alert(document.domain) y': 'z'
  }]
})

SSR output:

<link data-x onload=alert(document.domain) y="z" rel="stylesheet" href="/valid-stylesheet.css">

The browser parses onload=alert(document.domain) as its own attribute. Once the stylesheet loads, the handler fires.

The same injection works on any tag type since acceptDataAttrs is applied to all of them at line 114. Here's the same thing on a meta tag (the injected attributes render, though onclick doesn't fire on non-interactive <meta> elements):

useHeadSafe({
  meta: [{
    name: 'description',
    content: 'legitimate content',
    'data-x onclick=alert(document.domain) y': 'z'
  }]
})

Realistic scenario

A Nuxt app accepts SEO metadata from a CMS or user profile. The developer uses useHeadSafe() as the docs recommend. An attacker puts a data-* key with spaces and an event handler into their input. The payload renders into the HTML on every page load.

Suggested fix

For vulnerability 1, validate that attribute names only contain characters legal in HTML attributes:

const SAFE_ATTR_RE = /^[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9\-]*$/

function acceptDataAttrs(value: Record<string, string>) {
  return Object.fromEntries(
    Object.entries(value || {}).filter(
      ([key]) => (key === 'id' || key.startsWith('data-')) && SAFE_ATTR_RE.test(key)
    ),
  )
}

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmunheadall versions2.1.11npm install unhead@2.1.11

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
unheadunjs
< 2.1.11
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for unhead, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update unhead to 2.1.11 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-31860 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Escape or sanitise the affected output on the server side rather than relying on client-side filtering, and add a Content-Security-Policy that blocks inline script execution so injected markup cannot run even if it reaches the page.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary `useHeadSafe()` can be bypassed to inject arbitrary HTML attributes, including event handlers, into SSR-rendered `<head>` tags. This is the composable that Nuxt docs recommend for safely handling user-generated content. ## Details **XSS via `data-*` attribute name injection** The `acceptDataAttrs` function (safe.ts, line 16-20) allows any property key starting with `data-` through to the final HTML. It only checks the prefix, not whether the key contains spaces or other characters that break HTML attribute parsing. ```typescript function acceptDataAttrs(value: Record<string, st
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-31860 in your dependencies?

Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-31860: unhead XSS — Fixed in 2.1.11